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This thesis is entitled Essays on Behavioral Responses to Taxation and consists of five 
chapters. The first one describes the framework in which the thesis is placed, the three subsequent 
chapters present the major studies and findings, and the last one states the general conclusions. 
 
In the second chapter, I provide empirical evidence on taxpayers’ responsiveness to personal 
income taxation through the estimation of the elasticity of taxable income for Spain. Applying 
the bunching approach and an annual cross-section data that covers all income tax returns for 
2010-2014, I find clear evidence of bunching behavior at the first four tax kinks of the Spanish 
Personal Income Tax created by the progressivity of the tax and intensified by the tax reform of 
2011. Further exploration confirms the existence of considerable heterogeneity in the value of the 
elasticity depending on taxpayers’ characteristics. By analyzing the anatomy of responses, I find 
that much of the behavioral response to kinks in the Spanish tax system is the result of married 
taxpayers using itemized deductions to minimize their tax liabilities. 
 
In the third chapter, I assess the impact of the 2011 tax reform on tax revenue, well-being and 
efficiency. Using the 2SLS method and a panel from the Spanish Personal Income Tax for the 
years 2009-2014, considerable heterogeneity is detected in the values of the elasticity of taxable 
income and of the marginal cost of public funds. Both depending on the socio-economic 
characteristics of taxpayers and the timing of the responses. The marginal welfare cost of raising 
an extra euro of tax revenue is estimated to be substantial in the year immediately after the tax 
reform. In particular, findings suggest that efficiency losses are considerable among Catalan 
taxpayers and self-employed individuals. Also, income shifting between the two tax bases of the 
income tax is found to have an important role in the evaluation of the welfare costs. 
 
In the fourth chapter, I analyze empirically the trade-off between revenue and production 
efficiency in the choice of tax instruments in Argentina. I use an optimal tax model which I extend 
to account for turnover evasion. Moreover, I exploit the introduction of a production inefficient 
tax policy, the Simplified Tax Regime, which affect firms’ behavior on compliance and real 
output. Based on the bunching approach and on administrative tax data covering all Corporate 
xii 
 
Income Tax returns for the years 1997-2011, I find evidence of bunching behavior among medium 
firms in all the period. The results suggest that the introduction of the Simplified Tax Regime 
provides medium enterprises with an additional incentive to reduce turnover (‘legally’ or 









Summary (in Spanish) 
 
 
Esta tesis se titula Ensayos sobre las Respuestas de los Contribuyentes ante Variaciones en 
los Impuestos y consta de cinco capítulos. El primero describe el marco en el que se encuadra la 
tesis, los tres capítulos siguientes presentan los estudios y resultados principales, y el último 
enuncia las conclusiones generales.  
 
En el segundo capítulo, proporciono evidencia empírica sobre las respuestas de los individuos 
al Impuesto sobre la Renta de las Personas Físicas (IRPF) a través de la estimación de la 
elasticidad de la renta gravable para España. En este capítulo utilizo el método del bunching y 
una base de datos anual de corte transversal de las declaraciones del IRPF para el periodo 2010-
2014. Encuentro clara evidencia de bunching en los primeros cuatro kinks del IRPF causados por 
la progresividad del impuesto e intensificados por la reforma tributaria de 2011. Un análisis más 
profundo del bunching confirma la existencia de una gran heterogeneidad en el valor de la 
elasticidad en función de las características socio-económicas de los contribuyentes. Al analizar 
la anatomía de las respuestas, encuentro que gran parte de éstas corresponden a contribuyentes 
casados que utilizan las deducciones a la base imponible para minimizar sus obligaciones 
tributarias. 
 
En el tercer capítulo, evalúo el impacto de la reforma fiscal de 2011 en la recaudación, en los 
costes de eficiencia y en el bienestar. En este capítulo utilizo el método 2SLS y una base de datos 
panel del IRPF español para el periodo 2009-2014. Detecto una heterogeneidad importante en los 
valores de la elasticidad de la renta gravable y del coste marginal de los fondos públicos, según 
las características socio-económicas de los individuos y el tiempo de las respuestas. El coste 
marginal de recaudar un euro adicional en este impuesto es sustancial en el año inmediatamente 
después de la reforma fiscal. En particular, los resultados sugieren que los costes de eficiencia 
son considerables entre los contribuyentes catalanes y los autónomos. A su vez, se observa que el 
trasvase de renta entre las dos bases del IRPF desempeña un papel importante en la evaluación de 
los costes de bienestar.  
xiv 
 
En el cuarto capítulo, analizo empíricamente el equilibrio entre ingresos y eficiencia 
productiva en la elección de instrumentos fiscales en Argentina. En este capítulo utilizo un modelo 
de imposición óptima, el cual extiendo para incorporar la evasión en el volumen de ventas. 
Asimismo, exploro la aplicación de una política fiscal ineficiente de producción, el Régimen 
Simplificado, que afecta el comportamiento de las empresas en cuanto al cumplimiento y la 
producción. Además, hago uso del método bunching y de una base de datos anual de corte 
trasversal del Impuesto de Sociedades para el periodo 1997-2011. Encuentro evidencia de 
bunching entre las empresas de tamaño mediano a lo largo de todo el periodo. Los resultados 
sugieren que la introducción del Régimen Simplificado brinda a las empresas medianas de un 
incentivo adicional para reducir el volumen de sus ventas (‘legamente’ o ‘ilegalmente’) y para 















Taxes are part of one of the two channels (i.e. price intervention and regulation) used by 
governments to intervene in the economy. Governments raise taxes to finance public goods and to 
redistribute income; however, by doing so they affect quantities and market prices and, in 
consequence, they have an effect on distribution and efficiency. The effect on distribution refers to 
the incidence of taxation, while the effect on efficiency refers to the deadweight loss or the surplus 
lost created by a tax modification. At the heart of public finances is the analysis of both; however, 
the efficiency costs of taxation are of particular interest for this thesis.  
 
The efficiency costs of taxation arise because in order to generate €1 of tax revenue, taxpayers’ 
welfare fall by more than €1 because of the distortion created by the tax on taxpayers’ behavior. The 
insight behind this is that taxes create a number of incentives that lead households and firms to 
modify their economic decisions in order to minimize the effect of a tax change, or simply to reduce 
their tax bill paid. So, tax policies induce economic agents to alter their behavior and to respond 
through; for example, evasion, avoidance or real responses. All these behavioral responses affect 
reported income and therefore tax revenue. Then, the magnitude of these responses is crucial in the 
construction of tax policies because it has implications on the design of the tax system and the 
revenue capacity of the tax structure (Feldstein 1995). But, understand the effect of tax rates on tax 
revenue requires a measure that captures all these potential responses to taxation. To address this, 
public finance economists have focused their attention on estimating the elasticity of behavior with 
respect to taxes.  
 
Sanz-Sanz et al. (2015) identify three generations in this literature. The first generation focused 
on the effect of income taxes on the number of hours worked and on the decision to whether 
participate in the labor market. In effect, this generation centered its attention on the elasticity of 
labor supply. It was until Feldstein (1995, 1999) when an alternative methodology erupted in the 
public economic literature and gave birth to the second generation. The main contribution of 
Feldstein was to consider labor supply as only one response among all the potential responses to 
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income taxation. At the margin, as Feldstein stated, all behavioral responses are revealed on reported 
income and can be captured in a single measure: the Elasticity of Taxable Income (ETI). This 
supposed a turning point in the evaluation of fiscal distortions because the ETI became a sufficient 
statistic for calculating the deadweight loss caused by a tax change (Sanz-Sanz 2016). In other words, 
the ETI eliminated the need to combine each behavioral adjustment in a structural model (Creedy 
and Gemmell 2013). This advantage was used in the computation of various welfare measures as the 
marginal excess burden (MEB), the marginal welfare cost (MWC) and the marginal cost of public 
funds (MCF). 
 
In the last decades there has been a growing literature on the ETI for U.S. and for non-U.S. 
countries as Canada (Sillamaa and Veall 2011; Saez and Veall 2005), Norway (Aarbu and Thoresen 
2001), Sweden (Blomquist and Selin 2010; Holmlund and Söderström 2007), Japan (Moriguchi 
2010), Finland (Pirttilä and Selin 2011), Denmark (Kleven and Schultz 2013), New Zealand (Claus 
et al. 2012), Hungary (Bakos et al. 2008; Kiss and Mosberger 2015), Spain (Badenes 2001; 
Sanmartin 2007; Arrazola et al. 2014; Sanz-Sanz et al. 2015; Díaz and Onrubia 2018). The 
development of more robust econometric methods and the increasing availability of administrative 
tax data have been the causes of the emergence of these studies. As expected, this new literature – 
considered the third generation – improved the estimation methods of the ETI and gave rise to a 
number of critiques. One of these critiques is the omission of the income effect in the quantification 
of the ETI. The literature has not yet reached a consensus on the size of this effect. Nevertheless, 
lately some studies (Gruber and Saez 2002; Weber 2014; Sanz-Sanz et al. 2015; Burns and Ziliak 
2017) based on different econometric techniques have concluded that this effect is small and 
insignificant.  
 
Another important critique is the presence of fiscal externalities in the estimation of the elasticity. 
The accuracy of the ETI as a sufficient indicator for welfare analysis has been questioned because it 
takes all behavioral responses as full deadweight losses. However, some responses generate 
externalities that reduce the government leakage, e.g. the fines paid for tax evasion, the charitable 
contributions and the income shifted between tax bases (Chetty 2009). A third critique is the large 
degree of variation on the size of the ETI. As it is not a fixed parameter, the elasticity depends on the 
specific tax structure of each country, the different approaches applied in the estimation of the 
parameter, the type of data used, the reform examined, the period analyzed and the sample used. As 
a result, it is difficult to compare the ETI across countries and to find a consensus value of this 
parameter, Spain is a good illustration of this: 1.54 (Arrazola et al. 2014), 0.67 (Sanz-Sanz et al. 
2015), 1.31-1.54 (Arrazola and Hevia 2017) and 0.41 (Díaz and Onrubia 2018). Modern literature 
has introduced other aspects of taxpayers’ decisions on consumption, investment, savings, maternity, 
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education, labor mobility and emancipation. Yet, few studies (Doerrenberg, et al. 2017; Seim 2017; 
Le Maire and Schjerning 2013; Harju and Matikka 2014; Adam et al. 2015) examine the adjustment 
channels underlying the ETI; consequently, the behavioral responses responsible for the change in 
reported income remain unknown. This constitutes the fourth critique in the literature.  
 
The critiques highlighted here can be seen as challenges or gaps in the literature that need to be 
faced. For this reason, the present thesis aims to answer to the following questions: (i) Do economic 
agents respond to taxation? (ii) Who are the most responsive? (iii) How do they respond, through 
which channels (i.e. the anatomy of the responses)? (iv) When do they respond most, at the short-, 
medium-, or long-run (i.e. the timing of the responses)? On the whole, this thesis pretends to provide 
quantitative measures of the distortions caused by taxes on the behavior of economic agents.  
 
For doing so, this thesis relies on the 2SLS method and the bunching approach to provide 
consistent estimates of the ETI. On one side, the 2SLS regression is the most common method used 
in the literature since Auten and Carroll (1999) and Gruber and Saez (2002). It compares reported 
income in the pre- and post- tax reform periods and deals with the mean reversion problem, the 
heterogeneous income trends and the potential endogeneity of the marginal tax rate. On the other 
side, the bunching approach is the latest method developed in the literature. It was originally 
proposed by Saez (2010) and then, extended by Chetty et al. (2011). It is a visual technique which 
relies on the identification of agglomerations (or bunchings) in the density distribution of taxable 
income. The discrete jumps of marginal tax rates at bracket cutoffs (i.e. kinks) introduce an incentive 
to taxpayers for moving from a point above the cutoff to a point just below it by reducing taxable 
income through legal or illegal channels (Kleven 2016). Therefore, looking for bunching around kink 
points provides evidence of behavioral responses to taxation and more important, according to Saez 
(2010), the ETI can be inferred from the amount of excess bunching. Nowadays, more and more 
studies are applying this approach to different environments as optimization frictions (Bastani and 
Selin 2014), inattention (Chetty 2009), collective agreements (Piketty et al. 2013), notches (Kleven 
and Waseem 2013) and randomized field experiments (Kleven et al. 2011). 
 
The major studies and findings of this thesis are presented in three different chapters. Chapters 2 
and 4 use the novel bunching approach to provide visual evidence and empirical estimations of 
households’ and firms’ responses to taxation. Whereas, Chapter 3 uses the 2SLS method to estimate 
the ETI and assess the impact of behavioral responses on tax revenue, efficiency and welfare. In this 
manner, the present thesis contributes to the literature by providing two key parameters: the elasticity 
of taxable income and the marginal costs of public funds.  
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Chapter 2, titled The Elasticity of Taxable Income: Bunching Evidence from Spain, analyzes the 
behavioral responses of Spanish taxpayers to marginal tax rates. In particular, the study exploits the 
implementation of the Royal Decree-Law 20/2011. This reform provides a natural experiment 
suitable for this kind of study because it increased marginal tax rates leaving income thresholds 
unchanged. Moreover, I use the bunching approach and an annual cross-section data of income tax 
returns from the Spanish Institute for Fiscal Studies over 2010-2014 period. This chapter has four 
main results. First, I find clear and significant bunching at the first four tax kinks of the Spanish PIT 
schedule. Interestingly, the detected bunching is not a spike exactly at the kink, instead it takes 
different forms such as bunching-holes, holes, asymmetric bunching, agglomerations and interior 
bunching. Second, I show evidence that the tax reform of 2011 induced taxpayers to react more to 
taxation, this result is more evident in married couples with no child and in one-parent households. 
Third, I find that the tax filers responsible of the majority of bunching are women (in married couples 
with no child), men (in married couples with one child), wage earners and taxpayers reporting 
individually. Fourth, by analyzing the anatomy of responses, results suggest that most taxpayers 
reduce their taxable income by using itemized deductions, I find that this effect is more pronounced 
in men, in married couples and in wage earners. Thence, the importance of this chapter is threefold. 
First, it identifies the demographic characteristics of the taxpayers responsible of bunching and the 
potential channels through which they modify their taxable income. Second, this chapter relies on a 
new method free of potential mean reversion, heterogeneous income trends and endogeneity bias, 
the issues commonly faced in the estimation of the ETI. Third, Chapter 2 contributes to the literature 
by classifying different forms of bunching for the first time. 
 
Chapter 3, entitled How much does it cost to Spanish taxpayers to raise an additional euro of tax 
revenue? has two goals. On one side, calculate the costs of financing incremental government 
spending associated with the implementation of the aforementioned reform in the Spanish PIT 
schedule. On the other side, show the effect of income shifting on the welfare analysis of income 
taxation. For doing so, I estimate the ETI by 2SLS correcting for mean reversion, heterogeneous 
income trends and endogeneity bias. Based on these estimates, I determine the impact of the reform 
on tax revenue, well-being and efficiency. The data source for this exercise is a panel of tax returns 
from the Spanish Institute for Fiscal Studies over 2009-2014 period. This Chapter has four main 
results. First, the elasticity estimates suggest that women are more responsive to tax changes than 
men. Second, findings show that raising an extra euro of tax revenue entails substantial efficiency 
costs, especially in the year immediate to the reform. On average, for the entire population, the MCF 
is: 3.94 (in 2012), 2.47 (in 2013) and 1.88 (in 2014). In consequence, an important fraction of tax 
revenue is lost because of efficiency costs. The fraction of tax revenue lost through behavioral 
responses at national level is approximately: 73% (in 2012), 58% (in 2013) and 46% (in 2014). Third, 
results indicate that the welfare loss from raising an additional euro of tax revenue is not the same 
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for all Spanish taxpayers. In particular, I find that it is especially high for Catalan taxpayers and for 
self-employed individuals. Fourth, results show that welfare costs are quite sensitive to the 
introduction of income shifting responses. When I assume that half of income shifts from the general 
base to the savings base, the fraction of tax revenue lost due to behavioral responses drops from 73% 
to 52% (in 2012), from 58% to 41% (in 2013) and from 46% to 32% (in 2014). In this sense, the 
contributions of this chapter are threefold. First, illustrate how increases in tax rates are likely to be 
revenue-enhancing for some groups of the population. Second, contribute to the literature by 
analyzing the implications of income shifting on well-being. Third, provide new ETI estimates for 
Spain using different identification specifications to control for mean reversion and endogeneity bias. 
 
A key idea in public economics is that optimal tax policies and tax instruments can ensure 
production efficiency even in second-best environments. This theoretical prediction has been widely 
accepted and put into practice in developed and developing countries. Yet, it has been derived from 
models that ignore tax evasion. Once enforcement constraints are acknowledged, contrary to the 
theoretical prediction, production efficiency is no longer the centerpiece of the model while instead 
revenue efficiency becomes more relevant. Accordingly, Chapter 4 of this thesis, titled Evasion vs. 
Real production responses to Taxation among firms: Bunching Evidence from Argentina, analyzes 
empirically the trade-off between revenue and production efficiency in the choice of tax instruments 
in Argentina. In order to do this, I exploit a production inefficient tax policy called the Simplified 
Tax Regime, according to which firms are taxed either on their profits or turnover depending on 
which tax liability is larger. Moreover, I extend the model of Best et al. (2014) by introducing 
turnover evasion, in order to account for the Argentinean context. I use administrative data from the 
Federal Administration of Public Revenue (AFIP, in Spanish) covering the tax returns of all firms 
subject to corporate income tax between 1997 and 2011. Furthermore, I relied on the bunching 
approach to analyze this policy based on the idea that the simplified regime gives rise to non-standard 
kink points, due to the joint and discontinuous change of the tax rate and the tax base at a cutoff. As 
a result, such kinks influence the behavior of firms in terms of compliance and real production 
differently, and give rise to an excess mass around the kink. This Chapter has three main findings. 
First, the introduction of the policy provides small and medium enterprises (SMEs) with an additional 
incentive to reduce their turnover (‘legally’ or ‘illegally’) and to comply with costs. Second, I find 
that in Argentina this phenomenon is mostly the result of evasion responses. Third, in line with 
existing research (Devereux et al. 2012; Dekker et al. 2016), bunching is asymmetric around a profit 
rate of 0.09. This provides strong evidence that firms respond to the taxation component of the policy. 
Therefore, the contributions of this chapter to the literature are threefold. First, provide direct 
empirical evidence on firms’ margin responses to a widespread and questionable policy in Latin 
America with scarce quantitative evidence. Second, contribute to the CIT’s literature since the 
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majority of studies focus on the effect of marginal tax rates in the context of the PIT. Third, enrich 
the understanding of the taxation of SMEs and domestic revenue mobilization in developing 
countries.  
 
Following from this Introduction, in Chapters 2 to 4 the quoted studies are presented. The thesis 
ends with some general conclusions in Chapter 5. 





[1] AARBU, K. O., and THORESEN, T.O. (2001). Income Responses to Tax Changes – Evidence 
from Norwegian Tax Reform, National Tax Journal, 54 (2): 319–338. 
[2] ADAM, S., BROWNE, J., PHILLIPS, D. & ROANTREE, B. (2015). Adjustment costs and 
labor supply: evidence from bunching at tax thresholds in the UK. Working Paper, Fiscal 
Studies. 
[3] ARRAZOLA-VACAS, M. and HEVIA, J. (2017). La elasticidad de la renta declarada: 
concepto, relevancia y resultados para España, Papeles de Economía Española, nº154, 144-
159. 
[4] ARRAZOLA, M., HEVIA, J. SANZ-SANZ, J.F. and ROMERO, D. (2014). Personal Income 
Tax and the elasticity of Reported Income to Marginal Tax Rates: An Empirical Analysis 
Applied to Spain, Working Papers 12/2014, Victoria University of Wellington. 
[5] AUTEN, G., and CARROLL, R. (1999). The Effect of Income Taxes on Household Income, 
Review of Economics and Statistics, 81: 681–693. 
[6] BADENES, N. (2001). IRPF, Eficiencia y Equidad: Tres Ejercicios de Microsimulación, 
Colección Investigaciones 1/01. Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Fiscales. 
[7] BAKOS P, BENCZÚR P and BENEDEK D (2008). The elasticity of taxable income: 
Estimates and flat tax predictions using the Hungarian tax changes in 2005. National Bank of 
Hungary Working Paper 2008/7. 
[8] BASTANI, S. and SELIN, H. (2014). Bunching and non-bunching at kink points of the 
Swedish tax schedule, Journal of Public Economics, 109 (C), 36-49. 
[9] BEST, H., SPINNEWIJN, J., KLEVEN, H. and WASEEM, M. (2014). Production vs Revenue 
Efficiency with Limited Tax Capacity: Theory and Evidence From Pakistan, Journal of 
Political Economy, 123 (6), 1311-1355.  
[10] BLOMQUIST S. and H. SELIN (2010). Hourly Wage Rate and Taxable Labor Income 
Responsiveness to Changes in Marginal Tax Rates, Journal of Public Economics, 94; 
878−889. 
[11] BURNS, S.K. and ZILIAK, J.P. (2017). Identifying the Elasticity of Taxable Income, The 
Economic Journal 127, 297-329, DOI: 10.1111/ecoj.12299. 
[12] CHETTY, R. (2009). Is the taxable income elasticity sufficient to calculate deadweight loss? 
The implications of evasion and avoidance, American Economic Journal: Economy Policy 
1(2), 31-52. 
[13] CHETTY, R., FRIEDMAN, J., OLSEN, T. and PISTAFERRI, L. (2011). Adjustment Costs, 
Firm Responses, and Micro vs. Macro Labor Supply Elasticities: Evidence from Danish Tax 
Record, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 126, 749-804. 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
8 
 
[14] CLAUS, I., CREEDY, J. and TENG, J. (2012). The Elasticity of Taxable Income in New 
Zealand, Fiscal Studies, 33(3): 287–303 
[15] CREEDY, J. and GEMMELL, N. (2013). Measuring revenue responses to tax rate changes in 
multi-rate income tax system behavioral and structural factors, International Tax and Public 
Finance, 20: 974–991. 
[16] DIAZ, C. and ONRUBIA, J. (2018). How do taxable income responses to marginal tax rates 
differ by sex, marital status and age? Evidence from Spanish dual income tax. Economics 
Discussion Papers, No 2018-48, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.  
[17] DOERRENBERG, P.,  PEICHL, A. and SIEGLOCH.S (2017). The Elasticity of Taxable 
Income in the Presence of Deduction Possibilities, Journal of Public Economics, Vol.151, 41-
55.  
[18] FELDSTEIN, M. (1995). The Effect of Marginal Tax Rates on Taxable Income: A Panel Study 
of the 1986 Tax Reform Act, Journal of Political Economy, 103 (3), 551-72. 
[19]   (1999). Tax Avoidance and the Deadweight Loss of the Income Tax, Review of Economics 
and Statistics, 81(4), 674-80. 
[20] GRUBER, J. and SAEZ, E. (2002). The Elasticity of Taxable Income: Evidence and 
Implications, Journal of Public Economics, 84(1), 1-32. 
[21] HARJU, J. and MATIKKA, T. (2014). The elasticity of taxable income and income-shifting: 
what is “real” and what is not? International Tax and Public Finance, 23 (4), 640-669. 
[22] HOLMLUND, B., and SÖDERSTRÖM, M. (2007). Estimating income responses to tax 
changes: a dynamic panel data approach, CESifo Working Paper No. 2121 
[23] KISS, Á. and MOSBERGER, P. (2015). The Elasticity of Taxable Income of High Earners: 
Evidence from Hungary, Empirical Economics, 48, 883-908.  
[24] KLEVEN, H. (2016). Bunching, Annual Review of Economics, 8, 435-465. 
[25] KLEVEN, H., and SCHULTZ, E. A. (2013). Estimating Taxable Income Responses Using 
Danish Tax Reforms, American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 6 (4): 271–301. 
[26] KLEVEN, H. and WASEEM, M. (2013). “Using notches to uncover optimization frictions 
and structural elasticities: theory and evidence from Pakistan”, The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 128 (2). 
[27] KLEVEN, H.J., KNUDSEN, M., KREINER, C., PEDERSEN, S. and SAEZ, E. (2011). 
Unwilling or Unable to Cheat? Evidence from a Tax Audit Experiment in Denmark, 
Econometrica, 79 (3), 659-692.  
[28] LE MAIRE, D. and SCHJERNING, B. (2013). Tax bunching, income shifting and self-
employment, Journal of Public Economics, 107 (C), 1-18. 
[29] MORIGUCHI, C. (2010). Top wage incomes in Japan, 1951–2005, Journal of the Japanese 
and International Economies, 24, 301–33.  
Essays on Behavioral Responses to Taxation 
9 
 
[30] PIKETTY, T., SAEZ, E. and STANTCHEVA, S. (2013). Optimal taxation of top labor 
income: A tale of three elasticities. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 6(1), 230-
71. 
[31] PIRTTILÄ, J., and SELIN, H. (2011). Income shifting within a dual income tax system: 
evidence from the Finnish tax reform of 1993, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 113: 120–
144. 
[32] SAEZ, E. (2010). Do taxpayers Bunch at Kink Points? American Economic Journal, vol. 2 
(3), 180-212.  
[33] SAEZ, E., and VEALL, M.R. (2005). The evolution of high income in Northern American: 
lessons from Canadian evidence, American Economic Review, 95: 831–849 
[34] SANMARTIN, J. L. (2007). El efecto de los cambios en los tipos marginal sobre la base 
imponible del IRPF, Hacienda Pública Española, 182 (3), 9-27. 
[35] SANZ-SANZ, J.F. (2016). The Laffer curve in schedular multi-rate income taxes with non-
genuine allowances: An application to Spain, Economic Modelling, Elsevier, 55(C), 42-56.  
[36] SANZ-SANZ, J. F., ARRAZOLA-VACAS, M., RUEDA LÓPEZ, N. and ROMERO-
JORDÁN, D. (2015). Reported gross income and marginal tax rates: estimation of the 
behavioral reactions of Spanish taxpayers, Applied Economics, 47 (5), 66-484. 
[37] SEIM, D. (2017). Behavioral Responses to Wealth Taxes: Evidence from Sweden. American 
Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 9 (4): 395-421. 
[38] SILLAMAA, M.A., and VEALL M.R. (2011). The effect of marginal tax rate in taxable 
income: a panel study of the 1988 tax flattening in Canada, Journal of Public Economic, 80: 
341–356 
[39] WEBER, C. (2014). Toward obtaining a consistent estimate of the elasticity of taxable income 
using difference-in-differences, Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, 117(C), 90-103. 
 
 
















This chapter is about analyzing the effects of tax policies on the behavior of economic agents. It 
is well-known that taxes distort the decisions of taxpayers. Taxes change taxpayers’ behavioral 
economic pattern by substituting away from taxed to untaxed activities until the marginal cost of tax 
saving equals the marginal return of it (Slemrod 1998; Slemrod and Kopczuk 2002). In other words, 
tax policies result in behavioral responses intended to minimize taxpayers’ tax liability and tax 
payment. Those responses could take the form of tax avoidance, tax evasion or real responses which 
- under some assumptions - can be seen as “sources or symptoms of inefficiency” (Saez et al. 2012, 
p.4). As a consequence, a central topic in public economic is the assessment of those sources of 
inefficiency that produce welfare losses. For this reason, “the notion of a behavioral elasticity 
occupies a critical place in the economic analysis of taxation” (Saez et al. 2012, p. 3). But, it is since 
Feldstein’s (1995, 1999) pioneering papers that a key parameter emerged, the elasticity of taxable 
income (ETI). Based on this seminal work, the ETI can determine the welfare losses generated by 
the effects of tax rate modifications on taxpayers’ behavior. Consequently, several studies considered 
the ETI as a sufficient statistic for welfare analysis of the tax system2.  
 
A large literature has come out since then with the objective to measure responses of reported 
income to changes in marginal tax rates (MTRs). A recent strand of the literature uses a non-
                                                          
1 I would like to acknowledge a research grant from FUNCAS. This paper was presented at the 75th Annual Congress 
of the International Institute of Public Finance (Glasgow, August 2019). 
2 However, some studies have recognized its limitations as the static frictionless setting of the model. Le Maire and 
Schjerning (2013), for example, extended the static model into a dynamic one to account for inter-temporal income shifting 
through retained earnings in Denmark. On the other hand, Chetty et al. (2011) and Adam et al. (2015) introduced 
optimization frictions to understand why individuals do not re-optimize their decisions to respond to tax incentives and, in 
this way, explain the low values of the labor supply elasticities. 
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parametric method - called the bunching approach - to estimate the ETI3. This method exploits the 
clustering behavior of taxpayers at (convex) kinks of non-linear tax systems. Using this approach has 
several advantages. First, it is not susceptible to endogenous bias; second, looking for bunching 
around kink points provides evidence of behavioral responses to taxation, and more importantly - 
based on Saez (2010) work - the ETI can be inferred from the amount of excess bunching. Therefore, 
the goal of this study is to analyze the behavioral responses of Spanish taxpayers to MTRs. I will 
address questions such as: Are Spanish taxpayers sensitive to the Personal Income Tax (PIT)? Who 
are the taxpayers most sensitive? Which are the channels they use to reduce their reported income? 
For doing so, I use micro-data collected and prepared by the Tax Administration and the Institute for 
Fiscal Studies. It is an annual cross-section data that covers all income tax returns for 2010-2014 and 
with sampling weights to reflect all the population.  
 
Moreover, I rely on the basic micro-economic framework with two goods (consumption and 
leisure). From this basic model, I use the bunching approach to obtain the excess mass of taxpayers 
needed in the estimation of the ETI. Intuitively, the introduction of discontinuities (i.e. kinks) in the 
budget set of individuals induce taxpayers to reduce their reported taxable income legally or illegally 
in order to lower their tax liability and hence, their tax payment. Those responses lead to taxpayers’ 
agglomerations around kinks in the density distribution of taxable income. The empirical bunching 
is the only parameter that needs to be estimated in order to calculate the elasticity; for doing so, I use 
an econometric method developed by Saez (2010).  
 
This chapter has four main results. First, I find clear and significant bunching at the first four tax 
kinks of the Spanish PIT schedule, using the taxable income and the gross income. This finding 
suggests not only the conventional evidence of behavioral responses to taxation, but also the 
possibility of misperception. In addition, in line with the literature, I find that bunching is not a spike 
exactly at the kink, instead it can take different forms as bunching-holes, holes, asymmetric 
bunching, agglomerations and interior bunching due to the presence of adjustment costs, 
optimization frictions and psychological components. Second, I find evidence that the tax reform of 
2011 induced taxpayers to react more to taxation, these responses are observed among several 
Autonomous Communities (ACs) and different socio-economic groups, being more evident in 
married couples with no child and in one-parent households. Third, I find that the tax filers 
responsible of the majority of bunching are: women (in married couples with no child), men (in 
                                                          
3 Sanz-Sanz et al. (2015) classified the ETI literature in three generations based on the method applied and the accuracy 
of the estimations. The first generation analyzed tax distortions focus on labor supply responses. The second generation 
extended the effect of taxation on further behavioral responses as decisions on savings, investment, consumption, tax 
avoidance, etc. And, the third generation, took advantage of more robust econometric methods and the availability of 
administrative tax data to continue with the evaluation of those behavioral responses. According to the authors, the 
bunching approach is part of this last generation. 
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married couples with one child), wage earners and taxpayers reporting individually. By analyzing 
the anatomy of responses, I find that most taxpayers reduce their taxable income by using itemized 
deductions. Further exploration reveals that taxpayers at the second, third and fourth tax kinks use 
deductions to pension contributions to bunch at those kinks. Whereas, taxpayers at the first tax kink 
use the deduction for joint declaration to bunch at that kink. Finally, I find that this effect is mainly 
in men, in married couples and in wage earners. 
 
The importance of this research is threefold. First, further interpretation is needed about the 
precise nature of individuals’ responses in order to construct an appropriate policy design. I address 
this gap by identifying the demographic characteristics of the taxpayers responsible of bunching and 
the potential channels through which they modify their taxable income. Second, I rely on a new 
method free of potential mean reversion, heterogeneous income trends and endogeneity bias, the 
issues commonly faced in the estimation of the ETI. Finally, this study contributes to the literature 
by defining different forms of bunching: (i) bunching-hole (a hole in the distribution just after or 
before a bunching), (ii) hole (a missing mass in the distribution), (iii) agglomeration (a diffuse mass 
around tax kinks), (iv) interior bunching (bunching within a tax bracket) and (v) asymmetric 
bunching (bunching placed slightly below or above tax kinks)4.  
 
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the theoretical and empirical 
methodology that allows the estimation of the ETI using the bunching approach. Section 3 describes 




2.2 Theoretical framework  
 
In this section, first I present the simple one-period model with two goods (leisure and 
consumption) that set the effect of taxes on individuals’ behavior along the intensive margin. 
Bunching theory predicts that when individuals have convex preferences, smoothly distributed 
among the population, the existence of kinks in the budget set elicit behavioral responses that create 
bunching around them (Kleven 2016; Adam et al 2015). Based on this model, I then outline the 
empirical methodology proposed by Saez (2010) to derive the ETI, i.e. the bunching approach. 
 
                                                          
4 Most of the ETI literate is for U.S., see Gruber and Saez (2002) and Saez et al. (2012) for an overview. As far as we 
are concerned, Esteller-Moré and Foremny (2016) is the only study that use the bunching approach to estimate the ETI in 
Spain. They find no behavioral responses for the period 2009-2012. For a literature review of the ETI in Spain, see Arrazola 
and Hevia (2017). 





I consider the static frictionless model underlying the bunching estimation technique, proposed 
by Saez (2010). Let’s assume a situation where individuals maximize a quasilinear, iso-elastic utility 








 subject to the individual budget constraint 𝑐 = 𝑧 − 𝑇(𝑧) + 𝑅; 
where 𝑐 is consumption, 𝑧 is earnings, 𝑛 is the ability parameter, 𝑅 represents non-labor income and 
𝑇(𝑧) denotes the tax function. The utility function represents individual’s preferences for 
consumption and leisure. From the maximization problem I get the amount of reported income 𝑧 =
𝑛(1 − 𝜏)𝑒 that reflects individual’s skills, tastes for labor and opportunities for avoidance (Saez et 
al. 2012).  
 
Assume that the baseline of this model - before the introduction of a kink - is a linear tax system 
𝑇(𝑧) = 𝜏0𝑧 and incomes are smoothly distributed as ℎ0(𝑧). A convex kink is introduced at an income 
level 𝑧∗, such that for income 𝑧 > 𝑧∗ the tax rate 𝜏1 > 𝜏0 applies. Therefore, this discrete increment 
in the MTR modifies the tax system as follows: 𝜏 = 𝜏0 before the kink and 𝜏 = (𝜏0, 𝜏1), 𝜏1 > 𝜏0 
after the kink5. This modification on the tax system changes the income distribution as individuals 
adjust their income to the new scenario, thus the new distribution of income is ℎ(𝑧), see Fig. A.1. 
Consequently, the affected and unaffected individuals from the introduction of the kink are the 
following: 
 
 Non-bunchers: Individuals with 𝑧 ≤ 𝑧∗ before the kink who are unaffected because their 
income is unchanged and hence, their income distribution is as the baseline ℎ(𝑧) = ℎ0(𝑧).  
 Bunchers: Individuals with 𝑧 ∈ [𝑧∗, 𝑧∗ + 𝑑𝑧∗] before the kink who reduce their income 




 Potential bunchers: Individuals with 𝑧 > 𝑧∗ + 𝑑𝑧∗ before the kink who reduce their income 
towards a segment [ 𝑧∗, 𝑧∗ + 𝑑𝑧∗] filing up the hole left by bunchers.  
 
Three observations deserve our attention. First, I ruled out income effects, consequently the ETI 
reflects only the compensated elasticity and “takes this simple form whatever the size of the jump in 
rates” (Saez 1999, p. 16). In line with previous studies, I avoid income effects as those are considered 
insignificant and small, even for large kinks (Gruber and Saez 2002; Saez 1999; Bastani and Selin 
                                                          
5 Subscripts do not refer to different years on a timeline, 𝜏0 is the MTR for the tax bracket below the kink and 𝜏1 is the 
MTR for the tax bracket above it.  
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2014)6. Second, I assume that bunchers are homogeneous around the kink such that the elasticity is 
constant and unique in the area around the cutoff. Third, in line with the bunching literature, I expect 
to find diffuse bunching - commonly known as asymmetric bunching - rather than a clear spike at 
the kink due to adjustment costs, optimization frictions, imperfect forecast of income and incomplete 
information about the exact kink location (see Dekker et al. 2016). 
 
Saez (2010) relates the amount of bunching generated by the introduction of the kink to the 
compensated taxable income elasticity. Let’s take the buncher with the highest ability 𝑛 + 𝛥𝑛 with 
an income 𝑧∗ + 𝑑𝑧∗ before the kink. The indifference curve of this individual is tangent to the linear 
budget constraint with slope 1 − 𝜏0. After the introduction of the kink this buncher reduces its income 
towards 𝑧∗. As a result, her new indifference curve is tangent to the non-linear budget constraint with 
slope 1 − 𝜏1 (see Fig. A.1). According to Kleven (2016), this buncher satisfies two tangency 
conditions: 𝑧∗ = (𝑛 + 𝛥𝑛)(1 − 𝜏1)
𝑒 and 𝑧∗ + 𝛥𝑧∗ = (𝑛 + 𝛥𝑛)(1 − 𝜏0)
𝑒. The former refers to 
actual income (with the kink) and the latter refers to the counterfactual income (what the income 
would have looked like in the absence of the kink). By simple replacement of these two tangency 









− 1                         (1) 
 
Eq. (1) “measures to what extent taxpayers respond to marginal incentives” (Kiss and Mosberger 
2015, p. 886). In other words, to what extent they generate less taxable income when the MTR 
increases in 1%7. 
 
2.2.2 Empirical methodology 
 
In the seminal study of Saez (2010) the author relates the income response ∆𝑧∗ from Eq. (1) to 
the amount of bunching 𝐵 as follows: 
 




∗                                           (2) 
 
                                                          
6 Using a similar dataset, Arrazola et al. (2014) and Sanz-Sanz et al. (2015) found that income effects in Spain are not 
significantly different from zero. 
7 Note that the elasticity is with respect to the net-of-tax rate because “taxpayers increase their income until the marginal 
utility of the last dollar earned less the MTR paid on this last dollar is equal to the marginal cost that is spent to earn this 
last dollar” (Saez 1999, p.5).  
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For doing so, Saez (2010) uses the mean value theorem of integration and some 𝜉 ∈








For a small tax change (∆𝜏 = 𝜕𝜏 and ∆𝑧 = 𝜕𝑧), 𝜉 → 𝑧∗ and the number of individuals who bunch 
is 𝐵 = ℎ0(𝑧










                                (3) 
Note that the kink point 𝑧∗ and the net-of-tax ratio associated to the kink 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
1−𝜏0
1−𝜏1
) are known; 
whereas the excess mass 𝐵 at 𝑧∗ and the counterfactual density at the kink ℎ0(𝑧
∗) need to be 
estimated.  
 
The excess mass is estimated by comparing the empirical income distribution (with an excess 
mass around the kink) with respect to a counterfactual distribution (a hypothetical scenario absent of 
the kink). Saez (2010) constructs the counterfactual distribution using the empirical (observed) 
income distribution around the kink. For doing so, the author defines an income band around the 
kink (𝑧∗ − 𝛿, 𝑧∗ + 𝛿), and two surrounding income bands (𝑧∗ − 2𝛿, 𝑧∗ − 𝛿) and (𝑧∗ + 𝛿, 𝑧∗ + 2𝛿). 
The parameter 𝛿 measures the width of those income bands and is selected visually to ensure that 
(𝑧∗ − 𝛿, 𝑧∗ + 𝛿) covers the whole excess mass. Then, Saez (2010) estimates the excess mass by 
comparing the number of individuals in the band around the kink with respect to the number of 
individuals in the two surrounding bands as follows: 
 









Furthermore, to get the number of individuals in each band denoted as ?̂?∗, ?̂?+
∗ , ?̂?−
∗  Saez (2010) 
regresses simultaneously a dummy variable for belonging to each band on a constant in the sample 









and finally, he computes the empirical bunching parameter ?̂? = ?̂?∗ −  ?̂?+
∗ −  ?̂?−
∗  and the elasticity ?̂?. 
Standard errors are then calculated using the delta method (alternatively, the bootstrap method).  
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To conclude this section, three observations are worth pointing out. First, since the elasticity is 
not determined at 𝑧∗ = 0, I define 𝑧∗ as average base income for tax filers with taxable income in 
(𝑧∗ − 2𝛿, 𝑧∗ + 2𝛿)8. Second, for the cases of interior bunching I identify the amount where they are 
placed by visual detection, those amounts represent an approximation of where the interior bunching 
is. Ultimately, estimates are sensitive to the choice of the width parameter, if 𝛿 is too small (large), 
the excess mass might be under- (over-) estimated. I will go back to this in the next section. 
 
 
2.3 Institutional setting and data 
 
2.3.1 Personal income tax in Spain 
 
Since 1991 the Spanish PIT is fully individualized. The tax unit, the individual, has the option to 
declare separately or jointly, this last in case of married couples, non-married cohabiting couples or 
single taxpayers with an under-age child or with a disable person9. This option of joint filing is mostly 
chosen by tax units with one bread-winner in the household, or in the case of two or more earners 
with incomes substantially different (Arrazola et al. 2014). 
 
The Spanish PIT is a dual income tax system with two tax bases. The general tax base which 
include: labor, economic activities, movable capital (derived from intellectual and industrial 
property, technical assistance, renting of movable property, businesses or mines, subletting and 
leasing image rights), immovable capital, capital gains (not derived from the transfer of assets), 
income from special regimes and imputed income. The savings tax base which include: movable 
capital (derived from dividends, interest, income from insurance and capitalization operations) and 
capital gains (derived from transmissions and reimbursements of assets). Both tax bases are taxed at 
progressive rates that jump up at certain thresholds creating kinks in the tax schedule (see Table 2.1). 
For a matter of tractability, along this study I focus on the general tax base10.  
 
                                                          
8 I do the same to estimate bunching at the 1st tax kink in the base income distribution. But, to estimate bunching at the 
1st tax kink in the gross income distribution, I take the average gross income for tax filers with gross income in 
(𝑧∗ − 2𝛿, 𝑧∗ + 2𝛿), as there is no broader income variable. 
9 The last day for taxpayers to present their PIT returns to the tax administration is June 30th (year + 1). Thus, fiscal 
year (τ) is from January 1st to December 31st. 
10 Nevertheless, I am aware of the possibility of income shifting between tax bases. In a simultaneous analysis for 
savings taxable income I find bunching at the 2nd and 3rd tax kinks for married self-employed individuals with zero and one 
child (see Fig. E.1, Panel A). It is furthermore worth noting that taxpayers can transfer capital losses from current year to 
the next 4 years. This transfer - possible in both tax bases – reduce current base income as capital losses from year 𝑡 are 
compensated with capital gains from year 𝑡 + 1, 𝑡 + 2, 𝑡 + 3 and 𝑡 + 4. As intra-(inter-) income shifting is not the 
perspective taken in this study I do not go deeper on this road. For the importance of these types of responses see Le Maire 
and Schjerning (2013), and Harju and Matikka (2014). 
Chapter 2: The Elasticity of Taxable Income 
18 
 
Another particularity of the Spanish PIT is that central and regional governments (ACs) can 
legislate over their PIT schedule, ACs have 50% of capacity over MTRs, deductions and tax bases. 
For this reason, the MTR, taken is a combination of the tax rates set by both governments, although 
in some cases I take a ‘global’ MTR that is a generalization for all ACs. For a better understanding 
of the MTRs used, Table 2.1 provides the ‘global’ MTR and Table A.1 sets the specific MTR applied 
in each AC. The tax schedule for the general taxable income consists of six tax brackets (seven after 
the tax reform of 2011) with increasing MTRs that create seven tax kinks; however, I focus on the 
first four because is where bunching is the clearest, and MTRs and tax bases are homogeneous among 
ACs11.  
Table 2.1: 2011 Tax Reform 
  
National 
Taxable income  (general base) Marginal tax rates (%) 
Brackets Nominal thresholds 2011 2012-2014 
1 0 0.24 0.2475 
2 17 707 0.28 0.30 
3 33 007 0.37 0.40 
4 53 407 0.43 0.47 
5 120 000 0.45 0.50 
6 175 000 0.47 0.53 
7 300 000 0.47 0.54 
Taxable income  (savings base) Marginal tax rates (%) 
Brackets Nominal thresholds 2011 2012-2014 
1 0 0.19 0.21 
2 6 000 0.21 0.25 
3 24 000 0.21 0.27 
 
 
The Spanish PIT experimented a considerable modification with the Royal Decree-Law 20/2011 
which was approved in Dec. 2011 and was implemented in Jan. 201212. The application of the Royal 
Decree-Law 20/2011 raised MTRs substantially in both tax bases as can be seen in Table 2.1. It was 
considered the major increment on MTRs since PIT’s implementation in 1978. In the general tax 
base this tax reform supposed an increase in the MTR of 0.75 percentage points in the 1st tax bracket 
and a large jump of 7 percentage points at the top. In the savings tax base, the rise was of 2 percentage 
points in the 1st tax bracket and 6 percentage points in the highest. 
 
                                                          
11 Consequently, the range I use is [−5 000; 80 000]. Note that the general taxable income can be negative; for this 
reason, apart from One-parent households all histograms have no missing density just below zero. 
12 The goal of this tax modification was to reduce public deficits and mobilize domestic revenue; thus, no public 
announcement was previously done. 
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An overview of the components of the general taxable income (TIG) is given in Table 2.213. Gross 
income is the sum of all sources of reported income: labor, immovable capital, movable capital, 
economic activities, capital gains, income from special regimes and imputed income. Base income 
is the sum of all net income (gross income minus standard deductions) and taxable income is defined 
as base income less itemized deductions.  
 
Table 2.2: TIG components  
Gross income  
(-) Standard deduction to labor  
(-) Standard deduction to capital 
(-) Standard deduction to economic activities 
(-) Standard deduction to imputed income 
Base income = Gross income - Standard deductions 
(-) Itemized deduction for joint declaration 
(-) Itemized deduction for pension contributions 
(-) Itemized deduction for pension contributions of the spouse 
(-) Itemized deduction for pension contributions of the spouse constituted in favor of persons with disabilities 
(-) Itemized deduction for contributions to protected assets of persons with disabilities 
(-) Itemized deduction for compensatory pensions and alimonies 
(-) Itemized deduction for fees to political parties 
(-) Itemized deduction for pension contributions of athletes 
Taxable income = Base income - Itemized deductions 
 
 
To sum up, the Spanish tax system can evoke bunching behavior due to the combination of four 
factors. First, the progressive nature of the PIT creates discrete jumps of MTRs at bracket cutoffs. 
Second, joint tax filing for couples rises the possibility of income shifting between partners. Third, 
the exogenous increment on MTRs in the tax reform of 2011 exacerbates the incentives for bunching 
around cutoffs. Fourth, the important number of deductions for pension contributions (especially 
among couples) create room for strategic behavior of taxpayers. As I will show, these specific 




I use tax return microdata for the period 2010-2014, collected and prepared by the Spanish Tax 
Administration and the Institute for Fiscal Studies14. It is an annual cross-section sample with 
                                                          
13 Bear in mind that the tax process continuous and further deductions (for housing, investment, charitable giving, 
maternity, etc.) are applied until we arrive to the exact amount of tax payment. 
14 The advantage of this type of data is that reported income represents the exact amount of taxable income the 
individual is due and, hence measurement error is minimal. 
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sampling weights to reflect the distribution of income tax returns of all the population with an 
approximate number of 1 million annual observations that represent to approximately 19 million of 
taxpayers per year (see Table 2.3).  
 
The data contains variables corresponding to all sources of income, deductions and demographic 
information which I exploit in the anatomy of responses (see Table A.2). I restrict the estimation 
sample as follows. Neither Navarre nor Basque Country are included, data contains information only 
from the so-called Common Regime ACs. As in Chetty et al (2011), I exclude individuals under 16 
years old and above 65 years old in order to consider taxpayers at working age and non-pensioners. 
Finally, no adjustment (or indexation) for inflation is needed in the study as inflation was low in the 
period under study and the tax schedule was stable in all the period15. 
 
Table 2.3: Summary statistics (general tax base) 




22816 31618 -8233590 3.98e+07 
Base income 18821 31003 -8234023 3.99e+07 




22614 40063 -1.10e+07 9.62e+07 
Base income 18611 30644 -1.10e+07 2.77e+07 




21878 31114 -1.72e+07 2.99e+07 
Base income 17916 30456 -1.72e+07 2.99e+07 




21924 39429 -7.90e+07 6.28e+07 
Base income 17960 39044 -7.90e+07 6.29e+07 




22050 40191 -9.61e+07 5.21e+07 
Base income 18064 39624 -9.61e+07 5.21e+07 
Taxable income 17141 39286 -9.61e+07 5.21e+07 
 
 
2.3.3 Sample selection 
 
Three types of disaggregation are done in the empirical analysis. First, based on previous studies 
for Spain, I observe that changes in MTRs have heterogeneous effects on different tax filers 
depending on their socio-economic characteristics. For this reason, I divide the whole sample in five 
socio-economic groups: non-married taxpayers with no child (One-household), non-married 
cohabiting couples and single taxpayers with a disable person or with an under-age child (One-
                                                          
15 CPI: 1% (2010), 3.3% (2011), 2% (2012), 2.7% (2013) and 0.2 (2014). Source: National Statistics Institute (INE). 
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parent), married taxpayers with no child (Married0), married taxpayers with one child (Married1) 
and married taxpayers with two or more children (Married2). Second, I disaggregate by demographic 
characteristics: gender (men, women), type of tax return (individual, joint) and main income source 
(wage earners, self-employed). I define wage earners as taxpayers whose main income source (MIS) 
is labor; that is, when their net income from labor is strictly higher than their net income from capital 
and their net income from economic activities16. Likewise, I define self-employed individuals as 
those whose MIS is economic activities; that is, when their net income from economic activities is 
strictly higher than their net income form capital and their net income from labor. The third type of 
disaggregation is by fiscal characteristics: deduction for joint declaration (Itemized_C) and 
deductions to pension contributions (Itemized_PP). The former refers to taxpayers who only use the 
deduction for joint declaration and the latter refers to taxpayers who use any itemized deductions, 
except the one for joint declaration. Note that I am pooling together all itemized deductions (except 
joint declaration) into the deduction to pension contributions because the majority of them refer to it 
and separately represent insignificant amounts (see Table 2.2).   
 
Lastly, I make a selection of cases based on the following criteria. (i) Statistical significance17. 
(ii) Responsiveness, that is I select the AC in each socio-economic group with the clearest bunching 
evidence. (iii) Consistency, estimations must be consistent with what is visually detected18. (iv) 
Representativeness, I focus on the most representative ACs, although the analysis is over the 16 ACs 
(Ceuta and Melilla are pooled together). 
 
Three final comments. First, the main drawback in this study is that I have no information 
available for gross income from economic activities neither for imputed income. To overcome this 
limitation, in the estimation of gross income I take the net income of those sources. Second, there are 
no observations below zero for One-parent. This is so, because individuals using the deduction for 
joint declaration only report positive taxable income and, by definition, One-parent taxpayers are 
those who make use of this deduction. Third, the ETI parameter can be negative because 𝛿 does not 
capture the whole bunching, or capture much more than it reducing (or increasing) the magnitude 
and the significance of the parameter. Negative elasticity might also reveal that taxpayers are not 
bunching exactly at the tax kink because of incomplete information, imperfect forecast, adjustment 
costs, optimization frictions or psychological components19. Finally, negative elasticity might be 
simply because I have a missing mass in the distribution (i.e. a hole). For all these reasons, the 
                                                          
16 When I refer to capital I am not considering capital gains nor savings.  
17 I have exceptional cases which are cases with sharp bunching at tax kinks, but with 0.1 < p. value ≤ 0.2. 
18 Besides these criteria, for interior bunching I select the most notorious and repetitive cases. 
19 As a matter of fact, when I take the point where bunching is exactly placed - as in the case of interior bunching - I 
get no negative elasticity.  
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appropriate bandwidth is determined by graphical inspection being 𝛿 = (1 000€, 1 500€, 2 000€) 





Bunching estimation is a genuinely visual technique (Bastani and Selin 2014). Accordingly, along 
this section I display graphs and estimate elasticities for the most responsive AC in each socio-
economic group: Madrid (One-household), Catalonia (One-parent), Andalusia (Married0), Castile-
La Mancha (Married1) and Valencia (Married2) 21. For a matter of tractability, I show in each graph 
the type of bunching I identify: bunching (B), bunching-hole (BH), agglomeration (A), asymmetric 
bunching (AB), hole (H) and interior bunching (IntB) 22. I begin by providing evidence for Spanish 
taxpayers bunching at tax kinks. I show that some of these cases are only due to the progressivity of 
the PIT, but others are also a consequence of the reform undertaken in 2011. I go on to identify who 
are the tax filers responsible of such bunching and the potential channels used to bunch at tax kinks.  
 
 2.4.1 Bunching evidence 
 
Figure 2.1 reports the histogram of gross income (GIG) and taxable income (TIG) for the general 
tax base, in each socio-economic group. Dashed lines depict the corresponding MTR schedule for 
each AC (as a function of income) and vertical lines display the location of the kinks. The goal is not 
to compare between GIG and TIG, instead it is to show visual evidence of bunching.  
 
Three elements are worth noting in Figure 2.1. First, there is a clear clustering of tax filers around 
the first four tax kink points in the gross income distribution (see Panels A-E). The reason for this 
may be the existence of optimization frictions such as inattention and misperception among Spanish 
taxpayers. Because of the complexity of the tax schedule taxpayers might confuse their TIG with 
their GIG and bunch exactly at tax kinks. This argument is related to the ‘revenue complexity 
hypothesis’ which suggest that the more complex the tax schedule, the more difficult it is for tax 
filers to know their tax liability (Sanandaji and Wallace 2010)23.   
                                                          
20 Exceptionally I also use 𝛿 = (500€, 2 500€). 
21 Results for the rest of ACs are available upon request. 
22 Note that when nothing is written on the graph is because nothing is visually detected. To identify bunching at the 
4th tax kink I reduce the range of observations to the exact size of the tax bracket. 
23 Several studies quantify the effect of misperception on taxation. Among them, Chetty (2009) and Chetty et al. (2009) 
analyzed tax incidence and welfare with misperceiving agents. For Spain, for instance, Arrazola et al. (2000) found 
divergences between statutory and perceptive MTRs among working married men.  




The second element identified in Figure 2.1 (Panels F-J) is the clear bunching at the first four tax 
kinks in the taxable income distribution. There is no bunching in the upper tax kinks because 
taxpayers in top tax brackets may misreport through other channels (not taken in the study) as 
savings, wealth and income shifting. Bunching at the first four tax kinks for taxable income confirm 
that taxpayers are responding to taxation. As stated in previous section, discrete jumps of MTRs at 
bracket cutoffs introduce an incentive to taxpayers for moving from a point above the cutoff to a 
point just below it by reducing taxable income through legal or illegal channels (Kleven 2016)24. For 
tractability, in this study I pooled all legal channels into two behavioral responses: real supply 
responses (changes in hours of work, effort, productivity, etc.) and compliance responses. For 
practical reasons, I classify compliance responses in legal tax avoidance responses (LTA) and legal 
tax reduction responses (LTR). The goal in both is to reduce taxable income, the difference is in the 
strategy used for doing so. In LTA responses, taxpayers take advantage of the legal gaps in the tax 
system to reduce their taxable income through the “retiming of transactions, shifting of income from 
one base to another, shuffling of financial transactions, and so on” (Slemrod 1998, p. 787). On the 
contrary, in LTR responses, taxpayers use the fiscal benefits that correspond to them and, in this way, 
they reduce their reported income. 
 
Third, in Figure 2.1 (Panels A-J) bunching takes different forms as: bunching-hole, 
agglomeration, hole, asymmetric bunching or interior bunching. Three arguments in the empirical 
bunching literature can shed light on this result. (i) Agglomerations and asymmetric bunching are 
often due to the presence of adjustment costs, imperfect forecast of income and incomplete 
information about the exact kink location which impede taxpayers to bunch exactly at the kink25. (ii) 
Bunching-holes and holes are probably due to the unwillingness of potential bunchers to move to the 
left to fulfill the gap left by bunchers creating a hole just above the kink point26. (iii) Interior bunching 
is a more puzzling form of bunching. In trying to explain it, one could call upon the presence of 
psychological components. According to Dekker et al. (2016), risk-averse taxpayers are more likely 
to over-adjust their income to make sure they realize an income which is below the cutoff and, in 
consequence, they end up within the tax bracket27.  
                                                          
24 I am not considering illegal channels (i.e. tax evasion) in the analysis as I have no information about non-registered 
taxpayers. 
25 Another explanation for agglomerations and for asymmetric bunching is the ‘rounding effect hypothesis’: “taxpayers 
have a tendency to report taxable income in round numbers, which create mass points at round numbers in the empirical 
distribution” (Kleven and Waseem 2013, p. 693). 
26 Bunching-holes are similar to what Kleven and Waseem (2013) call notches. The difference is that bunching-holes 
are produced by discontinuities in the slope of the choice set; whereas, notches are produced by discontinuous jumps in tax 
liability at brackets cutoffs. Moreover, the difference between bunching-holes and asymmetric bunching is that the latter is 
not followed by a hole. 
27 Also, it is possible that the point where the interior bunching is placed is a natural focal point created by the central 
or the regional government when they legislate public policy. In the empirical bunching literature those points are known 
as ‘reference-points’ (Kleven 2016). 
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Finally, in respect to the sensitivity analysis, I expect to have larger elasticities with large 
bandwidths (Saez 2010); however, there are two reasons why this intuition is not necessarily true. 
First, when bunching takes the form of a bunching-hole, a hole, an asymmetric bunching or an 
agglomeration, the elasticity is likely to be non-significant28. Nevertheless, it must be stressed that in 
some cases there is a bandwidth that captures the bunching-hole, the hole, the asymmetric bunching 
or the agglomeration making the elasticity significant29. This is so, because the place where the 
bunching-hole, the hole, the asymmetric bunching or the agglomeration is located is not exactly at 
the cutoff30. Second, the width of bunching can be different in each case; therefore, if bunching is 
narrow (wide) a larger bandwidth will reduce (increase) the elasticity31. Consequently, the elasticity 
does not necessarily increase (on magnitude and significance) with the bandwidth. For this reason, 
the appropriate bandwidth varies its size depending on the observed bunching and is determined by 
graphical inspection32. 
 
All in all, this first result shows substantial evidence of bunching around the first four tax kink 
points of the PIT. Further interpretations have been risen to explain such bunching and its different 
forms. I will go back to some of them in the next sections, but first I need to distinguish if the detected 
bunching is only due to the progressivity of the PIT, or it can be also evidence of the 2011 tax reform. 
                                                          
28 For instance, see in Table 2.4: Columns (1), (3), (4), (8), 2nd kink. Column (4), 3rd kink. 
29 For instance, see in Table 2.4: Columns (5) - (7), 2nd kink. Columns (5) and (7), 3rd kink. Columns (4), (6), (7), (9), 
4th kink. 
30 Indeed, when I take the exact point where bunching is placed, large bandwidths give larger elasticities. This is the 
case of interior bunching, see columns (1) - (9), Table 2.4.  
31 For the case of a wide bunching, see in Table 2.4: Columns (2), (6), (10), 3rd kink. Columns (1) and (5), 4th kink. For 
the case of a narrow bunching, see in Table 2.4: Columns (1-10), 1st kink. Column (8), IntB. 
32 This method of trial-and-error is one of the main critiques to Saez (2010) methodology; however, few studies have 
proposed an alternative, Dekker et al. (2016) is one of them. 
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Figure 2.1: Bunching evidence 
 
 




Notes: Figure 2.1 displays the histogram of gross income (left) and taxable income (right) for the most responsive AC in each socio-
economic group. Gross income is defined as the sum of all sources of income (labor, economic activities, capital and imputed income) and 
taxable income is defined as base income minus itemized deductions, I do not consider savings.  Histograms are computed using sample 
weights and for a given year over 2010-2014. The MTR schedule is displayed by the dashed line and corresponds to the AC under study. 
The first four tax kink points are displayed by the vertical lines on the graph and are exactly the same in all ACs: 0€, 17 707€, 33 007€ 
and 53 407€. Bins 100€. Interior bunching for taxable income: One-household (12 500€), One-parent (10 000€), Married0 (4 000€), 
Married1 (12 500€), Married2 (11 600€) and for gross income: Married0 (4 800€) and Married1 (13 500€). 
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Table 2.4: Income elasticity estimates using bunching evidence 
Kink Bandwidth 
Gross income Taxable income 
One-household One-parent Married0 Married1 Married2 One-household One-parent Married0 Married1 Married2 
Madrid Catalonia Andalusia CM Valence Madrid Catalonia Andalusia CM Valence 
(1) (2)b (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)b (8) (9) (10) 
Panel A: Estimates around kinks and interior points 
1st 1 500 € 
14.85*** - 13.65*** 10.11*** 10.64*** 17.61*** - 12.71*** 7.10*** 9.76*** 
(0.17) - (0.27) (0.75) (0.35) (0.21) - (0.24) (0.63) (0.26) 
2nd 1 500 € 
0.11 0.44* 0.09 0.01 0.46** 0.15 2.28*** -0.06 0.63* 0.37a 
(0.23) (0.26) (0.12) (0.19) (0.19) (0.35) (0.76) (0.15) (0.32) (0.25) 
3rd 1 500 € 
0.03 0.19 -0.07* 0.06 0.19** 0.04 -0.28*** 0.04 0.24* -0.20*** 
(0.08) (0.16) (0.04) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.10) (0.06) (0.13) (0.05) 
4th 1 500 € 
-0.05* 2.92*** 0.19*** -0.09 -0.11*** 0.07*** -0.22*** -0.05*** 0.09* -0.10*** 
(0.03) (1.19) (0.05) (0.07) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.01) 
IntBc 1 500 € 
- - 0.50*** 0.1** - 1.11*** 1.37*** -0.28*** 1.13*** 1.50*** 
- - (0.02) (0.04) - (0.37) (0.53) (0.06) (0.42) (0.34) 
Panel B: Sensitivity analysis with bandwidth 
1st 1 000 € 
16.58*** 
- 
16.51*** 14.31*** 12.49*** 19.16*** 
- 
7.81*** 7.99*** 10.19*** 
(0.19) 
- 
(0.28) (0.60) (0.36) (0.24) 
- 
(0.36) (0.55) (0.25) 
2nd 1 000 € 
0.18 0.40 0.09 0.14 -0.1 -0.64*** 0.81 -0.02 -0.09 -0.04 
(0.21) (0.26) (0.11) (0.18) (0.13) (0.19) (0.51) (0.13) (0.21) (0.18) 
3rd 1 000 € 
0.31** (-) 0.14** -0.13*** -0.04 -0.01 0.07 -0.28*** 0.16** 0.15 0.00 
(0.13) (0.06) (0.03) (0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.10) (0.06) 
4th 1 000 € 
0.01 0.60** 0.05 -0.10* -0.05* 0.14*** 0.07* 0.05*** 0.02 -0.09*** 
(0.03) (0.31) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.01) 
IntBc 1 000 € 
- - 0.33*** 0.06* - 0.31 0.78* 0.41*** 0.26 0.62*** 
- - (0.02) (0.03) - (0.32) (0.40) (0.07) (0.30) (0.24) 
1st 2 000 € 
12.87*** 
- 
8.27*** 2.05*** 5.87*** 16.20*** 
- 
12.10*** 3.51*** 8.15*** 
(0.17) 
- 
(0.44) (0.74) (0.57) (0.22) 
- 
(0.25) (0.41) (0.41) 
2nd 2 000 € 
0.03 0.43 -0.03 0.25 0.70*** 0.122 2.81*** 0.20 0.27 0.08 
(0.25) (0.29) (0.13) (0.23) (0.22) (0.39) (0.86) (0.19) (0.32) (0.25) 
3rd 2 000 € 
-0.13 0.51** 0.02 0.07 0.16* -0.17** 0.03 -0.05 0.08 -0.22*** 
(0.08) (0.24) (0.06) (0.11) (0.09) (0.07) (0.19) (0.06) (0.12) (0.06) 
4th 2 000 € 
0.39*** 0.30 -0.01 -0.06 0.14** 0.01 -0.28*** -0.1 -0.08* 0.02 
(0.06) (0.19) (0.04) (0.09) (0.06) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) 
IntBc 2 000 € 
- - 0.62*** 0.11** - 1.39*** 2.65*** -1.86*** 2.06*** 0.97*** 
- - (0.03) (0.04) - (0.42) (0.68) (0.05) (0.51) (0.32) 
 
Notes: Table 2.4 shows the elasticity estimates for the B, BH, A, H, AB and IntB detected in Fig. 2.1. Standard errors are in parentheses; 
all are computed using the delta method. Significance levels are *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
a This is an exceptional case with sharp AB at the kink, but p-value of 0.145. 
b Since there is no observation below zero for One-parent, no bunching at the 1st tax kink is detected. 
c  (-) means no interior bunching is visually detected in the income distribution.
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2.4.2 Dynamics of bunching 
 
The key insight of the bunching approach is that discontinuities in the budget set of individuals 
induce them to reduce their taxable income and cluster at tax kinks. Therefore, any progressive tax - 
as the Spanish PIT - give rise to kinks and bunching around them. However, the tax has the additional 
peculiarity of having implemented a tax reform in 2011 in which all MTRs were severely raised 
making discontinues changes in marginal tax incentives more marked (see Table 2.1)33. At first 
glance, in Fig. A.2 the number of taxpayers and the amount of taxable income decrease most in 2012 
with respect to 2011. This drop is detected in all socio-economic groups and all tax brackets, but 
more substantially in the 3rd and 4th tax brackets. This first overlook suggests that Spanish taxpayers 
did not accept the reform passively; on the contrary, they reacted by modifying their reported income. 
This hypothesis rests on three main findings.  
 
First, Figure 2.2 (Panels E and F) and Figure B.1 (Panels A and B) show bunching and interior 
bunching in the post-reform income distribution that are inexistent in the pre-reform distribution34. 
Empirically, the elasticities are either negative, non-significant or inexistent in the pre-reform year, 
and positive and significant in the post-reform year35. Second, bunching is more centered at the kink 
in the post-reform year. For instance, in Figure 2.2 (Panels C and D) and Figure B.1 (Panels C and 
D) there is a bunching-hole and an asymmetric bunching in the pre-reform year that becomes a 
bunching in the post-reform year. For these cases, the elasticity is negative and/or non-significant in 
the pre-reform year, and positive and significant in the post-reform year36. Third, bunching at the 1st 
tax kink and interior bunching are more pronounced in the post-reform year than in the pre-reform 
year37. Empirically, the elasticity is higher in magnitude and significance in the post-reform year than 
in the pre-reform year38.  
 
All in all, these three findings confirm the impact of the tax reform on individuals’ behavior. 
Interestingly, when I analyze deeply the characteristics of the tax reform effect by gender and by 
                                                          
33 I select the best AC to show the effect of the tax reform in each socio-economic group. However, for Madrid (One-
household), Catalonia (One-parent) and Castile-La Mancha (Married1) I find evidence of the PIT’s progressivity but not 
of the tax reform. Therefore, I select the second-best AC to display evidence of the tax reform in those socio-economic 
groups. 
34 There is a spike at 1 500€ in the post-reform income distribution of Married0, which is not taken as interior bunching 
because it is captured in the bunching window of the 1st tax kink. It must be taken with caution as it can over-estimate the 
ETI of the 1st tax kink. 
35 See: Panel C, 2nd-4th kinks and IntB, Table 2.5. Panel A, 3rd-4th kinks, IntB, Table B.1. 
36 See: Panel B, 2nd-4th kinks, Table 2.5. Panel B, 4th kink, Table B.1. 
37 For bunching at the 1st kink: Figure 2.2 (all panels, except C and D) and Figure B.1 (Panels C and D). For interior 
bunching: Figure 2.2 (Panels C, D, G and H). 
38 See: All panels (except Panel B), 1st kink, Table 2.5. Panel B, 1st kink, Table B.1. Panel B, IntB, Table 2.5.  
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MIS, I see this effect is especially pronounced for Married0, for women and for wage earners39 (see 
Fig. B.1 and Table B.1). This result indicates that these groups are more sensitive to tax changes and 
consequently react more to the tax reform, I will go back to this intuition in the next subsection.  
 
On the whole, there is evidence in favor that the tax reform undertaken in 2011 had an impact on 
individuals’ behavior. Moreover, the speed of reaction provides supporting evidence that behavioral 
changes are driven by compliance responses rather than real responses since it is difficult to adjust 
real supply responses in a short period, because of adjustment costs and optimization frictions, e.g. 




                                                          
39 The economic crisis might have made the Spanish labor market more flexible (with more temporal contracts, easing 
firings, etc.) which in turn might have made feasible real supply responses than in other years of more rigidity. In addition, 
the economic crisis may have had an effect on the extensive margin, rising unemployment and informal labor. Nevertheless, 
those effects are out of our scope of analysis, although I am aware of the potential influence of the real business cycle on 
the results. 
40 A similar reasoning is followed by Kleven and Waseem (2013), Saez (1999), Mosberger (2016) and Lediga et al. 
(2016). 
Chapter 2: The Elasticity of Taxable Income 
30 
 
Figure 2.2: Dynamics of bunching 
 
 




Notes: Figure 2.2 displays the histogram of taxable income for the best AC to show the effect of the tax reform in each socio-economic 
group. Taxable income is defined as base income minus itemized deductions and is the same in both years. I consider income from all 
sources, except savings. Histograms are computed using sample weights and for a given year before and after the reform. The MTR 
schedule is displayed by the dashed line and corresponds to each year (taking into account the tax reform) for the correspondent AC. The 
first four tax kink points are displayed by the vertical lines on the graph and are the same in both years: 0€, 17 707€, 33 007€ and 53 407€. 
Bins 100€. Interior bunching: One-parent (9 200€) in both years, Married0 (4 000€) in the post-reform year, Married1 (12 500€) in both 
years and Married2 (11 600€) in the post-reform year. 
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Table 2.5: Elasticity of taxable income, dynamics of bunching 
Kink Bandwidth c 
Pre-reform year Post-reform year 
(1) (2) 
Panel A: One-household, Catalonia 
1st 2 500 € 
13.47*** 13.57*** 
(0.19) (0.14) 
2nd 1 500 € 
-0.04 0.85*** 
(0.21) (0.24) 
3rd 1 500 € 
-0.42*** 0.28*** 
(0.03) (0.08) 
4th 1 500 € 
0.94*** 0.07*** 
(0.05) (0.02) 
IntB 1 500 € 
- - 
- - 
Panel B: One-parent, Castile-Leon 
1st 1 500 € 
- - 
- - 
2nd 1 500 € 
-0.79** 1.10* 
(0.39) (0.60) 
3rd 2 000 € 
-0.23a 0.22 
(0.17) (0.27) 
4th 2 000 € 
0.01 0.28* 
(0.13) (0.16) 
IntB 1 500 € 
0.86* 1.92*** 
(0.50) (0.56) 
Panel C: Married0, Andalusia 






3rd 1 000 € 
-0.08** 0.16** 
(0.04) (0.06) 
4th 1 000 € 
-0.12*** 0.05*** 
(0.01) (0.02) 
IntB 1 000 € 
- 0.41*** 
- (0.07) 
Panel D: Married1, Castile-Leon 






3rd 1 500 € 
0.11 -0.08 
(0.08) (0.06) 
4th 1 500 € 
0.04 -0.05** 
(0.04) (0.03) 
IntB 1 500 € 
0.52** 0.78*** 
(0.23) (0.19) 
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Panel E: Married2, Valence 
1st 1 500 € 
5.91*** 9.76*** 
(0.49) (0.26) 
2nd 1 500 € 
-0.03 0.37b 
(0.27) (0.25) 
3rd 1 500 € 
-0.10 -0.20*** 
(0.07) (0.05) 
4th 1 500 € 
0.01 -0.10*** 
(0.02) (0.01) 




Notes: Table 2.5 shows the elasticity estimates for the B, BH, A, H, AB and IntB detected in the pre- and post-reform year in Fig. 2.2. 
Standard errors are in parentheses; all are computed using the delta method. Significance levels are *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
a This is an exceptional case with sharp AB at the kink, but p-value of 0.17. 
b This is an exceptional case with sharp AB at the kink, but p-value of 0.15. 
c  The bandwidth selected captures best the result and estimates are consistent with what is visually detected. 
d  (-) means no interior bunching is visually detected in the income distribution.
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2.4.3 Who are the bunchers?  
 
To answer this question, in Figures 2.3 – 2.5 I break down the sample of Married0 (Andalusia) 
and Married1 (Castile-La Mancha) by gender, by type of tax return and by MIS41. Then, I observe if 
the bunching identified in the overall sample remains in one of the subgroups. If that is the case, then 
that subgroup is a buncher. In short, bunchers are the tax filers responsible of the observed bunching 
in the overall sample42. Empirically, in Table 2.6 I compare the sign, the significance and the 
magnitude of the elasticity between subgroups to verify what is visually detected43. Additionally, in 
Table 2.7 I run a Probit regression to confirm who bunch at the 1st tax kink.  
 
I find that bunchers are: married couples, women (in Married0), men (in Married1), wage earners 
and taxpayers filing their tax return individually. One explanation for married couples being more 
responsive to taxation is because being married in the Spanish PIT schedule gives additional fiscal 
benefits and hence, more room for LTR responses. For instance, the option of joint tax filing and two 
additional deductions related to pension contributions that only married couples can use (i.e. itemized 
deduction for pension contribution of the spouse and itemized deduction for pension contribution of 
the spouse constituted in favor of persons with disabilities, see Table 2.2).  
 
Figure 2.3 (Married0) shows that women are responsible of interior bunching and bunching at 1st-
4th tax kinks. On the contrary, Figure 2.3 (Married1) shows that men are responsible of interior 
bunching and bunching at the 4th tax kink. Both results are confirmed in Table 2.6 (columns (2) and 
(3)) as elasticities are higher in significance and magnitude for women (in Married0) and men (in 
Married1). Women being more sensitive to taxation than men is a result commonly explained in the 
bunching literature with the argument that, among married couples, women are more likely to be 
second or part-time earners and men, the breadwinner of the household. The insight behind this 
argument is that second or part-time earners usually have more flexibility in hours’ choice and 
earnings decisions (Saez 2010). In trying to explain why men are more responsive than women for 
married couples with one child, I find differences by gender for married taxpayers, not detected for 
non-married taxpayers. To be more precise, I find that, among non-married taxpayers, men and 
                                                          
41 I focus the analysis on these two socio-economic groups because when I divide One-household and One-parent by 
demographic characteristics, distributions become too noisy making difficult the identification of bunching. In addition, 
differences between subgroups are more notorious in Married0 and the results obtained for Married1 are the same for 
Married2. Therefore, findings for Married1 can be generalized to Married2. The figures for the rest of socio-economic 
groups are available upon request.  
42 Subgroups with more observations are more likely to have a similar distribution as the overall sample. However, this 
does not ensure them to be bunchers. As mentioned above, bunchers are the subgroups who have the same (or similar) 
bunching detected in the overall sample.  
43 Bear in mind that the estimates of the subgroups do not need to sum the estimate of the overall sample. I only care 
about the sign, the significance and the magnitude. 
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women are equally responsive but among married couples I observe clear differences between them. 
In addition, I find that women with no child are more responsive to taxation than women with one, 
two or more children. This suggests that the number of children may be influencing women reporting 
behavior; in other words, having one or more children make women less sensitive to taxation.  
 
Furthermore, in Figure 2.4 taxpayers who report individually are responsible of interior bunching 
and bunching at the 2nd-4th tax kinks. This result is supported empirically in Table 2.6 (columns (4) 
and (5)). This is so probably because tax filers reporting individually have a higher income level, 
compared to those reporting jointly. Contrarily to many other studies, I find that wage earners are 
responsible of interior bunching and bunching at the 2nd-4th tax kinks (see Figure 2.5 and Table 2.6, 
columns (6) and (7))44. The most plausible explanation is the use of tax deductions among this 
subgroup, as I will show in the next section. Nevertheless, other explanations relate this fact to 
institutional features as the existence of collusion between the employer and the employee, and 
bargaining channels (see Bastani and Selin 2014; Dekker et al. 2016; Piketty et al. 2013). 
 
Finally, I find that bunching at the 1st tax kink is driven by women, taxpayers reporting jointly 
and self-employed individuals. As can be seen in Figures 2.3 – 2.5, bunching at the 1st tax kink is 
steeper for these taxpayers than for men, taxpayers reporting individually and wage earners. This is 
precisely what is observed in Table 2.6 (Panels A and B) and Table 2.7. The Probit regression 
confirms that it is more likely for women, taxpayers reporting jointly and self-employed individuals 
(as well as capital owners) to bunch at the 1st tax kink. Women and taxpayers reporting jointly are 
usually individuals with low income, second or part-time earners who do not depend much on their 
income and hence, are less constraint to adjust their taxable income (Dekker et al. 2016) 45. However, 
this argument does not seem realistic for self-employed individuals. One possible explanation why 
these individuals bunch at the 1st tax kink is that they might have other sources of income, as savings. 
Figure E.1 (Panel A) confirms this hypothesis, I detect bunching at the 2nd and 3rd tax kinks of the 
savings taxable income distribution only for the self-employed in Married0 and Married1 (no 
bunching is detected for wage earners neither for One-household, One-parent and Married2).  
 
To conclude this section, two main findings are worth pointing out. First, interior bunching and 
bunching at the 2nd-4th tax kinks are mainly driven by women (in Married0), men (in Married1), 
taxpayers reporting individually and wage earners. Second, women, taxpayers reporting jointly and 
                                                          
44 In the broad literature self-employed individuals are commonly the most responsive taxpayers due to their greater 
possibilities of adjusting their taxable income, the lack of third-party reporting and their low tax moral (Kleven et al. 2011; 
Chetty 2012). 
45 Sharp bunching at the 1st tax kink is also explained by the fact that in a complex tax system, the 1st tax kink point “is 
more salient and easier to understand than other kink points” (Saez 2010, p. 211). 
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self-employed individuals are responsible of bunching at the 1st tax kink. These two findings are 
confirmed at an aggregate level (see Figures C.1-C.3 and Tables C.1-C.2). 
  
Figure 2.3: Bunchers, by gender 
 
Notes: Panel A displays the histogram of taxable income for Married0, Andalusia (left) and Married1, Castile-La Mancha (right). Panels 
B and C break all the sample by women and by men, respectively. Taxable income is defined as base income minus itemized deductions. 
I consider income from all sources, except savings. Histograms are computed using sample weights and for a given year over 2010-2014. 
The MTR schedule is displayed by the dashed line and corresponds to the specific AC. The first four tax kink points are displayed by the 
vertical lines on the graph and are exactly the same in both AC: 0€, 17 707€, 33 007€, 53 407€. Bins 100€. Interior bunching: Married0 
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Figure 2.4: Bunchers, by type of tax return 
 
Notes: Panel A displays the histogram of taxable income for Married0, Andalusia (left) and Married1, Castile-La Mancha (right). Panels 
B and C break all the sample for taxpayers reporting individually and for taxpayers reporting jointly, respectively. Taxable income is 
defined as base income minus itemized deductions. I consider income from all sources, except savings. Histograms are computed using 
sample weights and for a given year over 2010-2014. The MTR schedule is displayed by the dashed line and corresponds to the specific 
AC. The first four tax kink points are displayed by the vertical lines on the graph and are exactly the same in both AC: 0€, 17 707€, 33 
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Figure 2.5: Bunchers, by main income source 
 
Notes: Panel A displays the histogram of taxable income for Married0, Andalusia (left) and Married1, Castile-La Mancha (right). Panels 
B and C break all the sample for wage earners and for self-employed individuals, respectively. Taxable income is defined as base income 
minus itemized deductions. I consider income from all sources, except savings. Histograms are computed using sample weights and for a 
given year over 2010-2014. The MTR schedule is displayed by the dashed line and corresponds to the specific AC. The first four tax kink 
points are displayed by the vertical lines on the graph and are exactly the same in both AC: 0€, 17 707€, 33 007€, 53 407€. Bins 100€. 
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Table 2.6: Elasticity of taxable income, bunchers 
 
Kink Bandwidth 





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Panel A: Married0, Andalusia 
1st 1 000 € 
12.71*** 15.48*** 10.04*** 1.53*** 11.15*** -0.52*** 13.85*** 
(0.24) (0.40) (0.30) (0.28) (0.26) (0.05) (1.96) 
2nd 1 500 € 
-0.06 -0.22 0.03 -0.22 0.20 -0.03 0.15 
(0.15) (0.26) (0.19) (0.20) (0.24) (0.17) (0.51) 
3rd 1 000 € 
0.16** 0.39** 0.07 0.15* 0.19* 0.15** 6.84 
(0.06) (0.17) (0.06) (0.08) (0.11) (0.07) (5.74) 
4th 1 000 € 
0.05*** 0.24*** 0.00 0.08*** -0.01 0.06*** -0.10 
(0.02) (0.06) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) 
IntB 1 000 € 
0.41*** 1.59*** - 0.83*** - 1.27*** - 
(0.07) (0.22) - (0.17) - (0.18) - 
Panel B: Married1, Castile-La Mancha 
1st 2 000 € 
3.51*** 7.80*** 7.23*** 0.71** 7.41*** -0.08 5.11*** 
(0.41) (0.98) (0.87) (0.33) (0.53) (0.14) (1.40) 
2nd 1 500 € 
0.63* 0.69 0.59 1.02** -0.05 0.68** 0.38 
(0.32) (0.60) (0.38) (0.48) (0.39) (0.34) (1.09) 
3rd 1 500 € 
0.24* 0.36 0.17 0.31a 0.04 0.21b 0.34 
(0.13) (0.30) (0.15) (0.20) (0.16) (0.14) (0.60) 
4th 1 500 € 
0.09* 0.02 0.11* 0.08 0.10 0.07 0.38 
(0.05) (0.10) (0.05) (0.06) (0.08) (0.05) (0.28) 
IntB 1 500 € 
1.13*** - 0.84** 1.25*** 0.09 1.10*** -0.76 
(0.42) - (0.38) (0.42) (0.44) (0.35) (0.64) 
 
Notes: Table 2.6 shows the elasticity estimates for the B, BH, A, H, AB and IntB detected in in Fig. 2.3-2.5. Standard errors are in 
parentheses; all are computed using the delta method. Significance levels are *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
a This is an exceptional case with sharp B at the kink, but p-value of 0.12. 
b This is an exceptional case with sharp B at the kink, but p-value of 0.12. 
c (-) means no interior bunching is visually detected in the income distribution. 
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Table 2.7: Probit regression, (buncher 1)a 
  


























N 496893 133077 
 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels are *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Controls: marital status, number of 
child, AC of residence and Year. Base categories: women, individual tax filing and wage earners. Bandwidth 1 500€. 
a  This regression is run to verify who bunch at the first tax kink.  
 
 
2.5 Anatomy of responses  
 
This section casts further light on the mechanisms behind bunching uncovered until now. In order 
to have some intuition on how taxpayers bunch, essentially identify the potential channels bunchers 
use to reduce their taxable income and cluster at tax kinks. This type of analysis is what Slemrod 
(1996) called the “anatomy of the behavioral response” (Saez et al. 2012). 
 
2.5.1 Effects of deductions 
 
In the spirit of Saez (2010) and Doerrenberg et al. (2017), I show the importance of deduction 
possibilities for optimizing taxable income. For that, in Figure 2.6, I compare the density of gross 
income (Panel A), the density of base income i.e., defined as gross income minus standard deductions 
(Panel B) and the density of taxable income i.e., defined as base income minus itemized deductions 
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(Panel C). This comparison reveals the contribution of standard and itemized deductions to bunching. 
As before, I focus on Married0 (Andalusia) and Married1 (Castile-La Mancha)46.  
 
The channels through which taxpayers bunch at kinks are manifold; however, an overall look 
shows that tax deductions (standard and itemized) may play a crucial role to reduce taxable income 
in the Spanish PIT schedule. Three evidences confirm this result. First, bunching at the 1st tax kink 
is more pronounced for TIG than for GIG (for BIG is inexistent), see Figure 2.6. Consistent with 
visual detection, the elasticity of the 1st tax kink for TIG is the highest (see Table 2.8, column (3)). 
Second, bunching in the taxable income distribution is more centered around the tax kink. In fact, 
Figure 2.6 displays asymmetric bunching, bunching-holes and holes in the gross income distribution 
that become a bunching in the taxable income distribution47. Consequently, the elasticity is negative 
and/or non-significant for GIG, and positive and significant for TIG48. Third, interior bunching shifts 
to the left once I move from GIG to BIG and TIG. In the case of Married0 this shift is from 4 800€ 
to 4 000€ and in Married1, it is from 13 500€ to 12 500€.  
 
How bunchers bunch? To answer this question, in Figures D.1-D.3 I verify these three evidences 
for men (in Married1), women (in Married0), wage earners and taxpayers reporting individually. 
Indeed, Figure D.1 shows that bunching at the 1st tax kink for men (in Married1) and for women (in 
Married0) is more pronounced for TIG than for GIG49. Moreover, Fig. D.1-D.3 display bunching-
holes, holes and asymmetric bunching in the gross income distribution that become a bunching in 
the taxable income distribution50. Also, interior bunching shifts to the left once I move from GIG to 
BIG and TIG. On the whole, this first overlook points out that legal tax reduction responses (LTR) 
through standard and itemized deductions are a potential channel for optimizing taxable income.  
    
                                                          
46 As in previous section, findings for Married1 can be generalized for Married2.  
47 For instance, see Married0, Andalusia, 3rd and 4th kinks, and Married1, CM, 2nd-4th kinks.  
48 For the aforementioned cases, see Table 2.8: Columns (1)-(3), 3rd and 4th kink, Panel A. Columns (1)-(3), 2nd-4th 
kinks, Panel B. 
49 For empirical confirmation, see Tables D.1 (Panel A) and D.2 (Panel A), 1st kink. 
50 See in Figures D.1-D.3: Married0, Andalusia, 3rd and 4th kinks (women, wage earners and individual) and Married1, 
CM, 2nd-4th kinks (individual and wage earners). For empirical confirmation see Tables D.1 and D.2. 
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Figure 2.6: Effects of deductions 
 
 
Notes: Figure 2.6 displays the histogram of gross income (Panel A), base income (Panel B) and taxable income (Panel C) for married 
taxpayers with no child in Andalusia (left) and married taxpayers with one child in Castile-La Mancha (right). Graphs in each socio-
economic group are for the same AC and the same year in order to be comparable. Gross income is defined as the sum of all sources of 
income, base income is gross income minus standard deductions and taxable income is base income minus itemized deductions. Histograms 
are computed using sample weights. The MTR schedule is displayed by the dashed line and corresponds to the AC analyzed. The first four 
tax kink points are displayed by the vertical lines on the graph and are exactly the same in both AC: 0€, 17 707€, 33 007€, 53 407€. Bins 
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Table 2.8: Income elasticity estimates, effects of deductions 
 
Kink Bandwidth a 
Gross income Base income Taxable income 
(1) (2) (3) 
Panel A: Married0, Andalusia 
1st 2 000 € 
8.27*** 2.72*** 12.10*** 
(0.44) (0.12) (0.25) 
2nd 1 000 € 
0.09 -0.12 -0.02 
(0.11) (0.11) (0.13) 
3rd 1 000 € 
-0.13*** 0.13** 0.16** 
(0.03) (0.06) (0.06) 
4th 1 000 € 
0.05 0.04** 0.05*** 
(0.03) (0.09) (0.02) 
IntB 1 000 € 
0.33*** 0.19*** 0.41*** 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.07) 
Panel B: Married1, Castile-La Mancha 
1st 2 000 € 
2.05*** 0.34*** 3.51*** 
(0.74) (0.09) (0.41) 
2nd 1 500 € 
0.01 0.33 0.63* 
(0.19) (0.27) (0.32) 
3rd 1 500 € 
0.06 0.33** 0.24* 
(0.09) (0.15) (0.13) 
4th 1 500 € 
-0.09 -0.08* 0.09* 
(0.07) (0.04) (0.05) 
IntB 1 500 € 
0.10** 0.48*** 1.13*** 
(0.04) (0.17) (0.42) 
 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses; all are computed using the delta method. Significance levels are *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 




2.5.2 Effects of itemizing 
 
In this last subsection I show evidence that part of the response goes through itemized deductions. 
It is worthwhile to examine these deductions because they can be used more strategically than 
standard deductions. I analyze the channels that drive bunching for Married0 (Andalusia) and 
Married1 (Castile-La Mancha). Figure 2.7 displays the density for taxable income of individuals who 
only use the deduction for joint declaration (Itemized_C) and Figure 2.8 displays the density for 
taxable income of individuals who only use deductions to pension contributions (Itemized_PP). 
 
Figures 2.7 and 2.8 capture three clear evidences. First, in Figure 2.7 (Panel A) there is sharp 
bunching around zero for individuals who only use the deduction for joint filing. This result is 
consistent with Figure 2.4 where bunchers at the 1st tax kink are taxpayers reporting jointly. The most 
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plausible explanation is that the option of joint tax filing is mostly chosen by households with one 
breadwinner (usually, men), or by married couples with two or more earners with a significant 
difference in incomes. Unfortunately, I cannot verify this result using elasticity estimates because of 
the few observations at this level of disaggregation. Nevertheless, I confirm this result in Table 2.10 
(columns (1) and (5)) by running a Probit regression51. Second, bunching at the 2nd-4th tax kinks in 
Figure 2.8 (Panel A) is driven by individuals who only use deductions to pension contributions. The 
reason why this evidence is more pronounced for married couples than for non-married taxpayers 
may be due to the fact that they have a higher income and thus, more margin to shift income through 
pension contributions. In addition, married taxpayers are the only ones who have two additional 
deductions related to the pension contributions of the spouse (see Table 2.2).  
 
Third, I disaggregate the overall sample by gender and by MIS in Figures 2.7 and 2.8 (Panels B 
and C). Surprisingly, I find clear bunching at the 2nd-4th tax kinks for men taxpayers who use 
deductions to pension contributions (see Fig. 2.8, Panel B). This finding indicates that pension 
contributions are a likely channel for men to bunch at tax kinks, but not for women. This result is 
consistent with the fact that in Spain around 60% of men on average are title holders of pension 
plans52. As expected, I find clear bunching at the 2nd-4th tax kinks for wage earners who use 
deductions to pension contributions (see Fig. 2.8, Panel C). These results are confirmed empirically 
using elasticity estimates in Table 2.9 (columns (2) and (4), Panels B and C) and Table 2.10 (columns 
(2) - (4), Panels B and C). Ultimately, when I turn to savings tax base I find that bunching at the 2nd 
and 3rd tax kinks for the self-employed in Married0 and Married1 are driven by those who use 
deductions to pension contributions (see Fig. E.1, Panel C). Empirically, Table E.1 (column (3)) 
shows that the elasticity is only significant for Itemized_PP. 
 
All in all, I find that a large share of bunching is driven by tax deductions, essentially by itemized 
deductions (to both pension contributions and joint taxation). These results confirm that those 
deductions are an important channel for reducing taxable income to reach tax kinks in the PIT 
schedule. In addition, these results indicate that itemized deductions among married couples and, 
more specifically for men and for wage earners, are a key to understanding bunching behavior in 
Spain. 
   
                                                          
51 This regression must be taken with caution as Itemized_C and Itemized_PP are prone to endogeneity, given that there 
are many pre-existing selection factors (marital status, AC of residence, number of child) associated with the reported 
income and the use of deductions. 
52 Source: Collective investment and pension funds (in Spanish, Inversión colectiva y fondos de pensiones INVERCO) 
with dataset from DGSFP, 2010-2014. 
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Figure 2.7: Effects of itemizing, joint declaration 
 
  
Notes: Panel A displays the histogram of taxable income for married taxpayers with no child who only use the deduction for joint 
declaration in Andalusia (left) and married taxpayers with one child who only use the deduction for joint declaration in Castile-La Mancha 
(right). Panels B and C break the overall sample for men taxpayers and for wage earners, respectively. Taxable income is defined as base 
income minus itemized deductions. I consider income from all sources, except savings. Histograms are computed using sample weights 
and for a given year over 2010-2014. The MTR is displayed by the dashed line and corresponds to the AC analyzed. The first four tax 
kink points are displayed by the vertical lines on the graph and are exactly the same in both AC: 0€, 17 707€, 33 007€, 53 407€. Bins 100€.  
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Figure 2.8: Effects of itemizing, pension contributions 
 
  
Notes: Panel A displays the histogram of taxable income for married taxpayers with no child who use deductions to pension contributions 
in Andalusia (left) and married taxpayers with one child who use deductions to pension contributions in Castile-La Mancha (right). Panels 
B and C break the overall sample for men taxpayers and for wage earners, respectively. Taxable income is defined as base income minus 
itemized deductions. I consider income from all sources, except savings. Histograms are computed using sample weights and for a given 
year over 2010-2014. The MTR is displayed by the dashed line and corresponds to the AC analyzed. The first four tax kink points are 
displayed by the vertical lines on the graph and are exactly the same in both AC: 0€, 17 707€, 33 007€, 53 407€. Bins 100€.  
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Panel A: Married0, Andalusia 
2nd 1 500 € 
0.09 1.35* 
(0.37) (0.70) 
3rd 1 500 € 
0.20 0.42** 
(0.17) (0.19) 
4th 1 500 € 
0.08 0.30*** 
(0.06) (0.05) 
Panel B: Married0, Andalusia, Men 
2nd 1 500 € 
0.26 1.93* 
(0.42) (1.05) 
3rd 1 000 € 
0.13 0.66** 
(0.14) (0.33) 
4th 1 500 € 
0.06 0.38*** 
(0.06) (0.07) 
Panel C: Married0, Andalusia, Wage earners 
2nd 1 500 € 
-0.05 1.51* 
(0.38) (0.79) 
3rd 1 500 € 
0.24 0.48** 
(0.19) (0.21) 




Notes: Table 2.9 shows the elasticity estimates for the bunching detected in Fig. 2.7. Standard errors are in parentheses; all are computed 
using the delta method. Significance levels are *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
a  The bandwidth selected captures best the result and estimates are consistent with what is visually detected. 
b Itemized_C refers to individuals who only use the deduction for joint declaration and Itemized_PP refers to individuals who only use 
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Table 2.10: Elasticity of taxable income, effects of itemizing 
 
Kink Bandwidth a 
Itemized_C Itemized_PP 
(1) (2) 
Panel A: Married1, Castile-La Mancha 
2nd 2 000 € 
0.15 2.16* 
(0.54) (1.18) 
3rd 1 500 € 
-0.17 0.45b 
(0.16) (0.33) 
4th 1 000 € 
0.07 -0.10*** 
(0.12) (0.04) 
Panel B: Married1, Castile-La Mancha, Men 
2nd 1 500 € 
0.26 3.55* 
(0.52) (2.11) 
3rd 1 500 € 
-0.17 0.23 
(0.16) (0.35) 
4th 2 000 € 
0.19 -0.14** 
(0.19) (0.07) 
Panel C: Married1, Castile-La Mancha, Wage earners 
2nd 2 000 € 
0.20 2.11* 
(0.59) (1.22) 
3rd 1 500 € 
-0.20 0.36 
(0.16) (0.33) 




Notes: Table 2.10 shows the elasticity estimates for the bunching detected in Fig. 2.8. Standard errors are in parentheses; all are computed 
using the delta method. Significance levels are *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
a  The bandwidth selected captures best the result and estimates are consistent with what is visually detected. 
b This is an exceptional case with sharp bunching at the kink, but p-value of 0.18. 
c Itemized_C refers to individuals who only use the deduction for joint declaration and Itemized_PP refers to individuals who only use 
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Table 2.11: Probit regression, (bunchers 1-4)a 
 
  Married0, Andalusia Married1, Castile-La Mancha 
 1
st kink 2nd kink 3rd kink 4th kink 1st kink 2nd kink 3rd kink 4th kink 
Panel A: All 
Itemized_C 0.15*** -0.04*** -0.21*** -0.24*** 0.36*** -0.02*** -0.42*** -0.34*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Constant -0.93*** -1.44*** -1.88*** -2.58*** -1.32*** -1.33*** -1.83*** -2.58*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Itemized_PP -0.84*** 0.18*** 0.61*** 0.56*** -0.92*** 0.21*** 0.42*** 0.53*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Constant -0.80*** -1.47*** -2.07*** -2.78*** -1.13*** -1.38*** -2.01*** -2.80*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
N 50339928 50339928 50339928 50339928 13307718 13307718 13307718 13307718 
Panel B: Men 
Itemized_C 0.37*** -0.01*** -0.14*** -0.35*** 0.57*** -0.10*** -0.43*** -0.44*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
Constant -1.25*** -1.42*** -1.90*** -2.44*** -1.61*** -1.29*** -1.79*** -2.44*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Itemized_PP -0.82*** 0.05*** 0.63*** 0.59*** -0.99*** 0.23*** 0.30*** 0.49*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Constant -1.02*** -1.43*** -2.09*** -2.68*** -1.27*** -1.35*** -1.96*** -2.67*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
N 29695364 29695364 29695364 29695364 8026061 8026061 8026061 8026061 
Panel C: Wage earners 
Itemized_C 0.16*** -0.05*** -0.18*** -0.25*** 0.36*** -0.03*** -0.44*** -0.32*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
Constant -1.13*** -1.36*** -1.80*** -2.52*** -1.52*** -1.28*** -1.79*** -2.56*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Itemized_PP -0.73*** 0.11*** 0.57*** 0.54*** -0.80*** 0.13*** 0.35*** 0.51*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Constant -1.00*** -1.39*** -1.98*** -2.72*** -1.33*** -1.31*** -1.94*** -2.76*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
N 39432644 39432644 39432644 39432644 11286429 11286429 11286429 11286429 
 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels are *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Controls: (Panel A) Marital status, AC 
of residence, Number of child, Year; (Panel B) Marital status, AC of residence, Number of child, Year, Men; (Panel C) Marital status, AC 
of residence, Number of child, Year, Wage earners. Bandwidth 1 500€. 
a  This regression is run to verify who bunch at the first tax kink, second kink, third kink and fourth  kink. 
b Itemized_C refers to individuals who only use the deduction for joint declaration and Itemized_PP refers to individuals who only use 





Standard economic theory predicts that individuals bunch at convex kinks of the budget 
constraint, such as those created by progressive tax systems (Adam et al. 2015). In this chapter, I 
estimate the ETI with respect to the net-of-tax rate in Spain. Using tax return microdata from 2010-
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2014 and the bunching approach, I exploit bunching behavior at the first four tax thresholds of the 
PIT schedule. I show that Spanish taxpayers are sensitive to the tax and to tax modifications. The 
speed of reaction raises the possibility of compliance responses (LTR and LTA) being more 
important than real supply responses.  
 
I contribute to the literature by providing empirical evidence on different forms of bunching as 
bunching-holes, holes, agglomerations, interior bunching and asymmetric bunching. Moreover, the 
identification of bunchers reveal that married couples, taxpayers filing separately and wage earners 
have greater sensitivity. Surprisingly, I find that having a child make women less sensitive to 
taxation. Further exploration of the anatomy of responses reveal that bunching is caused by itemized 
deductions. In particular, for married couples, for men and for wage earners I identify deductions to 
pension contributions as the main channel through which taxable income is adjusted. Overall, the 
empirical results show that the Spanish population responds to taxation and adjusts their taxable 
income through LTR responses.  
 
The ETI covers labor supply responses and many other aspects on the individual behavior as 
decisions on savings, fertility, emancipation, marriage. (Arrazola and Hevia, 2017). Therefore, the 
main contribution of this study is the identification of bunchers and some of their potential channels 
for tax reduction, crucial for any tax policy design. Nevertheless, I have raised the possibility of 
income shifting opportunities especially among high-income earners and self-employed individuals. 
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Supplemental material Chapter 2 
 
2.A Descriptive statistics  
 
Table A.1: Tax schedules pre- and post-reform (Central Government + Regional Government) 
 
Table A.1.1: Andalusia, Catalonia, Castile-Leon 
Taxable income  (general base) Marginal tax rates (%) 
Brackets Nominal thresholds 2011 2012-2014 
1 0 0.24 0.2475 
2 17 707 0.28 0.3 
3 33 007 0.37 0.4 
4 53 407 0.43 0.47 
 
Table A.1.2: Valence 
Taxable income  (general base) Marginal tax rates (%) 
Brackets Nominal thresholds 2011 2012-2013 2014 
1 0 0.239 0.2475 0.2465 
2 17 707 0.2792 0.3 0.2992 
3 33 007 0.3695 0.4 0.3995 
4 53 407 0.4298 0.47 0.4698 
 
Table A.1.3: Madrid 
Taxable income  (general base) Marginal tax rates (%) 
Brackets Nominal thresholds 2011 2012-2013 2014 
1 0 0.236 0.2435 0.2395 
2 17 707 0.277 0.297 0.293 
3 33 007 0.368 0.398 0.394 
4 53 407 0.429 0.469 0.465 
 
Table A.1.4: Castile-La Mancha 
Taxable income  (general base) Marginal tax rates (%) 
Brackets Nominal thresholds 2011 2012-2013 2014 
1 0 0.24 0.2475 0.2375 
2 17 707 0.28 0.3 0.3 
3 33 007 0.37 0.4 0.4 
4 53 407 0.43 0.47 0.47 
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Table A.2: Summary statistics (non-monetary variables) 
 
Category Label % (One-household) % (One-parent) % (Married0) % (Married1) % (Married2) 
Type of tax 
return 
Joint 0 99.93 29.77 28.06 32.25 
Individual 100 0.07 70.23 71.94 67.75 
Marital 
status 
Non-married 100 100 0 0 0 




Andalusia 15.51 16.16 16.06 17.79 20.63 
Castile-Leon 6.51 4.11 6.46 6.06 5.31 
Castile-La Mancha 4.36 3.76 4.51 4.83 5.42 
Catalonia 17.49 20.11 18.22 17.22 17.09 
Valence 10.61 11.11 11.48 11.71 11.26 
Madrid 17.70 17.37 15.34 14.80 15.69 
Number of 
child 
0 100 0 100 0 0 
1 0 62.31 0 100 0 
>=2 0 37.70 0 0 100 
Gender 
Men 56.56 21.97 58.82 59.42 60.78 




Self-employed 8.33 6.64 10.30 9.18 10.10 
Wage earners 78.95 92.01 80.81 86.38 85.69 
Capital owners 2.73 0.88 6.02 2.36 2.12 
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Notes: 𝐼𝐶𝐵 is the initial indifference curve of the taxpayer with an income 𝑧
∗ + 𝑑𝑧∗. The introduction of the kink induces this taxpayer to 
reduce her income towards 𝑧∗ and hence, her new indifference curve is 𝐼𝐶𝐵
′ . 𝐼𝐶𝑁 is the indifference curve of the non-buncher (unaffected 
by the kink). Panel B is the result of Panel A, it illustrates that all taxpayers with an income in [ 𝑧∗, 𝑧∗ + 𝑑𝑧∗] cluster around the kink point 
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2.B Additional evidence: Dynamics of bunching  
 
Figure B.1: Dynamics of bunching 
 
 
Notes: Figure B.1 displays the histogram of taxable income for married taxpayers with no child in Andalusia. Panels A and B are for wage 
earners, and Panels C and D are for women. Taxable income is defined as base income minus itemized deductions and is the same in both 
years. I consider income from all sources, except savings. Histograms are computed using sample weights and for a given year before and 
after the reform. The MTR schedule is displayed by the dashed line and corresponds to each year (taking into account the tax reform) for 
the correspondent AC. The first four tax kink points are displayed by the vertical lines on the graph and are the same in both years: 0€, 17 
707€, 33 007€, 53 407€. Bins 100€. Interior bunching is at 4 000€ in the post-reform year for both groups. 
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Table B.1: Elasticity of taxable income, dynamics of bunching 
 
Kink Bandwidth a 
Pre-reform year Post-reform year 
(1) (2) 
Panel A: Married0, Andalusia, Wage earners 
1st 1 500 € 
0.25*** 4.67*** 
(0.09) (0.43) 
2nd 1 500 € 
-0.03 -0.03 
(0.21) (0.17) 
3rd 1 000 € 
-0.07* 0.15** 
(0.04) (0.07) 
4th 1 000 € 
-0.10*** 0.06*** 
(0.01) (0.09) 
IntB 1 000 € 
- 1.27*** 
- (0.18) 
Panel B: Married0, Andalusia, Women 
1st 1 500 € 
10.59*** 15.48*** 
(0.56) (0.40) 
2nd 1 500 € 
0.64 -0.22 
(0.44) (0.26) 
3rd 1 000 € 
-0.13** 0.39** 
(0.06) (0.17) 
4th 1 000 € 
-0.23*** 0.24*** 
(0.02) (0.06) 




Notes: Table B.1 shows the elasticity estimates for the B, BH, A, H, AB and IntB detected in the pre- and post-reform year in Fig. B.1. 
Standard errors are in parentheses; all are computed using the delta method. Significance levels are *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
a  The bandwidth selected captures best the result and estimates are consistent with what is visually detected. 
b (-) means no interior bunching is visually detected in the income distribution.
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2.C Additional evidence: Bunchers 
 
Figure C.1: Bunchers, by gender 
 
 
Notes: Panel A displays the histogram of taxable income for Married0 (left) and Married1 (right). Panels B and C break all the sample for 
women and for men, respectively. Taxable income is defined as base income minus itemized deductions. I consider income from all 
sources, except savings. Histograms are computed using sample weights and for a given year over 2010-2014. In this case I have 
generalized the MTRs because the figure is not for a specific AC. The first four tax kink points are displayed by the vertical lines on the 
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Figure C.2: Bunchers, by type of tax return  
 
      
Notes: Panel A displays the histogram of taxable income for Married0 (left) and Married1 (right). Panels B and C break all the sample for 
taxpayers reporting individually and for taxpayers reporting jointly, respectively. Taxable income is defined as base income minus itemized 
deductions. I consider income from all sources, except savings. Histograms are computed using sample weights and for a given year over 
2010-2014. In this case I have generalized the MTRs because the figure is not for a specific AC. The first four tax kink points are displayed 
by the vertical lines on the graph and are the same in both AC: 0€, 17 707€, 33 007€, 53 407€. Bins 100€. Interior bunching: Married0 (4 
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Figure C.3: Bunchers, by main income source 
  
Notes: Panel A displays the histogram of taxable income for Married0 (left) and Married1 (right). Panels B and C break all the sample for 
wage earners and for self-employed individuals, respectively. Taxable income is defined as base income minus itemized deductions. I 
consider income from all sources, except savings. Histograms are computed using sample weights and for a given year over 2010-2014. 
In this case I have generalized the MTRs because the figure is not for a specific AC. The first four tax kink points are displayed by the 
vertical lines on the graph and are the same in both AC: 0€, 17 707€, 33 007€, 53 407€. Bins 100€. Interior bunching: Married0 (4 000€) 
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Table C.1: Elasticity of taxable income, bunchers 
 
Kink Bandwidth 





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Panel A: Married0 
1st 1 000 € 
9.29*** 9.59*** 9.03*** 5.50*** 10.57*** -0.43*** 11.36*** 
(0.13) (0.29) (0.12) (0.35) (0.10) (0.03) (0.74) 
2nd 1 500 € 
0.12* -0.18* 0.32*** 0.12 0.11 0.18** -0.10 
(0.06) (0.10) (0.08) (0.09) (0.10) (0.07) (0.19) 
3rd 1 000 € 
0.00 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.03 0.02 -0.28*** 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) 
4th 1 500 € 
0.04*** 0.00 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.00 0.04*** -0.04* 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) 
IntB 1 000 € 
1.49*** 2.44*** - 2.07*** - 1.94*** - 
(0.08) (0.11) - (0.09) - (0.09) - 
Panel B: Married1 
1st 1 500 € 
7.12*** 11.26*** 10.73*** 3.82*** 8.66*** 0.94*** 5.45*** 
(0.17) (0.22) (0.20) (0.30) (0.12) (0.07) (0.48) 
2nd 1 500 € 
0.14 0.30* 0.06 0.21* -0.03 0.16* -0.16 
(0.09) (0.17) (0.10) (0.12) (0.13) (0.09) (0.27) 
3rd 2 000 € 
0.14*** 0.19*** 0.11*** 0.17*** 0.03 0.14*** 0.10 
(0.04) (0.07) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.12) 
4th 1 500 € 
-0.02*** 0.24*** -0.08*** -0.03*** 0.01 -0.03*** 0.11** 
(0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) 
IntB 1 500 € 
0.44*** - 0.58*** 0.42*** - 0.45*** 0.11 
(0.09) - (0.12) (0.12) - (0.10) (0.24) 
 
Notes: Table C.1 shows the elasticity estimates for the B, BH, A, H, AB and IntB detected in Fig. C.1-C3. Standard errors are in 
parentheses; all are computed using the delta method. Significance levels are *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
Essays on Behavioral Responses to Taxation 
63 
 





























N 3057464 2689616 
 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels are *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Controls: marital status, number of child 
and Year. Base categories: women, individual tax filing and wage earners. Bandwidth 1 500€. 
a  This regression is run to verify who bunch at the first tax kink.  
b (-) means no interior bunching is visually detected in the income distribution.
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2.D Additional evidence: Effects of deductions 
 
Figure D.1: Effects of deductions, by gender 
 
 
Notes: Figure D.1 displays the histogram of gross income (Panel A), base income (Panel B) and taxable income (Panel C) for married 
women taxpayers with no child in Andalusia (left) and married men taxpayers with one child in Castile-La Mancha (right). Graphs in each 
socio-economic group are for the same AC and the same year in order to be comparable. Gross income is defined as the sum of all sources 
of income, base income is gross income minus standard deductions and taxable income is base income minus itemized deductions. 
Histograms are computed using sample weights. The MTR schedule is displayed by the dashed line and corresponds to the AC analyzed. 
The first four tax kink points are displayed by the vertical lines on the graph and are exactly the same in both AC: 0€, 17 707€, 33 007€, 
53 407€. Bins 100€. Interior bunching, for Married0: GIG (4 800€), BIG (4 000€), TIG (4 000€) and for Married1: GIG (13 500€), BIG 
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Figure D.2: Effects of deductions, by type of tax return 
 
  
Notes: Figure D.2 displays the histogram of gross income (Panel A), base income (Panel B) and taxable income (Panel C) for married 
taxpayers with no child who report individually in Andalusia (left) and married taxpayers with one child who report individually in Castile-
La Mancha (right). Graphs in each socio-economic group are for the same AC and the same year in order to be comparable. Gross income 
is defined as the sum of all sources of income, base income is gross income minus standard deductions and taxable income is base income 
minus itemized deductions. Histograms are computed using sample weights. The MTR schedule is displayed by the dashed line and 
corresponds to the AC analyzed. The first four tax kink points are displayed by the vertical lines on the graph and are exactly the same in 
both AC: 0€, 17 707€, 33 007€, 53 407€. Bins 100€. Interior bunching, for Married0: GIG (4 800€), BIG (4 000€), TIG (4 000€) and for 
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Figure D.3: Effects of deductions, by main income source 
 
   
Notes: Figure D.3 displays the histogram of gross income (Panel A), base income (Panel B) and taxable income (Panel C) for married 
wage earners with no child in Andalusia (left) and married wage earners with one child in Castile-La Mancha (right). Graphs in each socio-
economic group are for the same AC and the same year in order to be comparable. Gross income is defined as the sum of all sources of 
income, base income is gross income minus standard deductions and taxable income is base income minus itemized deductions. Histograms 
are computed using sample weights. The MTR schedule is displayed by the dashed line and corresponds to the AC analyzed. The first four 
tax kink points are displayed by the vertical lines on the graph and are exactly the same in both AC: 0€, 17 707€, 33 007€, 53 407€. Bins 
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Table D.1: Income elasticity estimates, effects of deductions 
Kink Bandwidth a 
Gross income Base income Taxable income 
(1) (2) (3) 
Panel A: Married0, Andalusia, Women 
1stb 1 000 € 
- - 5.54*** 
- - (0.59) 
2nd 1 000 € 
0.00 -0.46*** -0.36** 
(0.18) (0.15) (0.17) 
3rd 1 000 € 
-0.13*** 0.19 0.39** 
(0.05) (0.12) (0.17) 
4th 1 000 € 
-0.08* 0.37*** 0.24*** 
(0.04) (0.08) (0.06) 
IntB 1 000 € 
1.71*** 0.29*** 1.59*** 
(0.09) (0.05) (0.22) 
Panel B: Married0, Andalusia, Individual 
1stb 1 000 € 
- - 1.53*** 
- - (0.28) 
2nd 1 000 € 
-0.01 -0.26* -0.13 
(0.15) (0.15) (0.16) 
3rd 1 000 € 
-0.19*** 0.12 0.15* 
(0.03) (0.08) (0.08) 
4th 1 000 € 
-0.02 0.08*** 0.08*** 
(0.04) (0.03) (0.02) 
IntB 1 000 € 
0.89*** 0.24*** 0.83*** 
(0.05) (0.04) (0.17) 
Panel C: Married0, Andalusia, Wage earners 
1stb 1 000 € 
- - -0.52*** 
- - (0.05) 
2nd 1 000 € 
0.11 -0.04 0.03 
(0.12) (0.13) (0.14) 
3rd 1 000 € 
-0.14*** 0.13** 0.15** 
(0.03) (0.06) (0.07) 
4th 1 000 € 
0.03 0.06*** 0.06*** 
(0.04) (0.02) (0.02) 
IntB 1 000 € 
2.05*** 0.22*** 1.27*** 
(0.12) (0.04) (0.18) 
 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses; all are computed using the delta method. Significance levels are *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
a The bandwidth selected captures best the result and estimates are consistent with what is visually detected. 
b (-) means no interior bunching is visually detected in the income distribution. 
c Note that Married0 has a spike at 1 500€ with TIG. This spike is not taken as an interior bunching because it is captured in the bunching 
window of the 1st kink. It must be taken with caution because it can over-estimate the ETI. 
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Table D.2: Income elasticity estimates, effects of deductions 
Kink Bandwidth a 
Gross income Base income Taxable income 
(1) (2) (3) 
Panel A: Married1, CM,  Men 
1st 2 000 € 
- - 4.17*** 
- - (0.60) 
2nd 1 500 € 
0.19 0.46 0.59 
(0.24) (0.32) (0.38) 
3rd 1 500 € 
0.02 0.38* 0.17 
(0.12) (0.20) (0.15) 
4th 1 500 € 
0.02 -0.15*** 0.11* 
(0.10) (0.04) (0.05) 
IntB 1 500 € 
0.18*** 0.17*** 0.84** 
(0.06) (0.07) (0.382) 
Panel B: Married1, CM,  Individual 
1st 2 000 € 
- - 0.71** 
- - (0.33) 
2nd 1 500 € 
0.20 0.54 1.02** 
(0.29) (0.43) (0.48) 
3rd 1 500 € 
0.18 0.39* 0.31 
(0.15) (0.23) (0.20) 
4th 1 500 € 
-0.06 -0.10** 0.08 
(0.10) (0.05) (0.06) 
IntB 1 500 € 
0.09* 0.17*** 1.25*** 
(0.05) (0.07) (0.42) 
Panel C: Married1, CM,  Wage earners 
1st 2 000 € 
- - -0.08 
- - (0.14) 
2nd 1 500 € 
0.01 0.45 0.68** 
(0.20) (0.29) (0.34) 
3rd 1 500 € 
0.05 0.34** 0.21 
(0.10) (0.17) (0.14) 
4th 1 500 € 
-0.07 -0.11*** 0.07 
(0.08) (0.04) (0.05) 
IntB 1 500 € 
0.07 0.23*** 1.10*** 
(0.04) (0.07) (0.35) 
 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses; all are computed using the delta method. Significance levels are *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
a  The bandwidth selected captures best the result and estimates are consistent with what is visually detected. 
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2.E Additional evidence: Effects of itemizing 
 
Figure E.1: Effects of itemizing, savings taxable income 
 
  
Notes: Panel A displays the histogram of savings taxable income for Married0 (left) and Married1 (right). Panels B and C break the overall 
sample for taxpayers who only use the deduction for joint declaration and for those who use deductions to pension contributions, 
respectively. Savings taxable income contains shareholder funds, equity capital, insurances (life, disability), capitalization operations and 
life annuities. I have restricted the range to observations above 2 000€ to avoid the spike at zero. Histograms are computed using sample 
weights and for a given year over 2010-2014. In this case, I have generalized the MTRs from savings taxable income because the figure 
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Table E.1: Elasticity of taxable income, effects of itemizing 
 
Kinkd Bandwidth 
All Itemized_C Itemized_PP 
(1) (2) (3) 
Panel A: Married0, Self-employed 
2nd 200 
3.26*** -0.10 1.51** 
(0.76) (0.89) (0.74) 
3rd 200 
- - - 
- - - 
Panel B: Married1, Self-employed 
2nd 150 
0.90** 0.16 5.64** 
(0.37) (0.53) (2.38) 
3rd 150 
-0.45*** - -0.44*** 
(0.02) - (0.03) 
 
Notes: Table E.1 shows the elasticity estimates for the bunching detected in Fig. E.1. Standard errors are in parentheses; all are computed 
using the delta method. Significance levels are *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
a The bandwidth selected captures best the result and estimates are consistent with what is visually detected. 
b Itemized_C refers to individuals who only use the deduction for joint declaration and Itemized_PP refers to individuals who only use 
deductions to pension contributions. 
c (-) means no interior bunching is visually detected in the income distribution. 
d . I have restricted the range to observations above 2 000€ to avoid the spike at zero. Therefore, the 2nd and the 3rd tax kinks are displayed 
in Fig. E.1. 
 











How much does it cost to Spanish taxpayers to raise an 




“There are many fascinating theoretical and empirical issues to be addressed in public finance. 
But none is more important than measuring the effects of tax rate changes and the costs of 
incremental tax revenue” (Feldstein 1996, p. 27). Chapter 3 addresses both captivating issues through 
the estimation of the marginal costs of public funds (MCF). The MCF is one of the most important 
concepts in the field of public economics as it captures the costs of an increment on public spending. 
These costs – known as the costs of taxation – depend both on the “magnitude of the tax rate change 
that is required to raise the needed revenue and the deadweight loss associated with such change” 
(Feldstein 1996, p. 21)1. Both, in turn, depend on a full range of behavioral responses of taxpayers 
to the modification of marginal tax rates (MTRs). These behavioral responses arise because taxpayers 
alter their economic decisions and engage in certain activities to minimize the effect of tax changes2. 
In this way, taxes distort the allocation of resources in an economy producing inefficiencies and 
reducing tax revenue by a substantial amount. For this reason, in the last decades, a wide range of 
empirical studies have used the elasticity of taxable income (ETI) to calculate the marginal 
distortionary costs of taxation. This parameter – introduced by Feldstein (1995, 1999) – has the 
advantage to capture all behavioral responses to taxation in a single elasticity measure and be used, 
under some assumptions, to study the efficiency costs and the welfare implications associated to tax 
reforms (Saez et al. 2012). 
                                                          
1 Slemrod and Yitzhaki (1996) encountered four additional costs apart from the deadweight loss: the administrative 
costs, the compliance costs, the excess burden of tax evasion and the avoidance costs. This work only considers the 
deadweight loss. 
2 There are three types of behavioral responses: tax evasion, tax avoidance and real responses (changes in hours of 
work, effort, productivity, etc.). Income shifting is classified as a tax avoidance response and takes two forms: (i) inter-
income shifting, that is when taxpayers alter the timing of their reported income, and (ii) intra-income shifting, that is when 
income is shifted between individuals or tax bases. This work focus on intra-income shifting responses between tax bases, 
so I will use the term income shifting and intra-income shifting interchangeably throughout the chapter.  
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The aim of this chapter is twofold. First, calculate the costs of financing incremental government 
spending associated with the implementation of the Royal-Decree Law 20/2011. In this way, provide 
a money measure of the change in welfare facing different groups of the population. Second, show 
the effect of income shifting (IS) on the welfare analysis of income taxation. For doing so, I estimate 
the ETI by Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) correcting for mean reversion, heterogeneous income 
trends and endogeneity bias. Based on these estimates, I determine the impact of the reform on tax 
revenue, well-being and efficiency. Furthermore, I explore the sensitivity of findings to income-
shifting possibilities, variations in timing and different identification strategies. The data source for 
this exercise is a panel of tax returns from the Spanish Institute for Fiscal Studies over 2009-2014 
period.  
 
Chapter 3 has four main results. First, the elasticity estimates suggest that women are more 
responsive to tax changes than men. Moreover, I find that these estimates are quite sensitive to the 
length of the time-window over which the behavioral responses are observed, to capital gains and to 
the identification specification. Second, findings show that raising an extra euro of tax revenue entails 
substantial efficiency costs, especially in the year immediate to the reform. On average, for the entire 
population, the MCF is: 3.94 (in 2012), 2.47 (in 2013) and 1.88 (in 2014). In consequence, an 
important fraction of tax revenue is lost because of efficiency costs. At national level, the fraction of 
tax revenue lost through behavioral responses is approximately: 73% (in 2012), 58% (in 2013) and 
46% (in 2014). Third, results indicate that the welfare loss from raising an additional euro of tax 
revenue is not the same for all Spanish taxpayers. In particular, I find that it is especially high for 
Catalan taxpayers and for self-employed individuals. Fourth, results show that welfare costs are quite 
sensitive to the introduction of IS responses. When I assume that half of income shifts from the 
general base to the savings base, the fraction of tax revenue lost due to behavioral responses drops 
from 73% to 52% (in 2012), from 58% to 41% (in 2013) and from 46% to 32% (in 2014).  
 
The literature about the MCF is vast and diverse3. In the last decades, the literature has evidenced 
an increasing concern on this concept and on its application to different tax instruments and 
government expenditures4. Also, many incorporations have been made to the estimation of the MCF 
for a proper design of the tax system such as: distributional concerns, multiple-rate tax structures, 
tax bases’ interaction, externalities and public expenditure5. In Spain, studies give rise to different 
                                                          
3 The introduction of the concept of excess burden was in the 1960s and it was mainly verbal and descriptive. Empirical 
studies related to the MCF started with Harberger (1964) and Browning (1976). Nowadays, the literature is vast and much 
of it is fragmented because of the different measures used for the MCF such as marginal welfare cost, marginal excess 
burden, marginal efficiency cost and marginal deadweight loss (Dahlby 2008). 
4 Such as social security transfers (Bjertnaes, 2015), PIT, VAT and CIT (Dahlby and Ferede, 2018), grants (Dahlby 
and Ferede, 2016) and green taxes (Barrios et al. 2013). 
5 See: Giertz (2009), Blomquist and Simula (2010), Claus et al. (2012), Vasquez and Balistreri (2010), Chandoevwit 
and Dahlby (2007), Auriol and Warlters (2015). 
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measures and magnitudes of the MCF6. Indeed, there is no reason to expect a consensus value of the 
MCF as it depends on the particular reform examined and, most important, because it is remarkably 
responsive to the magnitude of the ETI. 
 
Chapter 3 draws upon the broad literature of the MCF (for a deep review see Dahlby 2008), the 
recent income shifting literature (Devereux et al. 2014; Le Maire and Shjerning 2013; Harju and 
Matikka 2014) and the studies of the ETI (see Giertz 2009 and Saez et al. 2012 for an exhaustive 
review of the literature). In that sense, the contributions of this chapter to the literature are threefold. 
First, the tendency for the analysis of the MCF has been in the context of identical individuals and 
the top tax bracket (Creedy and Gemmell 2013). In this work, I use the MCF to evaluate the increase 
in all marginal tax rates that is imposed to heterogeneous individuals under a progressive tax. In this 
way, I illustrate how increases in tax rates are likely to be revenue-enhancing for some groups of the 
population. Second, studies usually distinguish between real responses and tax-motivated income 
shifting in the calculation of the ETI, but few analyze the implications of IS on well-being. As far as 
I am concerned, there is no empirical study about IS in Spain apart from a recent paper by López-
Laborda et al. (2018). Providing new ETI estimates for Spain is the third contribution. The tax reform 
analyzed in this work was the most important tax modification done in the context of the 2008 
economic crisis, with a significant impact on Spanish public finances. Therefore, as Sanz-Sanz 
(2016) claimed, the case of Spain is of interest in itself given the scarce studies on the evaluation of 
tax reforms.  
 
The structure of this chapter is as follows. First, I present the basic theoretical framework in which 
I derive mathematically the ETI, the marginal revenue changes and the welfare changes caused by a 
tax modification. Then, I explain the empirical strategies used in the calculation of the main 
parameters. After this, I briefly describe the dual-income tax and the data used in the analysis. Finally, 
I present the main results and conclude. 
 
 
3.2 Theoretical framework 
 
The goal of this section is to develop the appropriate framework to analyze the deadweight burden 
caused by tax modifications. I begin with a brief review of the ETI; then, based on this parameter, I 
derive the analytical expressions needed for the quantification of the MCF. 
                                                          
6 For instance, Alonso-Carrera and Manzano (2003) estimated a MCF of 1.26-1.32 for the period 1970-1994. A similar 
study done by Sancho (2003) obtained a MCF of about 1.50 for 1990. A more detailed study is provided by González-
Páramo and Sanz-Sanz (2003) who estimated a MCF of 1.39 for married workers (1.11 for men and 1.92 for women) for 
the year 1999. Recently, Diaz and Onrubia (2018) found a MCF between 1.01-1.25 for the PIT reform of 2006. 
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3.2.1 Behavioral responses to taxation 
 
As showed by Feldstein (1999), in the absence of income effects7, the optimization of the utility 
function 𝑢𝑖(𝑐, 𝑧) with respect to the budget constraint 𝑐 = (1 − 𝜏)𝑧 + 𝜇 leads to the following 
reported income function:  𝑧∗ = 𝑧(1 − 𝜏)𝑒, where 𝑐 is consumption, (1 − 𝜏) is the net-of-tax rate, 𝜇 
denotes virtual income and 𝑧 is reported income. Under this framework, consider a marginal change 
in (1 − 𝜏). By using the standard definition of substitution elasticity and the reported income 





 (Harju and Matikka 2014). 
  
This behavioral elasticity calculates “the response of taxable income to a change in the marginal 
net-of-tax rate” (Creedy 2011, p. 271). But most important, through this reduced-form concept of the 
ETI, Feldstein (1995, 1999) contributed to “eliminate the need to construct and estimate a fully 
structural model with all taxpayers’ behavioral responses”, so that welfare measurements can be 
readily discussed and expressed explicitly in terms of the elasticity (Creedy 2013, p.1). Based on 
this, estimate the ETI is all I need for welfare analysis as it captures all individuals’ responses to 
taxation – IS being one of them8.  
 
3.2.2 Marginal revenue changes  
 
The Spanish PIT has two different tax bases: the general base (taxed by 𝜏𝑔) and the savings base 
(taxed by 𝜏𝑠), where 0 < 𝜏𝑠 < 𝜏𝑔 < 1 (see Table B.1.1)
9. In this context, it is reasonable to consider 
that the reduction in reported income in response to the 2011 tax reform was due in part to a shift 
away from the general base toward the savings base10.  This hypothesis rests on two intuitions:  
 
(a) The possibility of IS exists whenever there is another schedule where income is taxed at a 
lower tax rate. In these cases, taxpayers have tax opportunities for moving toward the tax base 
with a lower tax rate11.  
                                                          
7 This assumption is common in the ETI literature because it simplifies considerably the analysis and because income 
effects are found to be non-statistically different from zero. See Arrazola et al. (2014) and Sanz-Sanz et al. (2015) for 
Spain, and Gruber and Saez (2002), Weber (2014) and Burns and Ziliak (2017) for U.S. 
8 However, this should be taken with caution in the presence of fiscal externalities. For instance, if IS exists and is 
important in the tax schedule, the ETI may overstate the efficiency costs of taxation because the reduction in reported 
income could be due to a shift away from one tax base to another also taxed (Harju and Matikka 2014). In this context, 
income shifting is not a full deadweight loss because it generates additional tax revenue. I will come back to this point in 
Section 3.5. 
9 This relation is valid for 2011-2014, except for 2012-2014 (tax bracket 1). 
10 The increase on the PIT rate could induce some taxpayers to leave the PIT schedule toward the corporate income tax 
or to informality. However, these two possibilities are out of our scope of study since the dataset covers only registered 
taxpayers reporting their individual tax returns.  
11 Usually, in structural models with IS – as in Piketty et al. (2013) – there is a cost for shifting income from one source 
to another. This work assumes this cost is non-significant or inexistent. 
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(b) The 2011 tax reform reinforced the IS incentives of taxpayers, as the difference between tax 
rates increased, especially for high-income earners (see Table B.1.1)12. Hence, I expect that a 
fraction of income disappears from the general base following the tax rate increase 𝑑𝜏𝑔.  
 
Based on these two intuitions, I extend the analysis of Sanz-Sanz (2016) to see the effect of the 
2011 tax reform on tax revenue in the presence of IS possibilities. In the multi-rate structure of the 
Spanish PIT, the tax paid by an individual 𝑖 with taxable income 𝑧𝑖 is determined by a set of income 
thresholds 𝑎𝑔, … , 𝑎𝐺 , marginal tax rates 𝜏𝑔, … , 𝜏𝐺  and non-genuine allowances 𝑚𝑔13. Let’s suppose 
that the government increases all MTRs from the general tax base 𝑑𝜏𝑔, while leaving income 
thresholds unchanged14. The effect on total revenue from a population of taxpayers caused by this 
increment, denoted 𝑀𝑅𝑔, is determined as (Sanz-Sanz 2016, p. 46):  
 












)] 𝑑𝜏𝑔    (1) 
 
Note that 𝑑𝜏𝑔 induce two effects on tax revenue
15. (i) The mechanical effect (first term in 
parenthesis), defined as “the projected increase in tax revenue, absent any behavioral response” (Saez 
et al. 2012, p. 7). This effect, in turn, depends on the impact of 𝑑𝜏𝑔 on the tax due and on the tax 
savings derived from the entitle allowances (Sanz-Sanz 2016). (ii) The behavioral effect (second 
term in parenthesis), defined as the change in tax revenue due to behavioral responses. The 
decomposition of these two effects is crucial in the analysis of a tax modification because they move 
in opposite directions and together allow the calculation of the total revenue impact that would be 
expected from a tax modification (Arrazola et al. 2014). The total revenue paid by the 𝑔-th rate can 
be decomposed as16: 
 
                                                          
12 Table B.1.1 shows that before the tax reform of 2011 the gap between the MTR for general income and that for 
savings ranged from 3 to 5 percentage points for the lowest-income earners, and from 26 to 28 percentage points for the 
richest. After the tax reform, this gap was reduced for the lowest-income earners (-2.25 to 3.75) and increased for the richest 
(27 to 33). 
13 Sanz-Sanz (2016, p.44) specifies the tax function as: 𝑅𝑖=𝜏𝑔𝑖[𝑧𝑖 − 𝑎𝑔𝑖
′ ] − 𝑚𝑖𝑛[𝜏𝑚𝑖 . (𝑚𝑖 − 𝑎𝑚𝑖
′ ), 𝑅𝑖], where 𝑎𝑔𝑖
′  and 
𝑎𝑚𝑖
′  denote the effective tax thresholds for 𝑧𝑖 and 𝑚𝑖, respectively.  Note that Sanz-Sanz differentiates genuine from non-
genuine allowances because in the Spanish case the tax schedule is applied “to the personal and family allowances in order 
to subtract the obtained result from the derivative of applying the same tax schedule to taxpayer’s gross income” (Sanz-
Sanz 2016, p. 43). 
14 In fact, the 2011 tax reform increased the MTRs from both tax bases (general and savings). However, I ignore 𝑑𝜏𝑠  
assuming that the total revenue effect of responses from 𝑑𝜏𝑠 are second order. Therefore, all the analytical expressions 
refer to the general base. 
15 A third effect is the adjustment of public expenditure (redistribution). For tractability, this study only takes efficiency 
considerations, no distributional issues. In other words, I assume governments’ taste for redistribution is zero.  
16 See Sanz-Sanz (2016) for the complete derivation. 
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) ?̅?𝑧𝑔,1−𝜏𝑔 . 𝑧?̅?. 𝑁𝑔]} . 𝑑𝜏𝑔         (3) 
 
Where, 𝑁𝑔 (𝑁𝑔
𝑚) is the number of taxpayers whose taxable income (allowances) falls within rage 
𝑔, 𝑁𝑔
+(𝑁𝑔
𝑚+) is the number of taxpayers with taxable income (allowances) above 𝑎𝑔+1, 𝑧?̅? (?̅?𝑔) is 
the arithmetic mean of taxable income (allowances) falling within 𝑔, 𝑠 is the fraction of income that 
shifted from the general base to the savings base17, 𝜏𝑠 is the average tax rate from the savings base at 
which the shifted income is taxed and ?̅?𝑧𝑔,1−𝜏𝑔 is the average elasticity in bracket 𝑔 – weighted by 
individual income18.  
 
3.2.3 Marginal welfare changes  
 
The decomposition of the mechanical effect (ME) and the behavioral effect (BE) is important not 
only because it shed lights on the revenue impact of a tax change, but also because it allows the 
calculation of the well-being and the efficiency effects of the tax change (Arrazola et al. 2014). 
Because the behavioral responses to a tax change creates no additional welfare loss, the value of the 
ME approximates to the utility loss (measured in monetary terms) – known as the Equivalent 
Variation. See Section 3.A for the analytical derivation of this approximation. Hence, the BE roughly 
quantifies the variation in the deadweight loss or “the burden imposed on the taxpayer at the margin”, 
called the marginal excess burden (Slemrod and Yitzhaki 1996, p. 185). Consequently, the marginal 
welfare cost (MWC) of a given tax change, defined as the ratio between the marginal excess burden 
and the revenue variation is given by19: 
 
                                                          
17 Note that 𝑠 is not the fraction of total taxable income that is taxed at 𝜏𝑠, instead it is the fraction of general base 
taxable income (𝑧𝑔).  
18  Two observations with respect to Eq. (3). First, as in most of the literature, I assume that all individuals in a given 
tax bracket have the same elasticity. Second, I assume that behavioral effects do not affect average tax rates. By doing so, 
“behavioral effects are confined to taxpayers in the corresponding tax bracket”, while “mechanical ones are spread forward” 
through effective tax thresholds (Sanz-Sanz 2016, p. 49). 
19 This expression is only relevant when ME>BE, because it means that the tax rate is below the tax rate that would 
maximize tax revenue (i.e. the Laffer tax rate). So, there is still room for raising tax revenue (𝑀𝑅𝑔 > 0). 









      (4) 
 
The 𝑀𝑊𝐶𝑔 measures the change in well-being per euro of extra tax revenue resulting from a tax 
rate modification. Based on this expression, the MCF is calculated as20: 𝑀𝐶𝐹𝑔 = 1 + 𝑀𝑊𝐶𝑔. 
 
The advantage of working with microdata is that most of the parameters needed in the calculation 
of the marginal excess burden are relatively straightforward to measure. So that, 𝜏𝑠 and ?̅?𝑧𝑔,1−𝜏𝑔  are 
the only two parameters necessary in the computation of the 𝑀𝐶𝐹𝑔. The former is readily calculated 
assuming that 𝑠 take the following values: 0, 0.1, 0.3, 0.5. However, the estimation of the elasticity 
is more complex and is explained in the next section.  
 
 
3.3 Empirical methodology 
 
In this section I set up a simple model, formally laid out in Gruber and Saez (2002), for the 
estimation of the elasticity. Also, I characterize the main econometric issues that underlines the 
estimation and explain the strategies of identification followed to get consistent estimates.  
 
3.3.1 Regression specification  
 
I regress the change in log annual taxable income on the change in the log net-of-tax rate, 
conditional on some function of base-year income to control for possible mean reversion, and on 
further demographic controls to capture changes in reported income not caused by the tax change21: 
 
∆ log 𝑧𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1∆ log(1 − 𝜏𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽2𝑓(𝑧𝑖𝑡−1) + 𝛽3𝑋
′
𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡        (5) 
 
Where, ∆ represents the difference in the variable between the year 𝑡 and the base-year 𝑡 − 1. In 
this regression the individual ETI is represented by 𝛽1, “it measures to what extent taxpayers respond 
to marginal incentives or, in other words, to what extent they generate less taxable income when 
facing a higher MTR” (Kiss and Mosberger 2015, p.886). 
                                                          
20 The analytical expressions derived in this section are inevitably affected by the economic context. So, the impact of 
the economic cycle could be incorporated in the formulations developed above. A study on this matter can be found in 
Creedy and Sanz-Sanz (2010, 2011). 
21 These control variables include demographic variables (i.e. taxpayer’s gender, marital status, age and age squared), 
household characteristics (i.e. type of tax return) and other variables, as taxpayer’s main income source (i.e. whether 
taxpayers are self-employed, wage earners and capital owners).  
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The literature has identified two main problems with regard to the estimation of the ETI: 
 
(a) The endogeneity problem: Given the existing endogeneity between reported income and the 
marginal tax rate, any estimation of Eq. (5) by OLS is biased. This problem is solved, as in 
much of the literature, using the instrumental variable (IV) estimation procedure. Therefore, 
Eq. (5) is estimated by Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) using as instrument the predicted tax 
rate (𝜏𝑖𝑡
𝑝
). To construct 𝜏𝑖𝑡
𝑝
, I index all pre-reform taxable income with the corresponding CPI22 
that year and recalculate the corresponding amount as if the pre-reform indexed income would 
be taxed according to post-reform year regulations23 (see Auten and Carroll 1999; Gruber and 
Saez 2002). 
 
(b) The mean reversion problem: This phenomenon is caused by changes in income distribution 
and occurs when taxpayers experience high income in one year and then low income in the 
next, aside from any tax change. The possibility of mean reversion biases the estimates, so to 
rule out inconsistent estimates: (i) I introduce some function of base-year income 𝑓(𝑧𝑖𝑡−1) as 
a control variable, (ii) I use additional demographic controls, and (iii) I eliminate the lowest-




3.3.2 Identification strategies 
 
There is a growing concern in the literature that the IV is not sufficiently exogenous as it depends 
on base-year income25. For this reason, several methods have been risen to overcome this potential 
threat of endogeneity in the IV. This study uses two methods, one proposed by Weber (2014) and 
the other by Gruber and Saez (2002). First, to construct the IV, I use lagged base-year income (2009, 
2010) and exceptionally base-year income (2011). In this manner, as Weber (2014) argued, the IV is 
more exogenous to the error term. Different numbers of lags in the IV are also provided in Table C.2 
to warrant the robustness of baseline results.  
 
                                                          
22 CPI: 3.3% (2011), 1% (2010) and 0.8% (2009). Source: National Statistics Institute (INE). 
23 It is as if income does not change from 𝑡 − 1 to  𝑡, or as if taxpayers have their base-year income in both years and, 
in case of any change in income, it is solely due to inflation. Therefore, to calculate 𝜏𝑖𝑡
𝑝
 I assume nothing has change 
from 𝑡 − 1 to  𝑡, except inflation.  
24 I eliminate the individuals whose gross income pre-reform was below the Public Income Indicator of Multiple Effects 
(PIIME) which was 6 390.13 € (in 2011). 
25 Any shock to base-year income affects the IV and makes it correlated with the error term in the regression equation. 
Consequently, it does not satisfy one of the two requirements for an IV to be valid: (i) Relevance: 𝑐𝑜𝑣[Δlog(1−𝜏𝑖𝑡), 
Δlog(1−𝜏𝑖𝑡
𝑝
)| 𝑋′𝑖𝑡] > 0, where 𝑋
′
𝑖𝑡 is any other covariate included in the regression. (ii) Exogeneity: 𝑐𝑜𝑣[Δ log(1 −𝜏𝑖𝑡
𝑝
), 𝑢𝑖𝑡] 
= 0. See: Weber (2014). 
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Second, to faced out the potential endogeneity in the IV, the income control 𝑓(𝑧𝑖𝑡−1) takes the 
form of 10-piece splines in the lagged value of the dependent variable (∆ 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑧it−1), exceptionally it 
takes the form of 20-piece splines in the logarithm of the base-year income (𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑧it−1). This income 
control serves the purpose of controlling for income shocks, especially for transitory shocks which 
seems to be serially correlated, according to Weber (2014). Other specifications are also provided in 
Table C.3 to assess the sensitivity of baseline results.  
 
 
3.4 Institutional setting and data 
 
3.4.1 The Personal income tax in Spain 
 
The Spanish PIT has tree peculiarities that need to be taken into consideration in the analysis: 
 
(a) Since 2007, it has two different bases, the general base and the savings base. Both taxed 
according to a progressive schedule. The general base is composed by six types of incomes: 
(1) labor, (2) economic activities, (3) movable capital (derived from intellectual and industrial 
property, technical assistance, renting of movable property, businesses or mines, subletting 
and leasing image rights), (4) immovable capital, (5) capital gains (not derived from the 
transfer of assets), and (6) income from special regimes and imputed income. On the other 
hand, the savings base has two components: movable capital (derived from dividends, interest, 
income from insurance and capitalization operations) and capital gains (derived from 
transmissions and reimbursements of assets). 
 
(b) Since 2009, central and regional governments (ACs) can legislate over their PIT schedule, 
ACs have 50% of capacity over MTRs, deductions and tax bases. In the estimations, I take the 
tax rate and the income thresholds due by each taxpayer depending on his or her reported 
taxable income and Autonomous Community of residence. Therefore, the tax rate I use is a 
combination of the tax rates set by both governments (see Table B.1)26.  
 
(c) Since 2007, personal and family allowances take the form of tax credits, instead of tax 
deductions. 
 
                                                          
26 It is not a combination of 𝜏𝑔 and 𝜏𝑠 because IS force the distinction between the tax rate from the recipient tax base 
(𝜏𝑠) and the tax rate from the sender tax base (𝜏𝑔).   
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The Spanish PIT change constantly, but the most recent tax reform for which panel data is 
available is the Royal-Decree Law 20/2011, in force since January 2012. The reform raised MTRs 
substantially in both tax bases and introduced an additional tax bracket at the top while leaving the 
rest of income thresholds unchanged27. For this reason, it “provides a useful natural experiment for 
studying the responsiveness of taxpayers to changes in MTRs” (Claus et al. 2012, p.6). Table B.1 




I use a balanced panel dataset compiled by the Tax Agency and the Spanish Institute for Fiscal 
Studies corresponding to the period 2009-2014. This period was chosen “for methodological reasons 
related to the need to identify two moments in time during which an exogenous change in tax rates 
occurred” (Arrazola et al. 2014, p.5) and the need to have some years previous the reform to run 
strategies of identification in the estimation of the ETI. 
 
The database consists of 240 943 tax returns with detailed information about reported income, tax 
due and socio-economic characteristics from the principal taxpayer. The distribution of taxpayers 
and taxable income is reported in Table B.2. I restrict the estimation sample as follows. Navarre and 
Basque Country are not included in the original dataset as I only have information from the so-called 
Common Regime ACs. I exclude individuals under 16 years old and above 65 years old in order to 
consider taxpayers at working age and non-pensioners. Finally, the sample only includes taxpayers 
with a positive taxable income in 2009-201428.  
 
3.4.3 Descriptive statistics 
 
In this subsection I show two potential evidences of IS in the PIT schedule. Fig. 3.1 displays the 
size of the various components of gross income by tax brackets and by main income source. It shows 
that the shares of capital gains and movable capital (both from the savings base) increase with 
taxpayers’ income suggesting that high-income earners are more likely to shift income than low-
income earners. The same happens for self-employed individuals. One explanation for this is that 
self-employed individuals and high-income earners have easier access to differently tax bases and 
                                                          
27 This increase was uniform for all ACs; however, simultaneously certain ACs modified their regional marginal tax 
rates (e.g. Madrid, Andalusia, Asturias, Canary Islands, Cantabria, Castile-La Mancha, Extremadura, Murcia and Valence) 
and income thresholds (e.g. Andalusia, Asturias, Extremadura and Valence). All these modifications are taken into account 
in the estimation of the ETI (see Table B.1). 
28 I do not exclude taxpayers whose marital status or AC of residence change from 𝑡 − 1 to 𝑡 as they represent only 2% 
and 1%, respectively. I do not exclude capital gains neither because it is the most likely channel for IS. 
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thus, can more readily manipulate the composition of their income through e.g. asset allocation 
decisions (see Seim 2017).  
 
Figure 3.1: Income share and composition, in 2011-2014 (in %) 
 
 
Notes: Fig. 3.1 divides total income into eight income components: labor (GIL), economic activities (NIEA), other (income from special 
regimes and imputed income), movable capital in the general base (GIKA_g), immovable capital (GIKR), capital gains in the general base 
(Kgains_g), capital gains in the savings base (Kgains_s) and movable capital in the savings base (GIKA_s). 
 
 
Fig. 3.2 shows the evolution over time of capital gains and movable capital for top tax brackets. 
Capital gains and movable capital from the savings base display a similar path: a peak in 2011, 
followed by a fall and a recovery since 2012. However, for movable capital, the recovery was more 
moderate than for capital gains which display a steep rise from 2012 onwards. On the contrary, for 
the general base, I only detect fluctuations on capital gains after 201229. A short glance to capital 
gains and movable capital postulates these two incomes as the most likely channels for IS in the PIT 
schedule30. 
 
                                                          
29 This could be because “in 2013 and 2014, capital gains generated in less than a year (in the savings base) reverted to 
forming part of the general taxable base” (Laborda et al. 2018, p.102). 
30 Indeed, López-Laborda et al. (2018) found evidence that Spanish personal income taxpayers –especially the highest-
income individuals and the self-employed – shift part of their revenues from the general base to that of savings through 
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Figure 3.2: Evolution of movable capital and capital gains, in 2009-2014 (mean, in euros) 
 
Notes: Fig. 3.2 shows income from capital gains in the general base (Kgains_g), movable capital in the general base (GIKA_g), capital 
gains in the savings base (Kgains_s) and movable capital in the savings base (GIKA_s). For taxpayers with general taxable income between 






3.5.1 Elasticity of taxable income  
 
In order to have some variation to exploit in the estimation of the ETI, I group taxpayers in two 
categories (region and gender)31. Table 3.1 provides empirical estimates of Eq. (5). The predicted tax 
rate instrument is constructed from income lagged two periods prior the base-year in all cases, except 
for region 5 where it is a function of the log base-income. As noted by Weber (2014), the use of an 
appropriate lag is relevant in the construction of the instrument. In addition, a full set of socio-
economic characteristics (age, age squared, type of tax return and main income source) are included 
in each regression. Finally, all estimates are weighted by taxpayers’ income and standard errors are 
cluster by taxpayers’ marital status.  
 
Table 3.1 reports elasticities of taxable income for five regions, separately for men and women. 
My preferred baseline ETI estimates are in Columns (2)32. These estimates indicate that women are 
more responsive to marginal tax rate changes than men, except for regions 1 and 5. This is an 
expected outcome as, in Spain, women are more likely to be second or part-time earners within 
households, and thus have more flexibility in hours’ choice and earnings decisions. This result 
                                                          
31 Region 1 (Asturias, Cantabria, La Rioja, Aragon, Galicia, Ceuta, Melilla, Canary Islands, Castile-Leon), Region 2 
(Andalusia and Extremadura), Region 3 (Balearic Islands and Catalonia), Region 4 (Madrid and Castile-La Mancha) and 
Region 5 (Valence and Murcia). Apart from Region 1, the rest were pooled together based on their geographic proximity.  



















Chapter 3: The Marginal Costs of Public Funds 
84 
 
coincides with Blomquist and Selin (2010) for Sweden, and Badenes (2001), Díaz and Onrubia 
(2018) and Arrazola et al. (2014) for Spain. All the first-stage F-statistics are above 60, indicating 
that instruments are not weak. Coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level (with few 
exceptions).  
 
The period of time considered in this study (2009-2014) allows to explore the sensitivity of 
findings to the length of the time-window over which the behavioral responses are observed. In Table 
3.1, I compare ETI estimates based on one-, two-, and three-year differences to see if taxpayers’ 
responses become stronger or weaker in the course of time. The estimates in Columns (2) are the 
benchmark results and assume responses take two periods, in Columns (1) and (3) this assumption 
is relaxed to one and three periods, respectively. The estimates are all significant (with few 
exceptions) and suggest that behavioral responses somewhat decrease over time33. In other words, 
this finding shows that Spanish taxpayers – in particular, women – can rapidly adapt their compliance 
behavior to tax modifications. 
 
Finally, I estimate several specifications of Eq. (5) in order to assess the sensitivity of baseline 
results. These results are presented in Tables C.1-C.3. Table C.1 shows that the ETI is more sensitive 
to capital gains than to movable capital. Given that baseline estimates (Columns 1) change more 
when I drop individuals with capital gains (Columns 3) than when I drop individuals with movable 
capital (Columns 2). This result suggests that capital gains may be an important channel for IS in the 
Spanish PIT, in line with the study of López-Laborda et al. (2018). In Table C.2 identification appears 
to be sensitive to the number of lags used in the construction of the IV; whereas, in Table C.3 
estimates are insensitive to the number of splines used in the income control, except for region 5. 
 
                                                          
33 Except for region 1 (men), region 4 (women) and region 5 (men and women) where estimates increase with a broader 
time-window. 
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Table 3.1: Elasticity of taxable income a  
  Region 1 Region 2 Region 3 Region 4 Region 5 
  (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
Women 
1.30*** 0.68*** 0.41*** 1.13** 0.90*** 1.02 1.63*** 1.35*** 1.24*** 1.11*** 1.22*** 0.52*** 0.4 1.16 2.25*** 
(0.03) (0.13) (0.15) (0.53) (0.29) (0.64) (0.19) (0.39) (0.21) (0.03) (0.09) (0.19) (0.78) (1.13) (0.72) 
Men 
1.69*** 1.99*** 1.87*** 1.03*** 0.77*** 0.48*** 0.67*** 0.42*** 0.22*** 0.84*** 0.16* 0.13 0.35 0.83*** 0.75*** 
(0.13) (0.23) (0.16) (0.09) (0.02) (0.08) (0.19) (0.15) (0.05) (0.06) (0.10) (0.18) (0.33) (0.19) (0.19) 
Difference length 1 year 2 years 3 years 1 year 2 years 3 years 1 year 2 years 3 years 1 year 2 years 3 years 1 year 2 years 3 years 
Spline included b 10-Piece 10-Piece 10-Piece 10-Piece 10-Piece 10-Piece 10-Piece 10-Piece 10-Piece 10-Piece 10-Piece 10-Piece 20-Piece 20-Piece 20-Piece 
Instruments lags c 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 
First stage Partial R2:                
Women 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Men 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.02 
First stage F-statistic:                
Women 964 329 359 80 170 62 1378 255 183 5131 33027 109154 827 1069 384 
Men 1412 1739 13830 1272 288 1214 2006 11488 94826 1218 795 2198 91 91 258 
Observations:                
Women 20284 20204 20016 13510 13468 13336 19048 19000 18899 21145 21067 20925 10008 9973 9907 
Men 36739 36591 36357 28370 28277 28104 32267 32189 32047 37235 37054 36820 19085 19016 18914 
 
Notes: 2SLS regressions based on Eq. (5) for one -year difference (Columns 1), two -year difference (Columns 2) and three-year difference (Columns 3). Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by marital 
status are in parentheses. Indicator variables for type of tax return, main income source and age are also included in estimation (all in base-year). Significance levels are *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
a Region 1 (Asturias, Cantabria, La Rioja, Aragon, Galicia, Ceuta, Melilla, Canary Islands, Castile-Leon), Region 2 (Andalusia and Extremadura), Region 3 (Balearic Islands and Catalonia), Region 4 (Madrid and 
Castile-La Mancha) and Region 5 (Valence and Murcia). 
b I use a 10-piece spline on  ∆ 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑧2011, except for region 5 where I use a 20-piece spline on 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑧2011.  
c This row lists the number of lags used in the construction of the predicted tax rate instrument. 
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3.5.2 Revenue impact, well-being and efficiency 
 
The estimation of the individual elasticity allows to study the impact of the tax reform on revenue, 
well-being and efficiency. For doing so, I use the estimates of Table 3.1 and the analytical 
expressions derived in Section 3.2. Moreover, I take 2011 as based-year and run the simulations 
comparing 2011 (pre-reform year) and 2012, 2013, 2014 (post-reform years), under alternative 
assumptions about the value of 𝑠. Main results are in Tables 3.2-3.6 for the whole population, for 
Catalonia, for Madrid, for self-employed individuals and for wage earners. In Tables D.1-D.4, I show 
additional computations for specific groups of the population according to their marital status and 
age34.  
 
(a) Without income shifting: 𝑠 = 0 
 
On average, for the entire population, the MCF is found to be 3.94 (for 2012), 2.47 (for 2013) and 
1.88 (for 2014), see Table 3.2. Hence, for every extra euro of revenue arising from an increase in all 
MTRs, the marginal excess burden is €2.94 (in 2012), €1.47 (in 2013) and €0.88 (in 2014). This 
result indicates an important efficiency effect of the 2011 tax reform, especially in the year 
immediately after the tax modification. Indeed, MCFs decrease as the difference time-window 
increase, which suggest that behavioral responses are more substantial in 2012 than in the subsequent 
years. Consequently, an important fraction of tax revenue is lost because of efficiency costs. As can 
be seen in Table 3.2 (BE/ME), around 73% of the mechanical revenue gains are lost in 2012 due to 
inefficiencies created by the increased marginal tax burden. However, this lost decreases over time, 
it is around 58% in 2013 and around 46% in 2014.  
 
Looking this result in more detail, gives rise to important differences on welfare effects depending 
on individuals’ socio-economic characteristics. Tables 3.3 and 3.4 show that, on average, efficiency 
losses are more substantial in Catalonia than in Madrid: 3.69 vs. 2.86 (in 2012), 2.09 vs. 1.61 (in 
2013) and 1.64 vs. 1.15 (in 2014). Similarly, in Tables 3.5 and 3.6 the rise of an additional euro of 
tax revenue is, on average, more costly for self-employed individuals than for wage earners: 4.38 vs. 
3.89 (in 2012), 3.06 vs. 2.39 (in 2013) and 2.30 vs. 1.82 (in 2014)35. Consequently, on average, the 
fraction of tax revenue lost through behavioral responses (BE/ME) is higher in Catalonia than in 
Madrid (see Tables 3.3 and 3.4): 71% vs. 63% (in 2012), 52% vs. 38% (in 2013) and 38% vs. 13% 
                                                          
34 When I compute the MCF for Catalonia and Madrid, I use the MTRs and the income thresholds from Tables B.1.2 
and B.1.3. For the rest, since computation is at national level I work with the MTRs and the income thresholds from Table 
B.1.1. Moreover, I define wage earners (self-employed) as taxpayers whose main income source is labor (economic 
activities). 
35 MCFs are slightly higher for taxpayers above 45 years old than for those under 45 years old: 3.95 vs. 4.15 (in 2012), 
2.51 vs. 2.47 (in 2013) and 1.91 vs. 1.84 (in 2014), see Tables D.3 and D.4. For married and non-married individuals there 
is not much difference: 4.04 vs. 4.29 (in 2012), 2.55 vs. 2.54 (in 2013) and 1.91 vs. 1.92 (in 2014), see Tables D.1 and D.2. 
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(in 2014). Likewise, this fraction is on average higher for self-employed individuals than for wage 
earners (see Tables 3.5 and 3.6)36: 75% vs. 72% (in 2012), 66% vs. 57% (in 2013) and 56% vs. 44% 
(in 2014). Note that the groups with higher MCFs are usually the most responsive taxpayers to 
changes in MTRs. Accordingly, Catalonia was found by Arrazola et al. (2014) as one of the regions 
with the largest elasticity – even above Madrid. As well, the self-employed are the group in the 
population with more possibilities to adjust taxable income to changes in tax rates.  
 
Finally, when I compare tax brackets (in Table 3.2), I see that utility losses are higher in tax 
brackets 1 and 4 than in the rest; whereas, tax bracket 2 reports the smallest MCF. This result cannot 
be generalized to all groups, which suggest that increases in tax rates are not necessarily revenue-
enhancing in all tax brackets. 
 
(b) With income shifting: 𝑠 = 0.1, 0.3, 0.5 
 
When introducing IS possibilities I observe that MCFs get smaller as the fraction of income 
shifted (𝑠) increases. In Table 3.2, on average, MCFs decrease in 14%, 36% and 52% when 𝑠 takes 
the values of 0.1, 0.3 and 0.5, respectively. When I look in more detail, I see that in Madrid the 
introduction of IS possibilities does not reduce MCFs as much as in the rest of the groups, see Table 
3.4. The opposite happens for self-employed individuals (see Table 3.5). This result shows the 
sensitivity of welfare costs to the value of 𝑠.  
 
Note that with the introduction of 𝑠 behavioral responses erase less of the mechanical revenue 
gain, around 6% less (when 𝑠=0.1), 18% less (when 𝑠=0.3) and 29% less (when 𝑠=0.5), see Table 
3.2. This is so, because when I assume that 10%, 30% and 50% of income from the general base shift 
to the savings base I need to consider the fact that the shifted income is also taxed. As a result, the 
tax revenue from savings increases and offsets part of the loss in revenue on the general base, 
reducing the efficiency costs of taxation. Consequently, the standard ETI may overestimate the 
marginal excess burden because it assumes income shifting as a full DWL37.  
 
All in all, for each additional euro of taxes raised, the government imposed an extra cost which is 
especially high for Catalan taxpayers and self-employed individuals (compared to taxpayers from 
Madrid and wage earners). More important, findings indicate substantial efficiency costs of raising 
                                                          
36 For the rest (married, non-married, under45 and above 45) I do not observe substantial differences between groups. 
See: Tables D.1-D.4. 
37 This result is in line with recent contributions (Doerrenberg et al. 2017; Claus et al. 2012; Saez et al. 2012; Harju 
and Matikka 2014) that have shed light on the limitations of the ETI as a sufficient statistic for welfare analysis in the 
presence of fiscal externalities. 
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an extra euro of revenue in the year immediate to the tax reform. Finally, results show that revenue 
losses get smaller when I assume the existence of IS responses38.  
 
Table 3.2: National level 
Tax bracket s 
BE/ME MCF 
2012 2013 2014 2012 2013 2014 
1 
0 0.74 0.66 0.56 3.90 2.91 2.25 
0.1 0.68 0.60 0.51 3.17 2.53 2.05 
0.3 0.57 0.50 0.42 2.31 2.00 1.74 
0.5 0.45 0.40 0.34 1.82 1.66 1.51 
2 
0 0.55 0.49 0.40 2.24 1.95 1.67 
0.1 0.52 0.45 0.38 2.06 1.83 1.60 
0.3 0.43 0.38 0.31 1.75 1.61 1.45 
0.5 0.35 0.30 0.25 1.53 1.44 1.34 
3 
0 0.71 0.61 0.49 3.42 2.55 1.96 
0.1 0.67 0.58 0.46 3.04 2.36 1.87 
0.3 0.59 0.50 0.41 2.42 2.02 1.68 
0.5 0.51 0.44 0.35 2.03 1.77 1.54 
4 
0 0.80 0.66 0.52 4.95 2.97 2.07 
0.1 0.76 0.63 0.49 4.15 2.71 1.97 
0.3 0.68 0.57 0.44 3.14 2.31 1.79 
0.5 0.60 0.50 0.39 2.52 2.01 1.64 
5 
0 0.77 0.57 0.41 4.36 2.30 1.71 
0.1 0.73 0.54 0.39 3.77 2.17 1.65 
0.3 0.66 0.49 0.36 2.97 1.95 1.55 
0.5 0.59 0.43 0.32 2.44 1.77 1.46 
6 
0 0.79 0.53 0.37 4.75 2.11 1.59 
0.1 0.75 0.50 0.35 4.07 2.01 1.55 
0.3 0.68 0.46 0.32 3.16 1.84 1.47 
0.5 0.61 0.41 0.29 2.59 1.69 1.41 
Mean 
0 0.73 0.58 0.46 3.94 2.47 1.88 
0.1 0.69 0.55 0.43 3.38 2.27 1.78 
0.3 0.60 0.48 0.38 2.62 1.95 1.61 
0.5 0.52 0.41 0.32 2.15 1.72 1.48 
                                                          
38 Bear in mind that I can compute the MCF because ME>BE in all cases. 
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Table 3.3: Catalonia 
Tax bracket s 
BE/ME MCF 
2012 2013 2014 2012 2013 2014 
1 
0 0.77 0.59 0.49 4.37 2.45 1.95 
0.1 0.71 0.55 0.45 3.45 2.20 1.81 
0.3 0.59 0.45 0.37 2.43 1.82 1.59 
0.5 0.47 0.36 0.29 1.87 1.56 1.42 
2 
0 0.56 0.42 0.34 2.27 1.73 1.50 
0.1 0.52 0.39 0.31 2.09 1.65 1.46 
0.3 0.43 0.33 0.26 1.77 1.48 1.35 
0.5 0.35 0.26 0.21 1.54 1.36 1.27 
3 
0 0.70 0.52 0.40 3.34 2.08 1.68 
0.1 0.66 0.49 0.38 2.98 1.97 1.62 
0.3 0.58 0.43 0.34 2.39 1.76 1.50 
0.5 0.50 0.37 0.29 2.01 1.59 1.41 
4 
0 0.75 0.54 0.39 3.98 2.16 1.64 
0.1 0.71 0.51 0.37 3.47 2.04 1.59 
0.3 0.64 0.46 0.33 2.77 1.84 1.50 
0.5 0.57 0.41 0.30 2.30 1.68 1.42 
5 
0 0.73 0.50 0.34 3.70 2.01 1.51 
0.1 0.70 0.48 0.32 3.29 1.92 1.48 
0.3 0.63 0.43 0.29 2.70 1.77 1.41 
0.5 0.56 0.39 0.26 2.29 1.63 1.35 
6 
0 0.78 0.53 0.35 4.47 2.12 1.53 
0.1 0.74 0.51 0.33 3.89 2.02 1.50 
0.3 0.68 0.46 0.30 3.09 1.85 1.43 
0.5 0.61 0.41 0.27 2.56 1.71 1.37 
Mean 
0 0.71 0.52 0.38 3.69 2.09 1.64 
0.1 0.67 0.49 0.36 3.20 1.97 1.58 
0.3 0.59 0.43 0.32 2.52 1.75 1.47 
0.5 0.51 0.37 0.27 2.10 1.59 1.37 
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Table 3.4: Madrid 
Tax bracket s 
BE/ME MCF 
2012 2013 2014 2012 2013 2014 
1 
0 0.64 0.44 0.17 2.80 1.79 1.20 
0.1 0.59 0.41 0.15 2.44 1.69 1.18 
0.3 0.49 0.34 0.13 1.95 1.50 1.14 
0.5 0.38 0.26 0.10 1.62 1.36 1.11 
2 
0 0.50 0.32 0.12 2.00 1.48 1.14 
0.1 0.47 0.30 0.11 1.87 1.43 1.13 
0.3 0.39 0.25 0.09 1.63 1.33 1.10 
0.5 0.31 0.20 0.07 1.45 1.25 1.08 
3 
0 0.65 0.39 0.14 2.88 1.63 1.16 
0.1 0.62 0.37 0.13 2.62 1.58 1.15 
0.3 0.54 0.32 0.11 2.18 1.47 1.13 
0.5 0.47 0.28 0.10 1.87 1.38 1.11 
4 
0 0.73 0.35 0.11 3.75 1.54 1.12 
0.1 0.70 0.33 0.10 3.31 1.50 1.12 
0.3 0.63 0.30 0.09 2.67 1.43 1.10 
0.5 0.55 0.26 0.08 2.24 1.36 1.09 
Mean 
0 0.63 0.38 0.13 2.86 1.61 1.15 
0.1 0.59 0.35 0.12 2.56 1.55 1.14 
0.3 0.51 0.30 0.11 2.11 1.43 1.12 
0.5 0.43 0.25 0.09 1.80 1.34 1.10 
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Table 3.5: Self-employed 
Tax bracket s 
BE/ME MCF 
2012 2013 2014 2012 2013 2014 
1 
0 0.81 0.73 0.60 5.21 3.75 2.50 
0.1 0.74 0.68 0.55 3.91 3.08 2.23 
0.3 0.62 0.56 0.46 2.61 2.27 1.84 
0.5 0.49 0.44 0.36 1.95 1.80 1.57 
2 
0 0.56 0.51 0.42 2.26 2.04 1.73 
0.1 0.52 0.47 0.39 2.08 1.90 1.65 
0.3 0.43 0.39 0.33 1.76 1.65 1.48 
0.5 0.35 0.32 0.26 1.53 1.47 1.36 
3 
0 0.71 0.64 0.52 3.49 2.74 2.07 
0.1 0.68 0.60 0.49 3.09 2.52 1.97 
0.3 0.59 0.53 0.43 2.45 2.11 1.75 
0.5 0.51 0.46 0.37 2.04 1.83 1.59 
4 
0 0.81 0.72 0.60 5.25 3.52 2.53 
0.1 0.77 0.68 0.58 4.35 3.14 2.36 
0.3 0.69 0.61 0.52 3.24 2.57 2.07 
0.5 0.61 0.54 0.46 2.58 2.18 1.84 
5 
0 0.81 0.71 0.63 5.36 3.41 2.73 
0.1 0.78 0.67 0.60 4.45 3.07 2.52 
0.3 0.70 0.61 0.54 3.33 2.55 2.20 
0.5 0.62 0.54 0.49 2.66 2.18 1.94 
6 
0 0.79 0.65 0.55 4.71 2.86 2.24 
0.1 0.75 0.62 0.53 4.04 2.64 2.13 
0.3 0.68 0.56 0.48 3.14 2.29 1.92 
0.5 0.61 0.51 0.43 2.57 2.02 1.76 
Mean 
0 0.75 0.66 0.56 4.38 3.06 2.30 
0.1 0.71 0.62 0.52 3.65 2.72 2.14 
0.3 0.62 0.54 0.46 2.75 2.24 1.88 
0.5 0.53 0.47 0.39 2.22 1.91 1.68 
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Table 3.6: Wage earners 
Tax bracket s 
BE/ME MCF 
2012 2013 2014 2012 2013 2014 
1 
0 0.73 0.65 0.55 3.75 2.82 2.21 
0.1 0.68 0.59 0.50 3.08 2.46 2.02 
0.3 0.56 0.49 0.42 2.27 1.97 1.72 
0.5 0.44 0.39 0.33 1.80 1.64 1.49 
2 
0 0.55 0.49 0.40 2.24 1.95 1.67 
0.1 0.52 0.45 0.38 2.06 1.83 1.60 
0.3 0.43 0.38 0.31 1.75 1.61 1.45 
0.5 0.35 0.30 0.25 1.53 1.44 1.34 
3 
0 0.71 0.61 0.49 3.42 2.55 1.96 
0.1 0.67 0.58 0.46 3.04 2.36 1.86 
0.3 0.59 0.50 0.41 2.42 2.02 1.68 
0.5 0.51 0.44 0.35 2.03 1.77 1.54 
4 
0 0.80 0.66 0.51 4.92 2.93 2.04 
0.1 0.76 0.63 0.49 4.13 2.68 1.95 
0.3 0.68 0.56 0.44 3.13 2.29 1.77 
0.5 0.60 0.50 0.39 2.51 1.99 1.63 
5 
0 0.76 0.53 0.37 4.17 2.13 1.58 
0.1 0.72 0.51 0.35 3.63 2.03 1.53 
0.3 0.65 0.46 0.31 2.89 1.84 1.46 
0.5 0.58 0.41 0.28 2.40 1.69 1.39 
6 
0 0.79 0.48 0.31 4.82 1.93 1.45 
0.1 0.76 0.46 0.30 4.12 1.86 1.42 
0.3 0.69 0.42 0.27 3.19 1.72 1.37 
0.5 0.62 0.38 0.24 2.60 1.60 1.32 
Mean 
0 0.72 0.57 0.44 3.89 2.39 1.82 
0.1 0.68 0.54 0.41 3.34 2.20 1.73 
0.3 0.60 0.47 0.36 2.61 1.91 1.58 
0.5 0.52 0.40 0.31 2.14 1.69 1.45 





Chapter 3 provides estimates of two important concepts in public finance: the elasticity of taxable 
income and the marginal costs of public funds of income taxation. Both crucial in the tax design of 
any country. Knowing these two parameters allows a more accurate estimation of the costs of 
financing public expenditure (Feldstein 1996).  
 
I estimate the elasticity of taxable income for Spain for the period 2009-2014. The estimated mean 
value of this key parameter in 2013 is 1.06 (for women) and 0.83 (for men), women being more 
sensitive to taxation than men. Interestingly, I find that the length of the time-window over which 
the behavioral responses are observed have a considerable effect on individuals’ responses. In 
particular, results show that Spanish taxpayers react almost immediately to tax changes. On the basis 
of these estimated elasticities, the impact of the 2011 tax reform has been assessed. Results reveal 
that the welfare cost of raising an extra euro of tax revenue is found to be well in excess of a euro, 
especially in the year immediate to the tax reform. Moreover, results indicate important differences 
in welfare costs depending on individuals’ socio-economic characteristics. It is more expensive to 
rise an additional euro of tax revenue in Catalonia than in Madrid, and among self-employed 
individuals than among wage earners. I also find that the introduction of 𝑠 behavioral responses erase 
less of the mechanical revenue gain, around 6% less (when 𝑠=0.1), 18% less (when 𝑠=0.3) and 29% 
less (when 𝑠=0.5). 
 
This empirical application has made evident the crucial role played by the ETI and IS responses 
in the evaluation of a tax reform Accordingly, from an applied point of view, these results are 
extremely useful because they shed lights on the design of tax policies and tax revenue forecasting. 
However, there are many questions yet to be answered. For instance, for a proper design of an optimal 
tax system it is relevant to consider more components of the cost of taxation as administrative costs, 
compliance costs, excess burden of tax evasion, avoidance costs (Slemrod and Yitzhaki 1996). Also, 
a more precise modelling of IS responses is necessary for an accurate analysis of the welfare losses 
of income taxation.  





[1] ALONSO-CARRERA, J. and MANZANO, B. (2003). Análisis dinámico del coste de 
bienestar del sistema impositivo español. Una exploración cuantitativa. Hacienda 
Pública/Española Revista de Economía Pública 167, 9-31. 
[2] ARRAZOLA, M., HEVIA, J. SANZ-SANZ, J.F. and ROMERO, D. (2014). Personal Income 
Tax and the elasticity of Reported Income to Marginal Tax Rates: An Empirical Analysis 
Applied to Spain, Working Papers 12/2014, Victoria University of Wellington. 
[3] AURIOL, E. and WARLTERS, M. (2015). ‘The Marginal Cost of Public Funds and Tax 
Reform in Africa’, in Alm, J. and Martinez-Vazquez, J. (eds) Tax Reform in Developing 
Countries. Volume 1. Elgar Research Collection. International Library of Critical Writings in 
Economics. Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA: Elgar, 591–605. 
[4] BADENES, N. (2001). IRPF, Eficiencia y Equidad: Tres Ejercicios de Microsimulación, 
Colección Investigaciones 1/01. Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Fiscales. 
[5] BARRIOS, S., PYCROFT, J. and SAVEYN, B. (2013). The marginal cost of public funds in 
the EU: the case of labour versus green taxes, Taxation Papers 35, Directorate General 
Taxation and Customs Union, European Commission.  
[6] BJERTNAES G. (2015). Social Security Transfers and the Marginal Cost of Public Funds, 
CESifo Group Munich, CESifo Working Paper Series Nº5689. 
[7] BLOMQUIST, S. and SIMULA, L. (2010). Marginal Deadweight Loss when the Income Tax 
is Nonlinear. CESIFO Working Paper Nº3053. 
[8] BLOMQUIST, S. and SELIN, H. (2010). Hourly Wage Rate and Taxable Labor Income 
Responsiveness to Changes in Marginal Tax Rates, Journal of Public Economics, 94; 
878−889. 
[9] BURNS, S.K. and ZILIAK, J.P. (2017). Identifying the Elasticity of Taxable Income, The 
Economic Journal 127, 297-329, DOI: 10.1111/ecoj.12299. 
[10] CHANDOEVWIT, W. and DAHLBY, B. (2007). The Marginal Cost of Public Funds for 
Excise Taxes in Thailand, eJournal of Tax Research, 5(1), 135–167. 
[11] CLAUS, I., CREEDY, J. and TENG, J. (2012). The Elasticity of Taxable Income in New 
Zealand, Fiscal Studies, 33(3): 287–303 
[12] CREEDY  (2011). “Tax and Transfer Tensions. Designing Direct Tax Structures”, Edward 
Elgar. 
[13]    (2013). The Elasticity of Taxable Income, Welfare Changes and Optimal Tax Rates. New 
Zealand Treasury, Working Paper 13/24. 
Essays on Behavioral Responses to Taxation 
95 
 
[14] CREEDY, J. and GEMMELL, N. (2013). Measuring revenue responses to tax rate changes in 
multi-rate income tax system behavioral and structural factors, International Tax and Public 
Finance, 20: 974–991. 
[15] CREEDY, J. and SANZ-SANZ, J.F., (2010). Revenue elasticities in complex income tax 
structures: an application to Spain. Fiscal Studies 31, 535–561. 
[16]   (2011). Modelling aggregate personal income tax revenue in multi-schedular and multi-
regional structures. Economic Modelling 28, 2589–2595. 
[17] DAHLBY, B. (2008). “The Marginal Cost of Public Funds: Theory and Applications”, MIT 
Press. 
[18] DAHLBY, B. and FEREDE, E. (2016). ‘The Stimulative Effects of Intergovernmental Grants 
and the Marginal Cost of Public Funds’, International Tax and Public Finance, 23(1), 114–
139. 
[19]   (2018). The Marginal Cost of Public Funds and the Laffer Curve: Evidence from the 
Canadian Provinces, FinanzArchiv, 74(2), 173–199. 
[20] DEVEREUX, M., LI L. and LORETZ, L. (2014). The Elasticity of Corporate Taxable Income: 
New Evidence from UK Tax Records. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 6 (2): 
19-53. 
[21] DIAZ, C. and ONRUBIA, J. (2018). How do taxable income responses to marginal tax rates 
differ by sex, marital status and age? Evidence from Spanish dual income tax. Economics 
Discussion Papers, No 2018-48, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.  
[22] DOERRENBERG, P., PEICHL, A. and SIEGLOCH, S. (2017). The elasticity of taxable 
income in the presence of deduction possibilities, Journal of Public Economic, 151: 41-55. 
[23] FELDSTEIN, M. (1995). The Effect of Marginal Tax Rates on Taxable Income: A Panel Study 
of the 1986 Tax Reform Act, Journal of Political Economy, 103 (3), 551-72. 
[24]   (1996). How big should government be? National Bureau of Economic Research. Working 
Paper 5868. 
[25]   (1999). Tax Avoidance and the Deadweight Loss of the Income Tax, Review of Economics 
and Statistics, 81(4), 674-80. 
[26] GIERTZ, S. (2009). The Elasticity of Taxable Income: Influences on Economic Efficiency 
and Tax Revenues, and Implications for Tax Policy. Economics Department Faculty 
Publications Nº64. 
[27] GONZÁLEZ-PÁRAMO, J.M. and SANZ-SANZ, J.F. (2003). ¿Quiénes se beneficiaron de la 
reforma del IRPF de 1999? Documentos de Trabajo 1, Fundación BBVA. 
[28] GRUBER, J. and SAEZ, E. (2002). The Elasticity of Taxable Income: Evidence and 
Implications, Journal of Public Economics, 84(1), 1-32. 
Chapter 3: The Marginal Costs of Public Funds 
96 
 
[29] HARJU, J. and MATIKKA, T. (2014). The elasticity of taxable income and income-shifting: 
what is “real” and what is not? International Tax and Public Finance, 23 (4), 640-669. 
[30] KISS, Á. and MOSBERGER, P. (2015). The Elasticity of Taxable Income of High Earners: 
Evidence from Hungary, Empirical Economics, 48, 883-908.  
[31] LE MAIRE, D. and SCHJERNING, B. (2013). Tax bunching, income shifting and self-
employment, Journal of Public Economics, 107 (C), 1-18. 
[32] LÓPEZ-LABORDA, J., VALLÉS, J., and ZÁRATE, A. (2018). Income shifting in the 
Spanish dual income tax, Fiscal Studies, 39 (1): 95–120. 
[33] PIKETTY, T., SAEZ, E. and STANTCHEVA, S. (2013). Optimal taxation of top labor 
income: A tale of three elasticities. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 6(1), 230-
71. 
[34] SAEZ, E., SLEMROD, J. and GIERTZ, S. (2012). The Elasticity of Taxable Income with 
Respect to Marginal Tax Rates: A critical review, Journal of Economic Literature, 50 (1), 3-
50. 
[35] SANCHO, F. (2003) ‘Una estimación del coste marginal en bienestar del sistema impositivo 
en España. (An Evaluation of the Marginal Welfare Cost of the Spanish Tax System. With 
English summary.)’, Hacienda Pública Española/Revista de Economía Publica, (169), pp. 
117–132. 
[36] SANZ-SANZ, J. F., ARRAZOLA-VACAS, M., RUEDA LÓPEZ, N. and ROMERO-
JORDÁN, D. (2015). Reported gross income and marginal tax rates: estimation of the 
behavioral reactions of Spanish taxpayers, Applied Economics, 47 (5), 66-484. 
[37] SANZ-SANZ, J.F. (2016). The Laffer curve in schedular multi-rate income taxes with non-
genuine allowances: An application to Spain, Economic Modelling, Elsevier, 55(C), 42-56.  
[38] SLEMROD, J. and YITZHAKI, S. (1996). The Costs of Taxation and the Marginal Efficiency 
Cost of Funds. IMF Staff Papers, 43 (1). 
[39] VASQUEZ, A. L. and BALISTRERI, E. J. (2010) The Marginal Cost of Public Funds of 
Mineral and Energy Taxes in Peru, Resources Policy, 35(4), 257–264. 
[40] WEBER, C. (2014). Toward obtaining a consistent estimate of the elasticity of taxable income 
using difference-in-differences, Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, 117(C), 90-103. 
Essays on Behavioral Responses to Taxation 
97 
 
Supplemental material Chapter 3 
 
3.A Analytical derivation: First vs. Second Order Approximations39 
 
Let’s consider the excess burden 𝐸𝐵 from raising a tax by ∆𝜏, given the pre-existing tax 𝜏:  
 
𝑀𝐸𝐵 = 𝐸𝐵(𝜏 + ∆𝜏) − 𝐸𝐵(𝜏)     (1) 
 










(∆𝜏)2     (2) 
 
Mathematically, the first term is first-order in ∆𝜏 and the second term is second-order in (∆𝜏)2. 
Graphically, in Fig. A.1, the first term is the DWL represented by the rectangle C, “C is an 
approximation to the decline in the value of net output” (Dahlby 2008, p. 29). The second term is the 
surplus loss of workers and employees represented by the two small triangles A and B. The leakage 
in government revenue only captures the first-order term in Eq. (2). 
 
Then, to get 𝑀𝐸𝐵 I need to derive 
𝑑𝐸𝐵
𝑑𝜏
. The excess burden 𝐸𝐵 is defined as equivalent variation 
𝐸𝑉 (i.e. the lump sum amount the individual is willing to pay to avoid the tax increment) minus tax 
revenue 𝑅: 𝐸𝐵(𝜏) = 𝐸𝑉 − 𝑅 = [𝑒(𝜏2, 𝑈) − 𝑒(𝜏1, 𝑈)] − 𝑅, where (𝜏1, 𝜏2) = (𝜏, 𝜏 + ∆𝜏), 𝑅 =
𝑧(𝜏). 𝜏 and 𝑒(. ) are expenditure functions (i.e. the minimum income agent requires to arrive a given 




















Note that, 𝑧 is the predicted revenue gain assuming behavior does not change with the tax rate 
modification (i.e. ME) and 𝜏
𝜕𝑧
𝜕𝜏
 is the behavioral response (i.e. BE).  
 
                                                          
39  This derivation is based on the Econ2450A Public Economics Lectures (Part 3: Efficiency Costs of Taxation) from 
Prof. Raj Chetty, Harvard University. 


























= (1 − 𝜏)𝑤 
 









= 0, the derivative of the expenditure function with respect to the tax is42: 
𝑑𝑒
𝑑𝜏
= 𝑧.  
 
Therefore, the value of the ME approximates to 
𝑑𝐸𝑉
𝑑𝜏













↔ 𝑀𝐸𝐵 ≃ −𝜏
𝑑𝑧
𝑑𝜏
∆𝜏      (4) 
 
Figure A.1: Excess burden of a tax increase (Harberger’s Trapezoid)43 
 
                                                          
41 The Shepard’s lemma is the mirror of the Envelop theorem. The latter maximizes initial utility given that marginal 
behavioral changes have no effect on utility, while the former minimizes initial expenditure given that marginal behavioral 
changes have no effect on expenditure.  
42 The FOC from this optimization problem generates Hicksian (or compensated) demand functions. Based on micro 
foundation, this derivation gives us a single-valued function for the size of the expenditure change EV required in the 
estimation. 
43 The rectangles E and D represent the burden of the tax increased that falls on workers and employees; in other words, 
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3.B Descriptive statistics  
 
Table B.1: Tax schedules pre- and post-reform (Central Government + Regional Government) 
 
Table B.1.1: National 
Taxable income  (general base) Marginal tax rates (%)  
Brackets Nominal thresholds 2011 2012-2014 Δ (%) 
1 0 0.24 0.2475 3.13 
2 17 707 0.28 0.30 7.14 
3 33 007 0.37 0.40 8.11 
4 53 407 0.43 0.47 9.30 
5 120 000 0.45 0.50 11.11 
6 175 000 0.47 0.53 12.77 
7 300 000 0.47 0.54 14.89 
Taxable income  (savings base) Marginal tax rates (%)  
Brackets Nominal thresholds 2011 2012-2014 Δ (%) 
1 0 0.19 0.21 10.53 
2 6 000 0.21 0.25 19.05 
3 24 000 0.21 0.27 28.57 
Note: The savings base’s schedule at national level is the same at regional level. 
 
 
Table B.1.2: Catalonia       
Taxable income  (general base) Marginal tax rates (%) 
Brackets Nominal thresholds 2011 2012-2014 Δ (%) 
1 0 0.24 0.2475 3.13 
2 17 707 0.28 0.30 7.14 
3 33 007 0.37 0.40 8.11 
4 53 407 0.43 0.47 9.30 
5 120 000 0.46 0.51 10.87 
6 175 000 0.49 0.55 12.24 
 
Table B.1.3: Madrid             
Taxable income  (general base) Marginal tax rates (%)     
Brackets Nominal thresholds 2011 2012, 2013 2014 Δ 2012, 13 (%) Δ 2012,14 (%) 
1 0 0.236 0.2435 0.24 3.18 1.69 
2 17 707 0.277 0.297 0.29 7.22 4.69 
3 33 007 0.368 0.398 0.39 8.15 5.97 
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Table B.2: Distribution of taxpayers and taxable income 
National (General tax base) 
Pre-reform year 2011 Nh Nh+ zh (mean) 
Bracket Absolute number (%) Absolute number (%) Absolute number (%) 
1 3468965 42% 4871669 58% 11261 2% 
2 3012918 36% 1858751 22% 24131 4% 
3 1343670 16% 515082 6% 40653 6% 
4 480500 6% 34582 0.41% 72810 11% 
5 23356 0.28% 11226 0.13% 142738 22% 
6 11226 0.13% 0 0% 354628 55% 
 
Catalonia (General tax base) 
Pre-reform year 2011 Nh Nh+ zh (mean) 
Bracket Absolute number (%) Absolute number (%) Absolute number (%) 
1 561258 35% 1024180 65% 11809 2% 
2 621732 39% 402448 25% 24172 4% 
3 283661 18% 118787 7% 40714 7% 
4 106077 7% 12711 0.80% 73672 12% 
5 7824 0.49% 4886 0.31% 142184 23% 
6 4886 0.31% 0 0% 316889 52% 
 
Madrid (General tax base) 
Pre-reform year 2011 Nh Nh+ zh (mean) 
Bracket Absolute number (%) Absolute number (%) Absolute number (%) 
1 492497 33% 1019816 67% 11794 6% 
2 551068 36% 468748 31% 24257 13% 
3 307685 20% 161063 11% 41151 23% 
4 161063 11% 0 0% 104501 58% 
 
Wage earners (General tax base) 
Pre-reform year 2011 Nh Nh+ zh (mean) 
Bracket Absolute number (%) Absolute number (%) Absolute number (%) 
1 2936120 39% 4530428 61% 11447 2% 
2 2808022 38% 1722406 23% 24179 4% 
3 1262545 17% 459861 6% 40593 6% 
4 431884 6% 27977 0.37% 72535 11% 
5 19211 0.26% 8766 0.12% 142688 22% 
6 8766 0.12% 0 0% 343986 54% 
 
Self-employed (General tax base) 
Pre-reform year 2011 Nh Nh+ zh (mean) 
Bracket Absolute number (%) Absolute number (%) Absolute number (%) 
1 266262 60% 176248 40% 10646 2% 
2 104328 24% 71921 16% 23325 3% 
3 40628 9% 31293 7% 41866 6% 
4 27400 6% 3893 0.88% 76032 11% 
5 2434 0.55% 1459 0.33% 143699 21% 
6 1459 0.33% 0 0% 383480 56% 




Non-married (General tax base) 
Pre-reform year 2011 Nh Nh+ zh (mean) 
Bracket Absolute number (%) Absolute number (%) Absolute number (%) 
1 1120171 42% 1521665 58% 11507 2% 
2 1040376 39% 481289 18% 23960 4% 
3 368846 14% 112443 4% 40434 7% 
4 106112 4% 6331 0.24% 71250 12% 
5 4545 0.17% 1786 0.07% 143298 23% 
6 1786 0.07% 0 0% 319822 52% 
 
Married (General tax base) 
Pre-reform year 2011 Nh Nh+ zh (mean) 
Bracket Absolute number (%) Absolute number (%) Absolute number (%) 
1 2204828 37% 3725241 63% 11097 2% 
2 1840428 31% 1884813 32% 24232 4% 
3 928839 16% 955974 16% 40738 6% 
4 928839 16% 27135 0.46% 73237 11% 
5 18152 0.31% 8983 0.15% 142545 22% 
6 8983 0.15% 0 0% 361038 55% 
 
Under45 (General tax base) 
Pre-reform year 2011 Nh Nh+ zh (mean) 
Bracket Absolute number (%) Absolute number (%) Absolute number (%) 
1 1788350 48% 1935221 52% 11481 2% 
2 1435495 39% 499726 13% 23795 4% 
3 386827 10% 112899 3% 40576 7% 
4 107478 3% 5421 0.15% 71417 12% 
5 3972 0.11% 1449 0.04% 142713 23% 
6 1449 0.04% 0 0% 324971 53% 
 
Above45 (General tax base) 
Pre-reform year 2011 Nh Nh+ zh (mean) 
Bracket Absolute number (%) Absolute number (%) Absolute number (%) 
1 1464019 36% 2629103 64% 10982 2% 
2 1390402 34% 1238701 30% 24468 4% 
3 868386 21% 370315 9% 40654 6% 
4 343010 8% 27305 0.67% 73234 11% 
5 18151 0.44% 9154 0.22% 142718 22% 
6 9154 0.22% 0 0% 360220 55% 
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3.C Sensitivity analysis  
 
Table C.1: Sensitivity analysis with respect to capital income a 
 
  Region 1 Region 2 Region 3 Region 4 Region 5 
  (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
Women 
0.68*** 0.68*** 0.71*** 0.90*** 0.98*** 0.68** 1.35*** 1.31*** 1.27*** 1.22*** 1.19*** 1.30*** 1.16 1.17 0.85 
(0.13) (0.15) (0.14) (0.29) (0.20) (0.31) (0.39) (0.32) (0.32) (0.09) (0.00) (0.10) (1.13) (1.19) (1.05) 
Men 
1.99*** 1.99*** 2.11*** 0.77*** 0.92*** 0.84*** 0.42*** 0.39* 0.25*** 0.16* 0.10 0.24*** 0.83*** 0.70*** 0.65* 
(0.23) (0.22) (0.30) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.15) (0.20) (0.03) (0.10) (0.09) (0.03) (0.19) (0.16) (0.34) 
Difference length 2 years 2 years 2 years 2 years 2 years 2 years 2 years 2 years 2 years 2 years 2 years 2 years 2 years 2 years 2 years 
Spline included b 10-Piece 10-Piece 10-Piece 10-Piece 10-Piece 10-Piece 10-Piece 10-Piece 10-Piece 10-Piece 10-Piece 10-Piece 20-Piece 20-Piece 20-Piece 
Instruments lags c 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 
First stage Partial R2:                
Women 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Men 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.02 
First stage F-statistic:                
Women 329 211 729 170 308 95 255 213 256 33027 7848 1671 1069 2881 7365 
Men 1739 1897 476 288 244 262 11488 156421 1290 795 773 8449 91 101 82 
Observations:                
Women 20204 19707 17011 13468 13167 11600 19000 18606 16822 21067 20612 18261 9973 9767 8628 
Men 36591 35392 30016 28277 27313 23438 32189 31176 27548 37054 35876 30871 19016 18459 16029 
 
Notes: 2SLS regressions based on Eq. (5) for two-year difference. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by marital status are in parentheses. Indicator variables for type of tax return, main income source 
and age are also included in estimation (all in base-year). Significance levels are *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Columns (1) repeat the baseline estimates of Table 3.1 as a benchmark. Columns (2) drop individuals 
with movable capital (general base) and Columns (3) drop individuals with capital gains (general base). 
a Region 1 (Asturias, Cantabria, La Rioja, Aragon, Galicia, Ceuta, Melilla, Canary Islands, Castile-Leon), Region 2 (Andalusia and Extremadura), Region 3 (Balearic Islands and Catalonia), Region 4 (Madrid and 
Castile-La Mancha) and Region 5 (Valence and Murcia). 
b I use a 10-piece spline on  ∆ 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑧2011, except for region 5 where I use a 20-piece spline on 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑧2011.  
c This row lists the number of lags used in the construction of the predicted tax rate instrument. 
 
 
Essays on Behavioral Responses to Taxation 
103 
 
Table C.2: Sensitivity analysis with respect to the number of lags in the IV a 
 
  Region 1 Region 2 Region 3 Region 4 Region 5 
  (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
Women 
2.64*** 2.31*** 0.68*** 3.38*** 2.15*** 0.90*** 3.81*** 3.70*** 1.35*** 2.35*** 3.52*** 1.22*** 1.16 -3.09*** -3.33*** 
(0.46) (0.13) (0.13) (0.11) (0.21) (0.29) (0.50) (0.05) (0.39) (0.02) (0.54) (0.09) (1.13) (0.01) (0.29) 
Men 
3.14*** 5.46*** 1.99*** 2.17*** 3.77*** 0.77*** 3.90*** 3.73*** 0.42*** 3.78*** 3.69*** 0.16* 0.83*** -2.60*** -2.65*** 
(0.35) (0.25) (0.23) (0.01) (0.17) (0.02) (0.33) (0.24) (0.15) (0.25) (0.05) (0.10) (0.19) (0.10) (0.21) 
Difference length 2 years 2 years 2 years 2 years 2 years 2 years 2 years 2 years 2 years 2 years 2 years 2 years 2 years 2 years 2 years 
Spline included b 10-Piece 10-Piece 10-Piece 10-Piece 10-Piece 10-Piece 10-Piece 10-Piece 10-Piece 10-Piece 10-Piece 10-Piece 20-Piece 20-Piece 20-Piece 
Instruments lags c 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2 
First stage Partial R2:                               
Women 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.02 0.06 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.04 
Men 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.04 
First stage F-statistic:                
Women 584 415 329 989 4759 170 2883 206 255 2.320e+07 657 33027 1069 69 44 
Men 149 5781 1739 3106 337247 288 1192 67752 11488 598 1764 795 91 17481 6968 
Observations:                
Women 20204 20204 20204 13468 13468 13468 19000 19000 19000 21067 21067 21067 9973 9973 9973 
Men 36591 36591 36591 28277 28277 28277 32189 32189 32189 37054 37054 37054 19016 19016 19016 
 
Notes: 2SLS regressions based on Eq. (5) for two-year difference. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by marital status are in parentheses. Indicator variables for type of tax return, main income source 
and age are also included in estimation (all in base-year). Significance levels are *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
a Region 1 (Asturias, Cantabria, La Rioja, Aragon, Galicia, Ceuta, Melilla, Canary Islands, Castile-Leon), Region 2 (Andalusia and Extremadura), Region 3 (Balearic Islands and Catalonia), Region 4 (Madrid and 
Castile-La Mancha) and Region 5 (Valence and Murcia). 
b I use a 10-piece spline on  ∆ 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑧2011, except for region 5 where I use a 20-piece spline on 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑧2011.  
c This row lists the number of lags used in the construction of the predicted tax rate instrument. Columns (3) repeat the baseline estimates of Table 3.1 as a benchmark, except for region 5 where Column (1) is the 
benchmark.
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Table C.3: Sensitivity analysis with respect to the number of splines a 
 
  Region 1 Region 2 Region 3 Region 4 Region 5 
  (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
Women 
0.68*** 0.68*** 0.68*** 0.90*** 0.90*** 0.90*** 1.35*** 1.35*** 1.35*** 1.21*** 1.22*** 1.21*** -5.23*** 0.33 1.16 
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.39) (0.39) (0.39) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (1.24) (1.16) (1.13) 
Men 
1.98*** 1.99*** 1.99*** 0.77*** 0.77*** 0.77*** 0.41*** 0.42*** 0.42*** 0.16* 0.16* 0.16* -8.06*** -0.38*** 0.83*** 
(0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.16) (0.08) (0.19) 
Difference length 2 years 2 years 2 years 2 years 2 years 2 years 2 years 2 years 2 years 2 years 2 years 2 years 2 years 2 years 2 years 
Spline included b 5-Piece 10-Piece 20-Piece 5-Piece 10-Piece 20-Piece 5-Piece 10-Piece 20-Piece 5-Piece 10-Piece 20-Piece 5-Piece 10-Piece 20-Piece 
Instruments lags c 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 
First stage Partial R2:                
Women 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.09 0.01 
Men 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.02 
First stage F-statistic:                
Women 329 329 329 170 170 170 255 255 255 26135 33027 33027 279 72 1069 
Men 1732 1739 1739 288 288 288 12189 11488 11488 794 795 795 80 74 91 
Observations:                
Women 20204 20204 20204 13468 13468 13468 19000 19000 19000 21067 21067 21067 9973 9973 9973 
Men 36591 36591 36591 28277 28277 28277 32189 32189 32189 37054 37054 37054 19016 19016 19016 
 
Notes: 2SLS regressions based on Eq. (5) for two-year difference. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by marital status are in parentheses. Indicator variables for type of tax return, main income source 
and age are also included in estimation (all in base-year). Significance levels are *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
a Region 1 (Asturias, Cantabria, La Rioja, Aragon, Galicia, Ceuta, Melilla, Canary Islands, Castile-Leon), Region 2 (Andalusia and Extremadura), Region 3 (Balearic Islands and Catalonia), Region 4 (Madrid and 
Castile-La Mancha) and Region 5 (Valence and Murcia). 
b This row lists the number of pieces of splines used in the construction of the income control. Columns (2) repeat the baseline estimates of Table 3.1 as a benchmark, except for region 5 where Column (3) is the 
benchmark. 
c This row lists the number of lags used in the construction of the predicted tax rate instrument. 
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3.D Additional estimations: revenue impact, well-being and efficiency 
 
Table D.1: Married 
Tax bracket s 
BE/ME MCF 
2012 2013 2014 2012 2013 2014 
1 
0 0.80 0.72 0.60 5.05 3.52 2.51 
0.1 0.74 0.66 0.55 3.82 2.94 2.25 
0.3 0.61 0.55 0.46 2.57 2.20 1.85 
0.5 0.48 0.43 0.36 1.94 1.76 1.57 
2 
0 0.56 0.50 0.42 2.26 2.00 1.71 
0.1 0.52 0.47 0.39 2.09 1.87 1.63 
0.3 0.43 0.39 0.32 1.76 1.63 1.47 
0.5 0.35 0.31 0.26 1.54 1.45 1.35 
3 
0 0.71 0.61 0.50 3.41 2.59 1.98 
0.1 0.67 0.58 0.47 3.03 2.39 1.89 
0.3 0.59 0.51 0.41 2.42 2.04 1.70 
0.5 0.51 0.44 0.35 2.02 1.78 1.55 
4 
0 0.79 0.66 0.51 4.80 2.94 2.05 
0.1 0.75 0.63 0.49 4.05 2.68 1.95 
0.3 0.68 0.56 0.44 3.08 2.29 1.78 
0.5 0.60 0.50 0.39 2.49 1.99 1.63 
5 
0 0.76 0.55 0.40 4.12 2.22 1.66 
0.1 0.72 0.52 0.38 3.60 2.10 1.61 
0.3 0.65 0.47 0.34 2.87 1.89 1.52 
0.5 0.58 0.42 0.30 2.38 1.73 1.44 
6 
0 0.78 0.51 0.36 4.58 2.05 1.56 
0.1 0.75 0.49 0.34 3.95 1.96 1.52 
0.3 0.68 0.44 0.31 3.10 1.80 1.45 
0.5 0.61 0.40 0.28 2.55 1.66 1.38 
Mean 
0 0.73 0.59 0.46 4.04 2.55 1.91 
0.1 0.69 0.56 0.44 3.42 2.32 1.81 
0.3 0.61 0.49 0.38 2.63 1.98 1.63 
0.5 0.52 0.42 0.32 2.15 1.73 1.49 
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Table D.2: Non-married 
Tax bracket s 
BE/ME MCF 
2012 2013 2014 2012 2013 2014 
1 
0 0.66 0.58 0.50 2.98 2.36 1.99 
0.1 0.61 0.53 0.46 2.57 2.13 1.85 
0.3 0.51 0.44 0.38 2.03 1.79 1.61 
0.5 0.40 0.35 0.30 1.67 1.53 1.43 
2 
0 0.54 0.47 0.38 2.20 1.89 1.62 
0.1 0.51 0.44 0.36 2.03 1.78 1.56 
0.3 0.42 0.36 0.30 1.73 1.57 1.42 
0.5 0.34 0.29 0.24 1.52 1.42 1.32 
3 
0 0.71 0.60 0.48 3.46 2.48 1.91 
0.1 0.67 0.57 0.45 3.07 2.30 1.83 
0.3 0.59 0.49 0.40 2.44 1.98 1.65 
0.5 0.51 0.43 0.34 2.04 1.75 1.52 
4 
0 0.82 0.68 0.54 5.56 3.13 2.17 
0.1 0.78 0.65 0.51 4.55 2.84 2.06 
0.3 0.70 0.58 0.46 3.33 2.39 1.86 
0.5 0.62 0.51 0.41 2.63 2.06 1.69 
5 
0 0.83 0.65 0.50 5.74 2.86 2.01 
0.1 0.79 0.62 0.48 4.70 2.63 1.92 
0.3 0.71 0.56 0.43 3.45 2.27 1.76 
0.5 0.63 0.50 0.39 2.73 1.99 1.63 
6 
0 0.83 0.61 0.45 5.84 2.54 1.80 
0.1 0.79 0.58 0.43 4.80 2.38 1.74 
0.3 0.72 0.53 0.39 3.54 2.11 1.63 
0.5 0.64 0.47 0.35 2.81 1.89 1.53 
Mean 
0 0.73 0.60 0.47 4.29 2.54 1.92 
0.1 0.69 0.56 0.45 3.62 2.34 1.83 
0.3 0.61 0.49 0.39 2.75 2.02 1.66 
0.5 0.52 0.43 0.34 2.23 1.77 1.52 
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Table D.3: Above45 
Tax bracket s 
BE/ME MCF 
2012 2013 2014 2012 2013 2014 
1 
0 0.76 0.68 0.57 4.22 3.10 2.34 
0.1 0.70 0.62 0.53 3.36 2.66 2.12 
0.3 0.58 0.52 0.44 2.39 2.07 1.78 
0.5 0.46 0.41 0.35 1.86 1.69 1.53 
2 
0 0.56 0.50 0.41 2.25 1.98 1.69 
0.1 0.52 0.46 0.38 2.08 1.86 1.62 
0.3 0.43 0.38 0.32 1.76 1.62 1.46 
0.5 0.35 0.31 0.26 1.53 1.45 1.34 
3 
0 0.71 0.62 0.51 3.45 2.62 2.02 
0.1 0.67 0.59 0.48 3.06 2.42 1.92 
0.3 0.59 0.51 0.42 2.43 2.05 1.72 
0.5 0.51 0.44 0.36 2.03 1.79 1.57 
4 
0 0.80 0.67 0.53 4.89 3.03 2.13 
0.1 0.76 0.64 0.50 4.11 2.75 2.01 
0.3 0.68 0.57 0.45 3.12 2.33 1.82 
0.5 0.60 0.51 0.40 2.51 2.02 1.67 
5 
0 0.77 0.56 0.41 4.28 2.26 1.69 
0.1 0.73 0.53 0.39 3.71 2.14 1.64 
0.3 0.66 0.48 0.35 2.93 1.92 1.54 
0.5 0.59 0.43 0.31 2.42 1.75 1.46 
6 
0 0.78 0.52 0.36 4.58 2.07 1.57 
0.1 0.75 0.49 0.35 3.95 1.98 1.53 
0.3 0.68 0.45 0.32 3.09 1.81 1.46 
0.5 0.61 0.40 0.28 2.54 1.67 1.40 
Mean 
0 0.73 0.59 0.47 3.95 2.51 1.91 
0.1 0.69 0.56 0.44 3.38 2.30 1.81 
0.3 0.60 0.49 0.38 2.62 1.97 1.63 
0.5 0.52 0.42 0.33 2.15 1.73 1.49 
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Table D.4: Under45 
Tax bracket s 
BE/ME MCF 
2012 2013 2014 2012 2013 2014 
1 
0 0.73 0.63 0.53 3.65 2.73 2.13 
0.1 0.67 0.58 0.49 3.02 2.40 1.96 
0.3 0.55 0.48 0.40 2.24 1.94 1.68 
0.5 0.44 0.38 0.32 1.78 1.62 1.47 
2 
0 0.55 0.48 0.39 2.21 1.92 1.65 
0.1 0.51 0.45 0.37 2.05 1.81 1.58 
0.3 0.43 0.37 0.30 1.74 1.59 1.44 
0.5 0.34 0.30 0.25 1.52 1.43 1.33 
3 
0 0.70 0.59 0.45 3.37 2.42 1.82 
0.1 0.67 0.56 0.43 3.00 2.26 1.75 
0.3 0.58 0.49 0.37 2.40 1.95 1.60 
0.5 0.50 0.42 0.32 2.01 1.73 1.48 
4 
0 0.80 0.65 0.48 5.13 2.82 1.92 
0.1 0.77 0.61 0.46 4.27 2.59 1.84 
0.3 0.69 0.55 0.41 3.19 2.23 1.69 
0.5 0.61 0.49 0.36 2.55 1.95 1.57 
5 
0 0.78 0.59 0.43 4.55 2.43 1.75 
0.1 0.74 0.56 0.41 3.90 2.28 1.69 
0.3 0.67 0.51 0.37 3.04 2.03 1.58 
0.5 0.60 0.45 0.33 2.49 1.82 1.49 
6 
0 0.83 0.60 0.44 6.00 2.48 1.77 
0.1 0.80 0.57 0.42 4.91 2.33 1.71 
0.3 0.72 0.52 0.38 3.59 2.07 1.60 
0.5 0.65 0.46 0.34 2.83 1.86 1.51 
Mean 
0 0.73 0.59 0.45 4.15 2.47 1.84 
0.1 0.69 0.56 0.43 3.52 2.28 1.75 
0.3 0.61 0.49 0.37 2.70 1.97 1.60 
0.5 0.52 0.42 0.32 2.20 1.74 1.47 











Evasion vs. Real production Responses to Taxation among 





In the last decades, globalization and market liberalization have exacerbated poverty and 
inequality in developing countries. As Besley and Persson (2013, p.2) claimed, “tax lies at the heart 
of state development”; as a result, according to the authors additional domestic revenue has become 
necessary in order to finance development and poverty reduction.  
 
In Latin America, governments generally rely more on indirect taxation and resource revenue 
than on direct taxation. The Value Added Tax (VAT) and non-tax revenues are the primary sources 
of revenue collection2. The presence of large informal economies is in fact one of the causes of this 
dependence on indirect taxation; since it results in income tax revenue being insignificant and the 
tax base being highly concentrated in a few large firms3. Furthermore, the economic growth 
witnessed by Latin American countries over the last decade and half has given rise to an 
entrepreneurship spirit, leading to the creation of numerous small and medium enterprises (SMEs). 
In the literature of tax design, these enterprises are classified as a ‘hard-to-tax’ sector4. Although 
this sector represents an important contribution to the national economy, the tax revenue raised by 
it is very low, due to the large informality.  
 
                                                          
1 I am grateful to Professor Jean Hindriks and Professor Romain Houssa for their advice and suggestions.  
2 Along 1990 and 2009, the revenue collected by the VAT was around half of the tax revenue in Argentina and the 
non-tax revenue was 12%. Based on the ICTD Government Revenue Dataset (ICTD GRD, 2014). 
3 According to Schneider et al. (2010), the shadow economy in Argentina during 1997-2007 represented 25.3%GDP 
(mean). Moreover, only 0.1% of firms remit 49% of tax revenue in Argentina (International Tax Dialogue, 2007).  
4 Over the period of study (1997-2011), large firms account for around 0.2% of total registered taxpayers in the 
corporate income tax structure; while, medium firms account for 67.6% and small firms account for 32.2%. Based on the 
Federal Administration of Public Revenue of Argentina (AFIP). 
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In this chapter, I argue that the taxation of SMEs is an important aspect of, and can help to 
explain, the relation between informality, tax evasion and domestic revenue mobilization in 
developing countries. I will address questions such as: does a cost-benefit analysis reveal it is worth 
taxing this sector? What should be the optimal tax structure of a country with numerous SMEs and 
limited tax capacity? The above-mentioned relation presents a challenge to both academic 
economists and policy practitioners in developing countries, hence I hope to contribute to the 
academic debate and inform policy.  
 
The broad literature on optimal taxation mainly relies on the production efficiency theorem of 
Diamond and Mirrlees (1971), which suggests that tax systems should be aimed at maintaining full 
production efficiency even in second-best environments. The policy recommendation that follows 
from this is to avoid taxes on turnover, trade and intermediate inputs that distort production 
efficiency. However, although this recommendation is relevant to developed countries, the 
theoretical framework on which it is based ignores the numerous issues faced by developing 
countries, such as imperfect enforcement, limited tax capacity, informality and tax evasion.  Recent 
studies – such as that of Kleven et al. (2016) – show that in environments with limited tax capacity, 
third-best policies are more suitable, even though they imply revenue creation at the expense of 
production efficiency. The objective of this study is to analyze empirically such a trade-off between 
revenue and production efficiency in the choice of tax instruments in a developing country, namely 
Argentina. In order to do this, I explore a production inefficient tax policy called the Simplified 
Tax Regime (SR), according to which firms are taxed either on their profits or turnover depending 
on which tax liability is larger5. This policy is based on the idea that a larger tax base is more 
difficult to evade. It was implemented in 1998 in Argentina with two purposes: to fight informality 
and to reduce evasion, or in tax policy jargon, to transform “ghosts” into taxpayers and “icebergs” 
into fully taxpayers6. 
 
I begin the analysis by presenting a simple theoretical framework based on the model of Best et 
al. (2014), which I extend by introducing turnover evasion, in order to account for the Argentinean 
                                                          
5 They were first introduced in the 1970s in Latin America to deal with the difficulty to apply the VAT to small 
taxpayers. Later, in the 1990s (1997, in Brazil and 1998, in Argentina) were expanded to the rest of the continent, except 
in Venezuela, Panama and El Salvador. Nowadays, there are three types of simplified tax regimes: ones that replace the 
income tax, others that replace the VAT and others that replace both plus social security contributions (applied only in 
Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay). The criterion of qualification is mainly the turnover; although some regimes have 
additional objective parameters as physical area, electricity bill and number of employees. Some countries have more 
than one regime as Chile (5), Bolivia (3), Mexico (3), Uruguay (2) and Peru (2). The universe of taxpayers covered is: 
self-employed individuals, and micro and small unincorporated enterprises mainly in the commercial and service sectors. 
Finally, the tax calculation commonly used is a monthly fixed quota. 
6 Kanbur and Keen (2014) divide the population of taxpayers by different forms of compliance and non-compliance. 
Among the latter we can find “ghosts” and “icebergs”. “Ghosts” are the invisible taxpayers who should be registered for 
tax purposes but do not, hence are outside the tax net. While, “icebergs” are registered taxpayers who illegally misreport 
their costs and/or output in order to reduce their tax liability.  
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context. The optimality conditions of this model suggest that, in countries with limited tax capacity, 
it may be desirable to deviate from full production efficiency in order to increase compliance. To 
evaluate this theoretical prediction, I use administrative data from the Federal Administration of 
Public Revenue (AFIP, in Spanish) covering the tax returns of all firms subject to corporate income 
tax between 1997 and 2011. Although it is quite rich, this dataset has two drawbacks: first, it is not 
micro-level data, and second, it does not represent firms in the simplified regime. To overcome 
these limitations, I adjust the estimation strategy of Best et al. (2014) while maintaining the core 
idea that the simplified regime gives rise to non-standard kink points, due to the joint and 
discontinuous change of the tax rate and the tax base at a cutoff. As the authors suggest, such kinks 
influence the behavior of firms in terms of compliance and real production differently, and give rise 
to an excess mass around the kink.  
 
There are three main findings. First, the introduction of the policy provides SMEs with an 
additional incentive to reduce their turnover (‘legally’ or ‘illegally’) and to comply with costs. As a 
result, I observe bunching among medium firms in all periods, but more pronounced in 1997 and 
1998 (respectively the year before and the year of the introduction of the policy). Second, I find 
that in Argentina this phenomenon is mostly the result of evasion responses. Indeed, given the 
speed of reaction, the observed bunching around zero and the significant bunching in 1997 and 
1998 is far more likely a consequence of evasion responses rather than of real output responses, as 
previous studies suggest (Mosberger 2016; Lediga et al. 2016). Third, in line with existing research 
(Devereux et al. 2012; Dekker et al. 2016), bunching is asymmetric around a profit rate of 0.09. 
This provides strong evidence that firms respond to the taxation component of the policy. Taken 
together, these three findings suggest that when turnover evasion is taken into account, the revenue 
efficiency of the policy is not as straightforward as the theory suggests.  
 
This study draws upon the broad literature of firms’ behavioral responses to taxes (Kopczuk and 
Slemrod 2006), the recent bunching literature (Saez 2010; Chetty et al. 2011; Kleven 2016; Kleven 
and Waseem 2013; Kleven et al. 2011) and the studies of optimal taxation of firms with limited tax 
capacity (Emran and Stiglitz 2005; Gordon and Li 2009; Kanbur and Keen 2014; Dharmapala et al. 
2011; Keen 2007; Keen 2012; Boadway and Sato 2009; Abramovsky et al. 2014). I believe the 
contributions of this work to the literature are threefold. First, this study provides direct empirical 
evidence on firms’ margin responses to a widespread and questionable policy in Latin America 
with scarce quantitative evidence. An overview of the literature indicates that the majority of the 
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existing work is based on developed countries; few studies analyze the relation between informal 
firms, evasion and taxation in developing countries7.  
 
Second, I contribute to the nascent literature that uses the bunching approach to estimate firm 
responses to tax changes. As Saez (1999) points out, the majority of studies focus on the effect of 
marginal tax rates in the context of personal income tax (PIT), and little attention has been paid to 
the corporate income tax (CIT). Third, I differ from Best et al. (2014) because I give a crucial role 
to turnover evasion and contrary to the results they obtained with Pakistan our results suggest 
skepticism towards the idea that a broader tax base significantly reduces evasion. Overall, three 
factors make this work a relevant contribution to the tax design literature: the topicality of the 
subject, the analytical approach used and the social implications of the policies discussed. 
 
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. The next section introduces the theoretical 
framework used for analyzing the trade-off between revenue and production efficiency. In section 
4.3, I discuss the relevant institutional background and data. Section 4.4 explains the empirical 
strategy used in estimating firms’ behavioral responses. In section 4.5, I present our results. Section 
4.6 deals with some experiences of the impact of the policy. Finally, section 4.7 briefly concludes. 
 
 
4.2 Theoretical framework   
 
The purpose of this section is to develop a conceptual framework within which will be 
examined the trade-off between production and revenue efficiency in the presence of tax evasion. I 
begin with a brief review of Best et al. (2014) who model this trade-off for Pakistan, I then take 
this model as our baseline model and propose two extensions to make it compatible with the 
Argentinean setting.  
 
4.2.1 The trade-off in the Best et al. (2014) framework 
 
Best et al. (2014) use a static model of optimal taxation of firms with no uncertainty. In a partial 
equilibrium framework with no inputs and only one final good, firms choose how much output 𝑦 to 
produce and the costs to report to the tax administration 𝑐. I assume firms can only over-report their 
costs 𝑐 > 𝑐(𝑦) in order to reduce their reported profits (and therefore tax liability). The tax liability 
depends on firms’ output and reported costs: 𝑇(𝑦, 𝑐) = 𝜏[𝑦 − 𝜇𝑐], where 𝜇 is the tax base 
                                                          
7 Indeed, Kleven and Waseem (2013) were the first to extend the literature to a developing country using 
administrative data. 
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parameter which determines the tax regime the firm belongs to, either to the simplified tax regime 
with a turnover tax base (𝜇 = 0) or to the general regime with a pure profit tax base (𝜇 = 1). 
Misreporting entails costs 𝑔(𝑐 − 𝑐(𝑦)), which correspond for instance to the risk of being audited, 
the fine paid when the firm is caught by the tax administration, the productivity losses from 
operating in cash, the costs of not keeping accurate accounting books or the costs from changing 
the production process to eliminate verifiable evidence (Kopzuk and Slemrod 2006; Best et al. 
2014). These costs are convex with the level of tax evasion8. Also, profits depend positively on 
after-tax income and negatively on reported costs. Moreover, I assume a small open economy 
where firms are price-takers; hence I normalize the price of the final good so that turnover and 
output are identical9. As a result, I have the true after-tax profit: 𝜋(𝑦, 𝑐) = 𝑦 − 𝑐(𝑦) − 𝜏[𝑦 − 𝜇𝑐] −
𝑔(𝑐 − 𝑐(𝑦)) and the reported after-tax profit: 𝜋(𝑦, 𝑐) = 𝑦 − 𝑐 − 𝜏[𝑦 − 𝜇𝑐]. The optimization 








= 0 →    𝑐′(𝑦) = 1 − 𝑡 (
1−𝜇
1−𝑡𝜇
) = 1 − 𝑡𝐸                                                 (1) 
𝑑𝜋
𝑑𝑐





)is the effective marginal tax rate (𝑡𝐸).  
 
The first of these expressions determines the real output level. Note that the effective tax rate 
reduces the marginal return to real output. It is a distortionary tax which creates a wedge and which 






≤ 0. An increase of the tax rate 
(∆𝜏 > 0) or a larger tax base (∆𝜇 < 0) raises the effective tax rate, which in turn reduces the 
marginal return of real output and, hence decreases firms’ real output level. The second expression 
determines the level of evasion and it is increasing in statutory tax rate and in tax base. Indeed, an 
increase of the tax rate (∆𝜏 > 0) or a narrower tax base (∆𝜇 > 0) raises the marginal return of 
                                                          
8 As a result, I have three possible cases: no misreporting (𝑐 − 𝑐(𝑦) = 0), over-reporting (𝑐 − 𝑐(𝑦) > 0) and under-
reporting (𝑐 − 𝑐(𝑦) < 0). Is not unreasonable to think that firms under-report costs; in fact, Carrillo et al. (2014) show 
that when the audit probability is a decreasing function of the profit rate, firms under-report revenues and costs in order to 
‘look small’ and, hence avoid being audited. Note that in our case, the SR affects firms’ size because it gives incentives 
to firms to stay small indefinitely and/or to reduce their size in order to benefit from the regime. However, firms modify 
their size through misreporting as long as the tax payment is larger or equal to the costs of misreporting. If the costs of 
misreporting are too large, then firms will prefer to not misreport and will reveal their true costs and/or turnover.  
9 Therefore, net income can be referred to as profits and gross income as turnover or output. The profit tax is thus 
over net income while the turnover tax is over gross income. 
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misreporting (∆𝑡𝜇 > 0) which in turn give more incentives to firms to evade by over-reporting 
costs10.  
 
When firms are subject to the general regime, they are taxed on their profits (𝜇 = 1) and the 
statutory tax rate is the profit tax. Equations (1) and (2) become: 𝑐′(𝑦) = 1, 𝑔′(𝑐 − 𝑐(𝑦)) = 𝜏𝜋. 
Observe in the first expression that the wedge disappears, so that the firm’s production decision is 
undistorted. The second expression implies that firms have an incentive to evade in the general 
regime because the marginal return of misreporting is the profit tax. Conversely, when firms are 
subject to the simplified tax regime, they are taxed on their turnover (𝜇 = 0) and the statutory tax 
rate is the turnover tax, hence equations (1) and (2) become: 𝑐′(𝑦) = 1 − 𝑡𝑦, 𝑔
′(𝑐 − 𝑐(𝑦)) = 0. In 
this case, a wedge distorts the production decision of firms by reducing the marginal return to real 
output; on the other hand, firms get no benefits from misreporting costs. 
 
The model specifies a government which can only raise revenue by taxing firms. This is not an 
unreasonable assumption in developing countries where, due to high administrative costs, income 
taxes are often concentrated on CIT11. In this setting, the government has two instruments for tax 
policy, the tax rate and the tax base. As a result, the government sets the tax base 𝜇 and the tax rate 
𝜏 in the presence of tax evasion in order to maximize welfare 𝑊 = 𝜋(𝑦, 𝑐) under the constraint of 
collecting a revenue 𝑅 ≤ 𝑇(𝑦, 𝑐), where, 𝑇(𝑦, 𝑐) = 𝜏[𝑦 − 𝜇𝑐]. Both FOCs give 𝜆 ≥ 1, where 𝜆 
denotes the (endogenous) marginal costs of public funds (intuitively, it is the ‘price’ the 
government faces to collect revenue in order to finance public expenditure). 
 
This simple model does not include the behavior of households. It is assumed that the only 
individuals in the economy are the firms’ owners, whose consumption depends on the after-tax 
profits obtained. Maximizing welfare is thus equivalent to maximizing the aggregate consumption 
or after-tax profit, subject to an exogenous revenue requirement 𝑅. From this model Best et al. 
(2014) state the following optimal tax rules: 
 
 Lemma 1: When there is perfect enforcement, then the optimal tax base is 𝜇 = 1. 
 
                                                          
10 For example, if the government improves its tax capacity by increasing the number of inspections or the amount of 
fines, then it becomes costlier for a firm to evade. In the 2004 reform, the Argentinean tax administration introduced a 
fine (100 - 3 000 pesos) plus the precautionary closing of the business in case of tax evasion. Five years later, in the 2009 
reform, the fine was modified to 50% of the single tax. In the model, these policy changes would translate into higher 
costs of evasion. 
11 The empirical evidence suggests that low fiscal capacity countries rely heavily on taxation of firms. For example, in 
Argentina CIT revenue represents 65% of the tax income revenue, while PIT represents only 31% (mean over 1990-
2010; based on the ICTD Government Revenue Dataset (ICTD GRD, 2014)). 
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Proof: Perfect enforcement implies no evasion, so firms report their true costs 𝑐 = 𝑐(𝑦) and 
𝑔(0) = 0. The optimization problem of firms becomes: 𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑦
𝜋(𝑦) = 𝑦 − 𝑐(𝑦) − 𝜏[𝑦 − 𝜇𝑐(𝑦)] 
where the result is an efficient output decision: 𝑐′(𝑦) = 1. Consequently, with perfect tax 
enforcement the theorem of Diamond and Mirrless (1971) holds, full production efficiency is 
maintained with 𝜇 = 1 and a pure profit tax. 
 
 Proposition 1: When there is imperfect enforcement, then the optimal tax base is 𝜇 = 0. 
Proof: With imperfect tax enforcement, firms have an incentive to misreport 𝑐 > 𝑐(𝑦) even 
though it entails some cost 𝑔(𝑐 − 𝑐(𝑦)) > 0. In such context, the firms’ optimization problem is: 
𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑦,𝑐
𝜋(𝑦, 𝑐) = 𝑦 − 𝑐(𝑦) − 𝜏[𝑦 − 𝜇𝑐] − 𝑔(𝑐 − 𝑐(𝑦)) . This results in an inefficient output decision 
𝑐′(𝑦) = 1 − 𝑡𝑦; consequently, firms deviate from optimality. 
 
Proposition 1 is a generalization of the optimal tax rule (Lemma 1) in the presence of tax 
evasion, it captures the trade-off between production and revenue efficiency in the choice of the tax 
base and reflects the notion that “a broader base is harder to evade” (Best et al. 2014, p.2). From a 
policy perspective, if the revenue efficiency concern is stronger than the production efficiency 
concern, then it is socially optimal to switch to turnover tax (i.e. broadening the tax base) 𝜇 = 0. 
As a result, the production wedge increases, producing a second-order welfare loss, while the 
evasion rate decreases, leading to a first-order welfare gain. Conversely, if the production 
efficiency concern is stronger than the revenue efficiency concern it will be socially optimal to 
choose a profit tax, by setting 𝜇 = 1. In this case, firms’ real output decision is undistorted, but this 
is at the expense of evasion. The first case appropriately describes the case of developing countries 





(a) Turnover evasion 
 
In the baseline model it was assumed that firms could only over-report costs12. In this section I 
extend the model to allow for turnover evasion. The extension is justified by the idea that 
Argentinean firms have strong incentives to under-report turnover because is the main criterion of 
qualification and categorization in the simplified tax regime. Firms can over-report costs 𝑐 > 𝑐(𝑦)  
and under-report output 𝑦 < 𝑦, and both of these entail costs 𝑔(𝑐 − 𝑐(𝑦), 𝑦 − 𝑦). In this setting, 
                                                          
12 The original assumption based on Best et al.’s (2014, p.4) idea that “it may be easier to fabricate costs than to 
conceal revenues”.  
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firms choose how much output y to produce, as well as the output 𝑦 and costs 𝑐 reported to the tax 








= 0 →    𝑐′(𝑦) = 1 − 𝑡 (
1−𝜇
1−𝑡𝜇
) = 1 − 𝑡𝐸                                                 (3) 
𝑑𝜋
𝑑𝑦
= 0 → 𝑔′𝑦 = 𝜏                        (4) 
𝑑𝜋
𝑑𝑐
= 0 → 𝑔′𝑐 = 𝜏𝜇                      (5) 
 
Equation (3) is the same as the baseline model. Similarly, Equation (4) determines the level of 
turnover evasion while equation (5) dictates the level of costs evasion. Both are increasing in 
statutory tax rate, but only equation (5) is affected positively by the tax base. Moreover, firms in 
the general regime (𝜇 = 1) have the same incentives to evade in turnover and in costs because the 
marginal return of misreporting is the profit rate: 𝑔′𝑦 = 𝑔′𝑐 = 𝜏𝜋. This result is reasonable in the 
general regime, where evasion in costs and/or in turnover reduces reported profits and hence tax 
liability. On the other hand, firms in the simplified regime (𝜇 = 0) only have an incentive to under-
report turnover: 𝑔′𝑦 = 𝜏𝑦, 𝑔′𝑐 = 0.  
 
In this extended model, the government’s optimization problem (and hence the result derived 
from it) remains the same: 𝜆 ≥ 1.  
 
To conclude, the introduction of turnover evasion to the baseline model does not contradict our 
previous results; on the contrary, it is helpful in furthering our understanding of the problem. 
Indeed, with this simple extension I captured the idea that firms under-report turnover irrespective 
of the tax regime to which they are subject, while they have more incentives to evade in the general 
regime than in the simplified regime because 0 < 𝜏𝑦 < 𝜏𝜋 (see Table 4.1).  
 
(b) Single tax 
 
In this second extension I assume a fixed fee rather than a turnover tax. This is to reflect the fact 
that in the simplified regime Argentinean firms pay a fixed fee called single tax, which is 
determined by the tax administration and depends on the category to which the firm belongs. The 
single tax thus depends positively on the reported turnover 𝜃(𝑦). The optimization problem for a 
representative firm with cost evasion only is:  














                                                   (6) 
𝑑𝜋
𝑑𝑐
= 0  →    𝑔′𝑐 = 𝜇2𝜏                                                     (7) 
 
Turnover evasion is now introduced to see if there are any significant changes in the results. 
Note that in this case the single tax  𝜃(𝑦) is decreasing in the turnover evasion; 
𝑑𝜃(𝑦)
𝑑𝑦
≤ 0. The 













                                                   (8) 
𝑑𝜋
𝑑𝑦
= 0 → 𝑔′𝑦 = 𝜇1𝜃′𝑦 + 𝜇2𝜏                     (9) 
𝑑𝜋
𝑑𝑐
= 0 → 𝑔′𝑐 = 𝜇2𝜏                                    (10) 
 
When there is only cost evasion (equation 6 and 7), firms in the general regime (𝜇1 = 0, 𝜇2 =
1) maintain full production efficiency and over-report costs: 𝑐′(𝑦) = 1, 𝑔′𝑐 = 𝜏𝜋, while firms in 
the simplified regime (𝜇1 = 1, 𝜇2 = 0) deviate from production efficiency and report costs 
truthfully: 𝑐′(𝑦) = 1 − 𝜃′𝑦, 𝑔′𝑐 = 0. When there is turnover and costs evasion (equations 8-10), 
firms in the general regime (𝜇1 = 0, 𝜇2 = 1) evade in turnover and costs: 𝑔′𝑦 = 𝑔′𝑐 = 𝜏𝜋, while 
firms in the simplified regime (𝜇1 = 1, 𝜇2 = 0) only under-report turnover: 𝑔′𝑐 = 0, 𝑔′𝑦 = 𝜃′𝑦. In 
both cases, the government chooses the tax rate 𝜏 and the tax base 𝜇1, 𝜇2 to maximize welfare 
subject to the revenue requirement: 𝑅 ≤ 𝜇1𝜃(𝑦) + 𝜇2𝑇(𝑦, 𝑐) when there is only costs evasion or 
𝑅 ≤ 𝜇1𝜃(𝑦) + 𝜇2𝑇(𝑦, 𝑐) when there is turnover and costs evasion. The result from the 
government’s optimization problem in both cases remains the same: 𝜆 ≥ 1. Therefore, this 
extension leads to the same predictions of the baseline model. Consequently, whether a single tax 
or a turnover tax is used should not alter the main insights of the model. 
 
This theoretical framework gives qualitative predictions on the optimal taxation of firms under 
the presence of tax evasion. In the empirical section, the quantitative implications of such 
predictions will be examined by exploiting a production inefficient tax policy in Argentina, namely 
the simplified tax regime.   
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4.3 Institutional setting and data 
 
4.3.1 Corporate income tax in Argentina  
 
Corporate taxation is a crucial source of revenue in Argentina, as it raises 4.4% of GDP, which 
represents about 29% of all central tax revenues13. The tax system is residence-based and the 
current CIT rate is 35%. In the period under study there was an average of 132 298 firms in the 
General Regime (GR) filing tax returns each year and 1 561 711 active firms registered in the 
Simplified Regime (SR) each year (Table A.1). Despite these numbers, the revenue collected in the 
SR is insignificant in Argentina’s tax system: it accounts for only 3% of CIT revenue and 1% of 
total tax revenue (mean over 1999 to 2011, see Table A.1)14.  
 
The introduction of the SR in November 1998 had two purposes: to fight informality (first 
motivation) and to reduce tax evasion (second motivation). This scheme is one of the few in Latin 
America that links informality, taxation and social protection15. It consists of a single tax composed 
by two components: a monthly tax which replaces income tax (PIT and CIT) and VAT, and a social 
security component that includes retirement benefits and health coverage. To keep the model 
simple, I ignore the social security contributions and focus only on the monthly tax and the CIT16. 
The SR classifies firms in eight categories depending on their reported turnover and each category 
has a different monthly tax.  Importantly, in order to follow the methodology of Best et al. (2014), I 
transform the single tax to a turnover tax, so that the turnover tax obtained is the minimum amount 
that a firm allocated in the lowest category can pay17. However, when comparing categories, the 
turnover tax of the lowest category is in fact the highest turnover tax in proportional terms, 
suggesting certain regressivity in the SR (as mentioned in the reports of the tax administration).  
 
The idea of the SR is to give incentives to small taxpayers to voluntarily comply with their tax 
obligations by offering access to a retirement plan and to health insurance, and by minimizing the 
costs of compliance. These small taxpayers are self-employed individuals, unincorporated small 
businesses such as cooperatives, and irregular societies of up to three members. The main rules of 
                                                          
13 Mean over 1997-2011, based on the ICTD Government Revenue Dataset (ICTD GRD, 2014). 
14 Nevertheless, the SR of Argentina collects the second highest revenue among SRs in Latin America (after Brazil’s 
simplified tax regime, SIMPLES) (ILO, 2014).  
15 Since 2004, the SR contains complementary special regimes for specific ‘hard-to-tax’ sectors, namely: (i) the 
Regime of Social Inclusion and Promotion of Independent Work, (ii) the Simplified Regime for Effectors of Local 
Development and Social Economy, (iii) the Special Regime for Workers Associated to Labor Cooperatives and (iv) the 
Simplified Regime for Domestic Service Workers. 
16 So, I use the terms “single tax” and “monthly tax” interchangeably throughout the paper. 
17 The turnover tax is the single tax (annual) divided by the lowest and highest annual turnover base of each category; 
thus, I have a minimum and a maximum turnover tax in each category. To follow as close as possible the methodology of 
Best et al. (2014), I choose the minimum turnover tax from the lowest category.  
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the SR are as follows. Once a taxpayer has adhered to the SR, a minimum period of permanence 
(one calendar year) is required. Also, when the firm wishes to withdraw from the SR, it has to 
fulfill the tax and social security obligations imposed by the GR at the latest on the first day of the 
month following the withdrawal. To be eligible, the highest turnover obtained from the principal 
activity in the previous year should not exceed the limit established by the tax administration. Other 
requirements for eligibility are that the firm has to meet some objective parameters, it cannot be an 
importer, it cannot reclaim credits on inputs. In addition, the firm must report its turnover and 
objective parameters regularly in order to confirm they meet the requirements18. On the other hand, 
a firm in the SR is not required to fill any tax return because it is excluded from VAT and CIT, nor 
is it required to keep accounting books.  
 
During the period under study, there were three reforms affecting either or both of the two 
regimes. The first reform (December 1998) increased the profit tax rate from 33% to 35%, the 
second reform (July 2004) raised the single tax of the highest categories in the SR and the third 
reform (December 2009) decreased the single tax of the lowest category. The three reforms 
introduced additional modifications that are deliberately ignored in order to focus on the changes of 
the tax rate. Table A.1 (Panel A) shows the variations in profit tax rate and turnover tax rate over 
the period under study. Similarly to Best et al. (2014), I exploit these variations in the empirical 
analysis. For practical reasons, I divide the period under study based on the policy and the three 
reforms identified. 
 
Table 4.1: Tax rates and tax kinks 
 
1997 1998 1999/2003 2004/2009 2010/2011 
Panel A: Tax rates 
Turnover tax (min.) - 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.020 
Turnover tax  (total, min.) - 0.066 0.066 0.088 0.110 
Profit tax 0.33 0.33 0.35 0.35 0.35 
Panel B: Tax kinks 
Profit rate (min.) - 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.05 
Profit rate (total, min.) - 0.20 0.18 0.25 0.31 
 
Notes: Turnover tax (min.) refers to the monthly tax and turnover tax (total,min.) refers to the monthly tax plus social security 





                                                          
18 Originally, this was every tax year, but since 2004, firms must report every four months (May, September and 
January). 
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The analysis is based on administrative data from the Federal Administration of Public Revenue 
(AFIP, in Spanish) for the period 1997-201119. It is an annual cross-section sample with sampling 
weights to reflect the distribution of CIT returns of all the population20. The data has two 
limitations that are important to highlight. First, it contains only firms filing the CIT returns, i.e. 
only firms in the GR. The next section explains how this limitation is dealt with. Second, the 
original data is already binned, firms are already grouped in 17 thresholds based on their turnover, 
ranged from 0 to more than 500 000 000 pesos (Table A.2). Consequently, the fact that the data is 
not completely disaggregated introduces measurement errors in the bunching estimates and the 
empirical density distribution is not completely smooth.  
 
4.3.3 Sample selection 
 
Before the introduction of the policy, the GR was the only regime in the CIT structure, and 
firms outside of it were informal firms, called “ghosts” in the tax jargon. Thus, firms could only 
move from the GR to informality and vice versa. Importantly, within the GR there were firms 
misreporting costs and turnover, colloquially called “icebergs” in the GR. Since the introduction of 
the policy, there were two regimes co-existing in the CIT structure, the GR and the SR. Six flows 
are identifiable: from the GR to the SR and vice versa; from the GR to informality and vice versa, 
and from the SR to informality and vice versa. Of course, in the SR, there are also firms that under-
report turnover, called “icebergs” in the SR. I restrict the analysis to the flow from the GR to the 
SR because, as explained above, the data relates exclusively the behavior of firms in the GR. Flows 
between formality and informality, although they provide interesting insights given the first 
motivation of the policy, are not the focus of this study. Instead, I focus on the second motivation 
of the policy, namely the reduction of evasion. 
 
For tractability, I selected three variables: turnover, profit and taxable income. The information 
available on the CIT returns includes all kind of balance sheet items such as total costs, total 
purchases, tax liabilities, total assets, initial and final stocks, etc., but the three aforementioned 
variables are sufficient for our purposes. Figures B.1 and B.2 identify the variables used in the 
empirical analysis. In this regard, the calculation of the profit rate (defined as profits as a fraction 
of turnover) is worth explaining. Indeed, when either the calculated profit (reported turnover minus 
                                                          
19 In Argentina, the tax year coincides with the calendar year, i.e. it runs from January 1 to December 31. However, 
the last day for firms to present their CIT returns to the tax administration is the June 30. Note that I do not consider the 
tax year 2001 because the observations were not sufficient. Indeed, in 2001, the tax administration modified the format of 
the tax returns. Another reason for excluding the tax year 2001 is that the Argentinean economy suffered of a deep 
recession (“corralito”) in that year. 
20 Note that electronic filing (Presentación de DDJJ y Pagos) is optional for all firms; but around 97% of firms used 
this method from 2006 to 2010 (CIAT, http://www.ciat.org/index.php/es/productos-y-servicios/ciatdata/anexos-
estadisticos.html) which ensures less measurement error in the data, as highlighted by Best et al. (2014). 
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reported costs) or the reported profit are used, the distribution of the profit rate is above zero and 
too on the right of the cutoff even when social security contributions are included. For this reason, 
the reported taxable income21 is used in the empirical analysis.  
 
In the original data, firms are classified in 17 categories defined by thresholds relating to their 
reported turnover (see Table A.2), even though all firms are taxed on their profits by a flat tax rate. 
I take advantage of this format and divide the data in groups according to their eligibility and size22: 
all firms (thresholds[1 − 17] ), eligible or small firms (thresholds[1 − 2] ), non-eligible firms 
(thresholds[3 − 17] ), medium firms (thresholds[3 − 15] ) and large firms (thresholds[16 − 17] ).  
 
 
4.4 Empirical methodology 
 
The empirical methodology used here builds on Best et al. (2014), but is adapted to account for 
the two limitations of the data. Therefore, I first briefly present the strategy and intuition 
underlying the approach of Best et al. (2014). Then, I explain how Chapter 4 differs from them in 
the construction of the empirical methodology, and I describe the intuition that underlies our 
approach.  
 
4.4.1 Bunching evidence  
 
As stated in the previous section, there was only one regime in the CIT structure before the 
introduction of the SR (namely the GR), while there were two regimes coexisting (the SR and the 
GR) after the policy was implemented. This is depicted in Fig. 4.1, which clearly shows that firms 
with a tax liability above certain cutoff belong to the GR while firms with a lower tax liability 
belong to the SR. 
 
Firms are thus taxed either on their profits or their turnover, depending on which tax liability is 
larger. Following Best et al. (2014), this main idea is described by the following equation: 
 
𝑇(𝑦, 𝑐) = 𝑚𝑎𝑥[𝑡𝜋(𝑦 − 𝑐), 𝑡𝑦𝑦]         (11) 
 
                                                          
21 Note that firms report their taxable income as the profit increased or decreased by items modifying the tax base, so 
that the profit tax rate is levied on it. 
22 Based on the “Boletín Oficial de la República de Argentina, No. 24/2001”. 
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Considering a firm at the border between both regimes, both tax liabilities can be equalized23: 
 







                        (13) 
 
This gives the cutoff separating the two regimes, defined by the ratio between both tax rates 
being equal to a profit rate (reported taxable income as a share of reported turnover). Based on this 
simple empirical strategy, Best et al. (2014, p.11) argue that the introduction of the SR gives rise to 
non-standard kink points because of the joint change in the tax rate and the tax base. Under this 
framework, the introduction of the SR affects firms’ decisions on real output and compliance 
differently, the policy causes an outflow of some firms from the GR to the SR. Once in the new 
regime, firms decide to produce less and to comply in costs. Both of these changes (under the 
assumption of diminishing returns to scale) increase their profit rate and thus create bunching at the 
cutoff. According to Best et al. (2014), bunching represents real output (∆𝑦 < 0) and evasion 
responses (∆𝑐 < 0), but mostly evasion responses from firms below the cutoff. In fact, the authors 
go further and argue that the bunching observed is the result of better compliance24.  
 
Unfortunately, the two behavioral responses used by Best et al. (2014) to explain bunching 
cannot be observed, because there is no information about firms in the SR (cf. second limitation of 
the data). Hence, taking inspiration from Best et al. (2014), I follow a backward process and 
attempt to construct my own strategy and intuition based on what is observed in the data. Contrary 
to what would be expected if one followed the reasoning of Best et al. (2014), the data shows 
bunching around the cutoff among firms in the GR. I argue that in Argentina firms in the GR could 
be indirectly affected by the policy, something that Best et al. (2014) completely discard.  
 
This hypothesis rests on three main intuitions, which will be verified in the next section. First, 
like Best et al. (2014), I argue that some firms move from the GR to the SR, and that these firms 
then decide to produce less and comply in costs. According to Best et al. (2014), firms reduce 
turnover because in the SR they have no incentives to continue producing at the optimal level 
                                                          
23 Based on previous studies (Saez 2010; Kleven and Waseem 2013; Best et al. 2014), a smooth distribution and 
homogeneous responsiveness across firms is assumed. In other words, it is assumed that “there exists a single marginal 
buncher who reveals the bunching response” (Best et al. 2014, p.12). In turn, this allows one to equalize the tax 
liabilities. 
24 Best et al. (2014) arrive to this conclusion by restricting real output responses. First, since the analysis is based on a 
partial equilibrium model it avoids an additional source of production inefficiency, namely the cascading effect. Second, 
the authors assume that bunching at the kink only captures intensive margin responses, restricting production distortions 
from the extensive margin (i.e. from informal firms). Third, the authors assume a non-distortionary profit tax and a 
distortionary turnover tax; but since the latter is smaller than the former, the distortion generated by the turnover tax is 
minimal at the cutoff. 
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(since the marginal return to output is lower than in the GR: 𝑐′(𝑦) = 1 − 𝑡𝑦). The argument is 
simpler: firms in the SR reduce turnover in order to be classified in the lowest categories of the 
regime and pay a lower single tax. This also implies that firms have an incentive to continue 
misreporting turnover in the SR: 𝑔′𝑦 = 𝜏𝑦. Therefore, the responses below the cutoff (see Fig. 4.1) 
represent real output (∆𝑦 < 0) and evasion (∆𝑐 < 0, ∆𝑦 > 0) responses. Importantly, this 
introduces an additional evasion response, namely turnover evasion. Unfortunately, this behavior is 
unobservable due to the second limitation of the data. However, the reports of the tax 
administration (AFIP, 2006) confirm the existence of “icebergs” in the SR, as they show the 
agglomeration of firms among the lowest categories of the SR and the frequent re-categorizations 
towards the highest categories of the SR. Also, the reports of the ILO (2013, 2014) conclude that 
the SR has become a ‘shelter’ for evaders. Section 4.6 will examine this issue more closely. 
 
The second intuition is that the bunching observed above the cutoff is the response of small and 
medium firms from the GR. With the introduction of the policy, these firms have an additional 
incentive to reduce turnover ‘legally’ or ‘illegally’. In the case of medium firms, the aim would be 
to become eligible and move to the SR, and in the case of small firms, to be classified in the lowest 
categories of the SR25. Also, those firms have an incentive to stop over-reporting costs to be 
consistent with the information revealed to the tax administration. These two behavioral changes 
among SMEs move the distribution of the profit rate to the right, creating an excess mass around 
the cutoff. By contrast, large firms are not expected to respond to the policy change because it 
would be too costly for them to reduce turnover to the level required by the SR, but also because 
large firms are more likely to have international activities and could perceive being registered in 
the VAT as a commercial advantage. Therefore, the responses above the cutoff (see Fig. 4.1) 
represent real output (∆𝑦 < 0) and evasion responses (∆𝑐 < 0, ∆𝑦 > 0) from SMEs. 
 
Finally, the last intuition is that the observed bunching represents mostly evasion responses 
(∆𝑐 < 0, ∆𝑦 > 0). When turnover evasion is introduced in the model, firms have an incentive to 
misreport turnover (∆𝑦 > 0) in both regimes, and this effect might offset the reduction in cost 
evasion (∆𝑐 < 0 ), in turn decreasing compliance. 
  
                                                          
25 Note that the behavioral decisions of medium and small firms are observable because to apply to the SR, firms 
need to prove they meet the turnover criteria for at least 12 months. Therefore, when firms take their production and 
compliance decisions for those 12 months, they are still in the GR. 
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Figure 4.1: Bunching theory 
 
Source: Based on Best et al. (2014, p.30) and Saez (2010, p.187) 
 
4.4.2 Bunching estimation 
 
Now, I turn to the methodology used in the bunching estimation. The estimation strategy builds 
on Saez (2010), as well as on the bunching empirical literature (Best et al. 2014; Lediga et al. 2016, 
Mosberger 2016, Dekker et al. 2016, Devereux et al. 2012).  
 
In the seminal study of Saez (2010) the author estimates the amount of bunching 𝐵 as follows: 
 




∗                                        (14) 
 
The excess mass is estimated by comparing the empirical income distribution (with an excess 
mass around the kink) with respect to a counterfactual distribution (what the distribution would 
have looked like had the kink absent). Saez (2010) constructs the counterfactual distribution using 
the empirical (observed) income distribution around the kink. For doing so, “the bunching window 
is chosen as the area around the kink that is visibly affected by the bunching” (Best et al. .2014, 
p.20). The bunching window is defined by a middle band around the kink [𝜏𝑦 𝜏𝜋⁄ − 𝛿, 𝜏𝑦 𝜏𝜋⁄ + 𝛿] 
and two surroundings bands [𝜏𝑦 𝜏𝜋⁄ − 2𝛿, 𝜏𝑦 𝜏𝜋⁄ − 𝛿] and [𝜏𝑦 𝜏𝜋⁄ + 𝛿, 𝜏𝑦 𝜏𝜋⁄ + 2𝛿], below and 
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above the kink, as depicted in Fig. 4.1. As in Saez (2010, p.187), the parameter 𝛿 measures the 
width of those bands and its choice matters when estimating excess bunching: “if 𝛿 is too small, the 
amount of excess bunching will be underestimated; but if 𝛿 is too large it will be overestimated”. 
As the author suggests, I select 𝛿 graphically to ensure that the full excess mass is included in the 
band [𝜏𝑦 𝜏𝜋⁄ − 𝛿, 𝜏𝑦 𝜏𝜋⁄ + 𝛿], for this reason the middle band is always selected in such a way that 
the kink points are at the center. Then, Saez (2010) estimates the excess mass by comparing the 
number of firms in the band around the kink with respect to the number of firms in the two 
surrounding bands as follows: 
 











= 𝜏𝑦 𝜏𝜋⁄ . 
 
Furthermore, to get the number of firms in each band denoted as ?̂?∗, ?̂?+
∗ , ?̂?−
∗  the author regresses 
simultaneously a dummy variable for belonging to each band on a constant in the sample of firms 








 and finally, 
he computes the empirical bunching parameter ?̂? = ?̂?∗ − ?̂?+
∗ − ?̂?−
∗  . Standard errors are then 





Bunching estimation is a genuinely visual technique (Bastani and Selin 2014). Accordingly, 
along this section I display graphs and bunching estimates. First, I show evidence of bunching for 
all the period according to firms’ size and eligibility. Then, I exploit the variations in the tax kink 
by comparing the reforms applied in December 1998 (∆𝜏𝜋 > 0), July 2004 (∆𝜏𝑦 > 0) and 
December 2009 (∆𝜏𝑦 < 0) to test whether the excess mass at the tax kink is indeed a response to 
the tax system. 
 
4.5.1 Bunching evidence 
 
The aim of this subsection is to show evidence that firms in the GR do indeed bunch and that 
this bunching is around tax kinks. Figure 4.2 displays bunching evidence for different years (1997, 
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1998, 1999/2003, 2004/2009 and 2010/2011) and for all firms. Empirically, bunching estimates are 
significant in all the period except in 1999/2003 and 2010/2011 (see Table 4.2, column (1)). This is 
so, because the excess mass is placed to the left of the kink point in 1999/2003 and to the right in 
2010/2011.  
 
To identify who are the main firms responsible of the overall bunching (i.e. bunchers), I divide 
the sample into two, according to whether a firm is eligible or not. The density distributions are 
plotted in Figures 4.3 and C.1. At first glance, there is bunching in all years only for non-eligible 
firms. But, if I disaggregate this group into medium and large firms, bunching occurs in all years 
for medium firms (Fig. 4.4) while there is no bunching for large firms (Fig. C.2). This is precisely 
what is observed in Table 4.2 (Column (2) and (3)). This finding seems to confirm the second 
intuition, i.e. that medium firms are indirectly affected by the policy26. Medium firms have more 
incentives to decrease their turnover ‘legally’ or ‘illegally’, to reduce their tax liability and/or to 
become eligible and move to the SR. As explained in the previous section, such behavior increases 
the reported profit rate and moves the distribution to the right, with a clustering of medium firms 
around the kink point. On the other hand, I do not detect any clear bunching among small or 
eligible firms. Contrarily to the intuition, small firms are not affected by the introduction of the SR 
probably because small firms already meet all the requirements needed to be an eligible firm and 
move to the SR.  
 
Finally, in respect to the sensitivity analysis in Table 4.2, it is important to mention that the 
bunching estimates are fairly sensitive with respect to the choice of the bandwidth, which confirms 




                                                          
26 One could argue that medium firms are more likely to be bunchers because they represent around 70% of all firms. 
However, this is not necessarily true. To identify bunchers, first I break down the distribution of all firms into eligible and 
non-eligible firms. Then, if I observe that the bunching originally detected in the distribution of all firms remains in the 
distribution of one of these subgroups, that subgroup is namely a buncher. 
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Figure 4.2: Bunching evidence, all firms 
 
 
Notes: Figure 4.2 shows the empirical Kernel density distribution of the profit rate (reported taxable income as a fraction of turnover) 
for all firms. The green solid line shows the kink points calculated using 𝜏𝑦(min) and 𝜏𝜋: 1998(0.1), 1999/2003(0.09), 2004/2009(0.09) 
and 2010/2011(0.05). The zero profit rate is marked by a dotted red line. 
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Figure 4.3: Bunching evidence, non-eligible firms 
 
 
Notes: Figure 4.3 shows the empirical Kernel density distribution of the profit rate (reported taxable income as a fraction of turnover) 
for non-eligible firms. The green solid line shows the kink points calculated using 𝜏𝑦(min) and 𝜏𝜋: 1998(0.1), 1999/2003(0.09), 
2004/2009(0.09) and 2010/2011(0.05). The zero profit rate is marked by a dotted red line. 
 
Chapter 4: Evasion vs. Real production Responses to Taxation among Firms 
130 
 
Figure 4.4: Bunching evidence, medium firms 
 
Notes: Figure 4.4 shows the empirical Kernel density distribution of the profit rate (reported taxable income as a fraction of turnover) 
for medium firms. The green solid line shows the kink points calculated using 𝜏𝑦(min) and 𝜏𝜋: 1998(0.1), 1999/2003(0.09), 
2004/2009(0.09) and 2010/2011(0.05). The zero profit rate is marked by a dotted red line. 
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Table 4.2: Bunching estimates at kink points a 
 
Years Kink Bandwidth 
All Non eligible Medium 
(1) (2) (3) 
Panel A: Bunching evidence  
1997 0.10 0.02 
-0.49* -0.73*** -0.73*** 
(0.23) (0.19) (0.20) 
1998 0.10 0.02 
-0.78*** -0.75*** -0.75*** 
(0.16) (0.18) (0.19) 
1999/2003 0.09 0.02 
0.17 0.14 0.14 
(0.13) (0.14) (0.14) 
2004/2009 0.09 0.02 
0.57*** 0.57*** 0.57*** 
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
2010/2011 0.05 0.02 
-1.00 -1.00 -1.00 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Panel B: Sensitivity analysis with bandwidth 
1997 0.10 0.01 
0.13 -0.92** -0.92** 
(0.50) (0.23) (0.23) 
1998 0.10 0.01 
-0.91** -0.91** -0.90* 
(0.21) (0.21) (0.30) 
1999/2003 0.09 0.01 
0.19 0.38** 0.38** 
(0.16) (0.16) (0.17) 
2004/2009 0.09 0.01 
0.43*** 0.43*** 0.43*** 
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12) 
2010/2011 b 0.05 0.01 - - - 
1997 0.10 0.03 
0.38 0.28 0.28 
(0.24) (0.26) (0.28) 
1998 0.10 0.03 
0.19 0.06 0.06 
(0.25) (0.27) (0.29) 
1999/2003 0.09 0.03 
0.82*** 0.87*** 0.87*** 
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
2004/2009 0.09 0.03 
0.78*** 0.77*** 0.78*** 
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
2010/2011 0.05 0.03 
-1.00 -1.00 -1.00 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 
Notes: Table 4.2 shows bunching estimates for the bunching detected in Figures 4.2-4.4. Standard errors are in parentheses; all are 
computed using the delta method. Significance levels are *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
a  All firms (thresholds[1 − 17]), non-eligible firms (thresholds[3 − 17]) and medium firms (thresholds[3 − 15]). 
b  The bunching parameter cannot be estimated in 2010/2011 because of few observations. 
 
 
4.5.2 Dynamics of bunching 
 
Turning to the intuition that bunching represents mostly evasion responses, there are two 
elements which support it. First, Figures 4.5 - 4.7 show that bunching in 1997 is sharper than in any 
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other year for all firms, non-eligible firms and medium firms27. In trying to explain the sharp 
bunching in 1997, one could call upon the foresight of firms. According to the reports of the tax 
administration (AFIP, 2006), the introduction of the SR is a response to the requests of small 
taxpayers made to the parliament of Argentina (probably based on the experience of Brazil where it 
was introduced in 1997). It is possible that Argentineans firms anticipated the policy and thus 
modified their behavior in 1997. This explanation requires the assumption that Argentineans firms 
have rational expectations and knew that the bill was being discussed in parliament. Another 
plausible explanation for the sharp bunching in 1997 is the case of potential endogeneity, the tax 
administration might have identified the profit rate where firms cluster and have used it as cutoff; 
in other words, the tax administration might have followed a methodology similar to ours to 
identify the cutoff that separates both regimes28.  
 
Bunching in 1998 (Fig. 4.5 – 4.7, Panel A) seems less surprising because although the 
implementation of the policy was in November 1998, it was approved by the parliament in June 
1998 and announced in July 1998 through important advertising campaigns. Thus, firms could have 
modified their behavior from July 1998 to June 1999 (the last month for firms to present their tax 
returns to the tax administration). Nevertheless, it must be stressed that, by the time the tax changes 
were announced, most of the real decisions corresponding to the tax year 1998 had already been 
taken29. Given this, the speed of reaction provides supporting evidence that behavioral changes are 
driven by evasion responses rather than real responses. A similar reasoning is followed by Waseem 
(2013), Saez (1999) and Mosberger (2016), and this conclusion is further supported by the finding 
of Lediga et al. (2016, p.7) that it is difficult to adjust real output in a short period, because of 
adjustment costs and optimization frictions, e.g. existing long-term contracts. In short, the bunching 
observed in 1997 and in 1998 confirms that firms can rapidly adapt their compliance behavior.  
 
The second element that support the intuition that bunching represent mostly evasion responses 
is the bunching detected around the zero profit rate30 (Fig. 4.5 – 4.7, Panels B-D). Bunching at zero 
is probably due to the high prevalence of losses in taxable income (see Table A.1) and zero taxable 
income (which in turn may be partly explained by the generous deductions offered in Argentina)31. 
                                                          
27 No evidence is found for eligible (small firms) nor for large firms. See Figures D.1 and D.2. 
28 In line with this, Carrillo et al. (2014, p.9) pointed out that the reported profit rate is one of the key characteristics 
that the tax authority considers when determining whether to audit.  
29 Indeed, as Dekker et al. (2016, p.18) explained, “when pooling data, we observe some firms more than once; as a 
result, we attribute bunching behavior to those firms in every period, although the behavioral decision is made only 
once”. 
30 In 1997 and 1998, there is no bunching around zero because no firms are reporting zero taxable income. Indeed, the 
tax returns of the CIT only allowed to report positive or negative taxable income, and this form of reporting only changed 
in 2001.  
31 In Argentina, firms can deduct for loss carry-forward, donations, differences in amortization, salaries to directors, 
expenditure of representation, contribution to private pension plans, etc.  in accordance with the Law on Corporate 
Income Tax 649/97 (III, art.87). 
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This is quite common in developing countries. For example, Lediga et al. (2016) found bunching at 
zero income for small firms in South-Africa, due to loss carry-forward provisions. Another 
explanation is a response to tax incentives: the policy gives an incentive to under-report turnover, 
which in turn results in zero taxable income and hence a zero profit rate. Lastly, bunching at zero 
profit rate is driven mostly by medium firms (see Fig. 4.7 and Table 4.3, column (3))32.  
 
Finally, what are the insights that are provided by the reforms? Actually, they do not reveal 
much. First, the reform of December 1998 (∆𝜏𝜋 > 0) slightly decreased the kink point from 0.1 to 
0.09. In Figure 4.5 (Panel A) the distribution does not move substantially. Also, the overlap of the 
effects of this reform with those of the introduction of the SR in November 1998 makes it difficult 
to distinguish any pattern in the data. Second, the reform of July 2004 (∆𝜏𝑦 > 0) increased the 
turnover tax rate of the highest categories in the SR. Because the turnover tax rate of the lowest 
category is used, the kink point is not affected. Finally, the third reform of December 2009 (∆𝜏𝑦 <
0) reduces the kink point from 0.09 to 0.05. In Figure 4.5 (Panel D) bunching remains on the right 
of the kink which suggests that firms are not responding to this last reform. Nevertheless, a broad 
overlook to the data (Table A.3) shows that the number of firms and subsequently the amount of 
turnover and taxable income decreased dramatically in the years after 1998. This effect is detected 
specially among medium and large firms, because small firms follow the contrary path. On the 
other side, in the years following the tax reforms of 2004 and 2009 the number of firms, turnover 
and taxable income decreased only among small firms.  
 
 
                                                          
32 No evidence is found for eligible (small firms), see Fig. D.1. For large firms, evidence is not consistent, see Fig. 
D.2. 
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Figure 4.5: Dynamics of bunching, all firms 
 
 
Notes: Figure 4.5 shows the empirical Kernel density distribution of the profit rate (reported taxable income as a fraction of turnover) for 
all firms in 1997, 1998, 1999/2003, 2004/2009 and 2010/2011. The green solid line shows the profit rates calculated using 𝜏𝑦(min) and 
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Figure 4.6: Dynamics of bunching, non-eligible firms 
 
 
Notes: Figure 4.6 shows the empirical Kernel density distribution of the profit rate (reported taxable income as a fraction of turnover) for 
non-eligible firms in 1997, 1998, 1999/2003, 2004/2009 and 2010/2011. The green solid line shows the profit rates calculated using 
𝜏𝑦(min) and 𝜏𝜋: 1998(0.1), 1999/2003(0.09), 2004/2009(0.09) and 2010/2011(0.05), and the zero profit rate is marked by a dotted line. 
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Figure 4.7: Dynamics of bunching, medium firms 
 
 
Notes: Figure 4.7 shows the empirical Kernel density distribution of the profit rate (reported taxable income as a fraction of turnover) for 
medium firms in 1997, 1998, 1999/2003, 2004/2009 and 2010/2011. The green solid line shows the profit rates calculated using 𝜏𝑦(min) 
and 𝜏𝜋: 1998(0.1), 1999/2003(0.09), 2004/2009(0.09) and 2010/2011(0.05), and the zero profit rate is marked by a dotted line. 
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Table 4.3: Bunching estimates at zero a 
 
Years 
Bandwidth All Non eligible Medium 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
Panel A: Bunching evidence 
1999/2003 0.02 
0.97*** 0.95*** 0.94*** 
(0.03) (0.05) (0.05) 
2004/2009 0.02 
1.00*** 1.00*** 1.00 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
2010/2011 0.02 
0.99*** 0.99*** 1.00 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.00) 
Panel B: Sensitivity analysis with bandwidth 
1999/2003 0.01 
1.00*** 1.00*** 1.00*** 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
2004/2009 0.01 
1.00 1.00 1.00 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
2010/2011 0.01 
1.00 1.00 1.00 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
1999/2003 0.03 
0.93*** 0.87*** 0.87*** 
(0.05) (0.07) (0.08) 
2004/2009 0.03 
1.00*** 0.99*** 1.00*** 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
2010/2011 0.03 
0.99*** 0.99*** 1.00*** 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) 
 
Notes: Table 4.3 shows bunching estimates at zero detected in Figures 4.5 – 4.7. Standard errors are in parentheses; all are computed 
using the delta method. Significance levels are *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
a  All firms (thresholds[1 − 17]), non-eligible firms (thresholds[3 − 17]) and medium firms (thresholds[3 − 15]). 
b Note that in 1997 and 1998, there is no bunching around zero because no firms are reporting zero taxable income. 
 
4.5.3 Robustness checks 
 
Figure 4.8 shows that at the beginning of the period under study (in 1998), firms bunch below 
the kink point 𝜏𝑦(𝑚𝑖𝑛. ) 𝜏𝜋⁄ , in 1999/2003 the bunch is placed around the kink point, in 2004/2009 
exactly at the kink point and in 2010/2011 above it. This is so for non-eligible firms (Figure 4.9) 
and medium firms (Figure 4.10)33. The finding that bunching becomes more centered on the kink 
point 0.09 over time may indicate that firms slowly adapt their real output behavior and provides 
compelling evidence that firms learn over time. Bunching translates graphically not into a clear 
spike at the kink point but instead into a diffuse mass around it. In other words, there is asymmetric 
bunching which is sometimes below the kink, other times at the kink and others above it.  
 
                                                          
33 This result is not observed for eligible (small) firms nor for large firms, see Fig. E.1 and E.2. 
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Moreover, Table 4.4 shows that bunching is predominantly around 0.09, which provides strong 
evidence that firms respond to the tax structure. Indeed, it is difficult to see a reason for firms to 
cluster around a profit rate of 0.09 other than the presence of the SR. An argument in the empirical 
bunching literature that can shed light on these findings is the ‘reference-point’. Kleven (2016, 
p.23) pointed out that the creation of a threshold which separates both regimes makes firms 
consider the 0.09 threshold as a reference point introduced by the policy. For example, Mosberger 
(2016) explained the Hungarian asymmetric bunching with this reasoning, arguing that, in 
countries where the tax authority is not credible, firms bunch above the threshold to avoid being 
audited34.  
 
To conclude this section, three main findings are worth pointing out. First, results show 
bunching around the kink point specially among medium firms, which confirms that the policy 
indirectly affects firms in the GR. Second, there is a slight bunching around zero and sharp 
bunching in 1997 and 1998, both results suggest that bunching is mostly due to evasion responses 
rather than real output responses. Finally, consistent with our original hypothesis, I observe an 
asymmetric bunching around a profit rate of 0.09 which provides strong evidence that firms 
respond to the policy. Unfortunately, the lack of data prevents from continuing with the analysis 




                                                          
34 This line of argumentation supports the idea of Castro and Scartascini (2015) that suggested that the level of 
compliance also depends on individual’s subjective beliefs about the levels of enforcement and penalties, the behavior of 
other taxpayers, etc. 
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Figure 4.8: Robustness checks, all firms  
 
 
Notes: Figure 4.8 shows the empirical Kernel density distribution of the profit rate (reported taxable income as a fraction of turnover) for 
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Figure 4.9: Robustness checks, non-eligible firms  
 
 
Notes: Figure 4.9 shows the empirical Kernel density distribution of the profit rate (reported taxable income as a fraction of turnover) for 
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Notes: Figure 4.10 shows the empirical Kernel density distribution of the profit rate (reported taxable income as a fraction of turnover) 
for medium firms in each time period. The kinks are at a profit rate: 0.1 (in 1998), 0.09 (in 1999/2003), 0.09 (in 2004/2009) and 0.05 (in 
2010/2011). 
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Table 4.4: Bunching estimates at 0.09 a 
 
Years Kink Bandwidth 
All Non eligible Medium 
(1) (2) (3) 
1997 0.09 0.01 
-0.67** -0.59* -0.59* 
(0.25) (0.29) (0.29) 
1998 0.09 0.01 
-0.53 -0.53 -0.53 
(0.34) (0.38) (0.38) 
1999/2003 0.09 0.01 
0.19 0.38** 0.38** 
(0.16) (0.16) (0.17) 
2004/2009 0.09 0.01 
0.43*** 0.43*** 0.43*** 
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12) 
2010/2011 0.09 0.01 
0.48** 0.48** 0.49** 
(0.21) (0.21) (0.22) 
 
Notes: Table 4.4 shows bunching estimates at 0.09 profit rate detected in Figures 4.8 – 4.10. Standard errors are in parentheses; all are 
computed using the delta method. Significance levels are *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
a  All firms (thresholds[1 − 17]), non-eligible firms (thresholds[3 − 17]) and medium firms (thresholds[3 − 15]). 





In this last section, I present some general information about the SR that I unfortunately did not 
have access to. As mentioned earlier, the policy had two motivations: to fight informality and to 
reduce evasion. It seems that these became the main concerns of the Argentinean tax administration 
because informality and the number of self-employed individuals increased sharply in the 1970s. 
Small firms are often associated with subsistence and home-based entrepreneurship, as well as low 
education levels. These firms cover a significant part of all salaried employment. For instance, in 
2011, firms of up to 5 employees contributed to 19% of the total employment, and firms of 6 to 25 
employees contributed to another 19% (Van Elk and Kok 2014, p.47). In addition, the tax 
administration reports (AFIP, 2006) refer to the existence of ‘involuntary informality’ as a result of 
a complex tax system and high administrative costs35. Unsurprisingly, there are few studies about 
tax evasion in Argentina due to the limited data availability. The study of Gómez and Jiménez 
(2011, p.29) estimated a tax evasion rate of 21.2% for VAT in 2006 and of 49.7% for income tax in 
2005. Since its implementation, the SR was successful in attracting taxpayers, as shown in Fig. 
4.11: the number of active taxpayers registered in the regime continuously increased and it almost 
quadrupled in the period under study, from 642 167 in 1998 to 2 371 469 in 2011.   
 
                                                          
35 According to “Doing business 2014” (World Bank), Argentina is ranked on the 126 position over 189 countries in 
the ease of registering a business. Source: http://www.doingbusiness.org/en/data/exploreeconomies/argentina# 
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Figure 4.11: Active taxpayers in the simplified regime 
 
Source: Based on ILO (2013, p.41) 
 
More importantly, the ILO reports (ILO 2013, p.42) showed that the majority of active 
taxpayers in the SR are from the service and commercial sectors. For example, in 1999, 40.7% of 
the total number of the registered taxpayers was from the service sector and 34.2% was from the 
commercial sector. In 2005, the percentages had increased to 67.4% and 28.7%, and in 2013 they 
had decreased slightly to 61.9% and 18.6%, respectively. Conversely, the minority of registered 
taxpayers are from the industrial and farming sectors. This is likely due to the fact that these sectors 
engage in trade with firms registered in the GR, which have a disincentive to carry out transactions 
with taxpayers in the SR, because deducting VAT credits from purchases is not possible in that 
case.  
 
Furthermore, the reports of the tax administration (AFIP, 2006) showed that, in February 1999 
(four months after the implementation of the policy), there were nearly 777 605 taxpayers which 
had registered in the regime and that, by the end of 1999, the number increased to almost one 
million taxpayers. According to the reports, 90% of those newcomers were classified in the lowest 
categories and around 2% in the highest categories. The ILO (2013, p.43) highlighted that such 
numbers continued until 2013: 46% of taxpayers were from the lowest category in 2005 and 54.7% 
in 2013; whereas only 0.2% of the taxpayers were from the highest category. The agglomeration of 
taxpayers in the lowest categories of the SR confirms the hypothesis that there exist “icebergs” in 
the SR, i.e. firms who under-report turnover in order to be classified in the lowest categories. As a 
consequence, there are frequent re-categorizations towards higher categories, as can be observed in 
Fig. 4.12, 79.8% of firms were re-categorized to a higher category in 2005, 82.3% in 2006, 86.7% 
in 2007, 87.6% in 2008 and 79% in 2009. By contrast, 17.9% of firms were re-categorized to a 
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2014:39). Also, the reports confirmed that 95.1% of firms registered in 1998 in the SR were from 
the GR, while only 4.9% were informal firms. Of these 95.1%, 83.8% were “icebergs” in the GR, 
while only 16.2% were fully taxpayers. Finally, in 2006, 11.4% of taxpayers registered in the 
income tax moved to the SR, yet surprisingly their participation in the income tax revenue was only 
0.8%36 (Van Elk and Kok 2014, p.50).  
 
Figure 4.12: Re-categorization in the Simplified Tax Regime 
 
Notes: Dark blue corresponds to a re-categorization to a lower category, yellow corresponds to a move from the SR to the VAT, red 
corresponds to a move from the SR to a sub-regime of the SR for eventual taxpayers and grey corresponds to a re-categorization to a 
higher category.  Source: Report (AFIP June 2006, p.14) 
 
Consequently, despite the high number of active taxpayers in the SR, the tax revenue collected 
is minimal37 (see Table A.1). This is probably because of the elevated evasion in the regime and 
because it concerns mostly small taxpayers with very low income. The tax administration reports 
(AFIP, 2006) also suggested that the amount of payments in the SR steadily decreased until 2002 
and started increasing only after 2004. Furthermore, many features affect the revenue collected 
through the SR, such as the economic cycle, the inflation and the degree of development. The 
reports (AFIP, 2006, p.10) estimated a coefficient of correlation between the amount of payments 
and the real GDP of 0.84 and between the tax revenue and the real GDP of 0.83 for 1998-2006. 
Inflation also affects the SR through prices and wages. For this reason, the ILO (2014) suggested 
that the scarcity of information about the SR may be due to its instability, (the single tax was 
continuously updated by the tax administration). Moreover, the ILO (2013) indicated that the cities 
with high HDI and less informality have a higher number of firms registered in the simplified 
regime.  
 
                                                          
36 For the VAT, Van Elk and Kok (2014, p.50) indicate that only 2.5% of taxpayers registered in the VAT moved to 
the SR, their payments were only 0.1% of the VAT revenue and 61.1% did not register any payment in 2006. 
37 70% of the revenue collected from the SR is destined to the ANSES (National Administration of Social Security) 
and 30% is set aside for provincial jurisdictions according to the partnership’s tax regime (Van Elk and Kok 2014, p.47). 
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Finally, the reports of the ILO (2013, 2014) raised a crucial issue about this policy in Argentina 
with further strengthens our findings. The SR stopped being a “transitory regime” towards 
formality, a short-term policy implemented to motivate a ‘smoother’ transition of informal firms to 
formality. Indeed, the weak entry barriers of the SR became strong exit barriers. As the ILO (2013, 
2014) claimed, the SR became a "trap" where small taxpayers are encouraged to remain 
indefinitely small in order to take advantage of the regime, although most of them have the 
capacity to register in the GR. In other words, the SR becomes a shelter for “icebergs”, impeding 
their transition to the GR. Thus, the SR is harmful to both tax revenue and production efficiency 
because it decreases the revenue that can be collected by the GR and gives incentives to firms in 
both regimes to under-report turnover. The ILO (2013, 2014) rightly argues that the SR should be 






In this study I analyzed the trade-off between production and revenue efficiency faced by 
governments in developing countries. In order to do so, I selected a production inefficient policy, 
the simplified regime, applied in all Latin America. Under this regime, firms are taxed based on 
their turnover and have access to social security benefits. I drew upon Best et al. (2014), who 
model the trade-off in the presence of evasion, and I introduced turnover evasion to better 
approximate the economic reality in Argentina. The optimality conditions suggest that, in countries 
with limited tax capacity, it may be desirable to deviate from full production efficiency in order to 
reduce evasion. I analyzed this empirically using the bunching approach, relying on the idea that 
firms are taxed either on their profits or on their turnover depending on which tax liability is larger. 
Results are not as robust as I hoped, due to the two limitations of the data. However, they do 
provide bunching evidence and help to shed light on the corporate tax situation in Argentina, which 
will be helpful for future research.  
 
The objective of this study was to analyze empirically the trade-off between revenue and 
production efficiency in the choice of tax instruments in a developing country. Is there indeed any 
trade-off between revenue and production efficiency in the SR of Argentina? Theoretically, the 
regime should reduce the number of “ghosts” and “icebergs”, and hence increase revenue 
efficiency (welfare gain) while reducing production efficiency (welfare loss). However, in practice 
these results are not so clear. In fact, I showed that turnover evasion played a crucial role in 
explaining the results. It is not so obvious that the SR increases compliance at the expense of 
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production efficiency, so that the trade-off in Argentina is not as clear as in the case of Pakistan 
analyzed by Best et al. (2014). All in all, the asymmetric bunching observed among firms in the 
GR suggests that the policy might indirectly affect the real and compliance behavior of firms in the 
GR by giving them an additional incentive to evade taxation. 





[1] ABRAMOVSKY, L., KLEMM, A. and PHILLIPS, D. (2014), “Corporate Tax in 
developing countries: current trends and design issues”, Institute for Fiscal Studies, 
559-588. 
[2] BESLEY, T. and PERSSON, T. (2013): “Taxation and Development”, CEPR 
Discussion Papers 9307, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. 
[3] BEST, M., SPINNEWIJN, J., KLEVEN, H. and WASEEM, M. (2014), “Production 
vs Revenue Efficiency with Limited Tax Capacity: Theory and Evidence From 
Pakistan”, Journal of Political Economy 124. 
[4] BOADWAY, R. and SATO, M. (2009), “Optimal Tax Design and Enforcement with 
an Informal Sector”, American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, Vol. 1, Nº. 1, 1-
27. 
[5] CARRILLO, P., POMERANZ, D. and SINGHAL, M. (2014), “Tax Me if Your Can: 
Evidence on Firm Misreporting Behavior and Evasion Substitution”, Working Paper, 
Harvard University. 
[6] CASTRO, L. and SCARTASCINI, C. (2015), “Tax compliance and enforcement in 
the pampas evidence from a field experiment”, Journal of Economic Behavior & 
Organization, 116, 65-82. 
[7] CHETTY, R., FRIEDMAN, J., OLSEN, T. and PISTAFERRI, L. (2011), 
“Adjustment Costs, Firm Responses, and Micro vs. Macro Labor Supply Elasticities: 
Evidence from Danish Tax Records”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 126, 749-
804. 
[8] DEKKER, V., STROHMAIER, K. and BOSCH, N. (2016). A Data-Driven 
Procedure to Determine the Bunching Window-An Application for the Netherlands, 
Hohenheim Discussion Papers in Business, Economics and Social Sciences, 
Discussion Paper Nº 05.2016. 
[9] DEVEREUX, M., LIU, L. and LORETZ, S. (2012), “The Elasticity of Corporate 
Taxable Income: New Evidence from UK Tax Records”, American Economics 
Journal: Economic Policy, 6, 19-53. 
[10] DHARMAPALA, D., SLEMROD, J. and DOUGLAS, J. (2011), “Tax policy and the 
missing middle: Optimal tax remittance with firm-level administrative costs”, 
Journal of Public Economics 95, 1036-1047. 
Chapter 4: Evasion vs. Real production Responses to Taxation among Firms 
148 
 
[11] DIAMOND, P. and MIRRLEES, J. (1971), “Optimal taxation and public production 
I: Production efficiency”, American Economic Review, 61(1), 8-27. 
[12] EMRAN, S. and STIGLITZ, J. (2005), “On selective indirect tax reform in 
developing countries”, Journal of Public Economics 89, 599-623. 
[13] Federal Administration of Public Revenue (AFIP), Report June 2006, “Régimen 
Simplificado para Pequeños Contribuyentes”. 
[14] Federal Administration of Public Revenue (AFIP), Report November 2006, 
“Evolución de los Regímenes Simplificados para Pequeños Contribuyentes en la 
República de Argentina”. 
[15] GÓMEZ, J. and JIMÉNEZ, J.P. (2011), “Estructura tributaria y evasión impositiva 
en América Latina”, Corporación Andina de Fomento, Documento de Trabajo Nº 
2011/08. 
[16] GORDON, R. and LI, W. (2009), “Tax structure in developing countries: Many 
puzzles and a possible explanation”, NBER Working Paper Series, Nº 11267.   
[17] International Centre for Tax and Development (ICTD): “ICTD Government Revenue 
Dataset” (ICTD GRD, 2014), http://www.ictd.ac/en/about-ictd-government-revenue-
dataset 
[18] International Labour Organization (2013), Desempeño del Monotributo en la 
formalización del empleo y la ampliación de la protección social, Nº4 Documento de 
Trabajo.  
[19] International Labour Organization (2014), Monotributo en América Latina: Los 
casos de Argentina, Brasil y Uruguay, FORLAC.  
[20] International Tax Dialogue (2007), “Small and Medium Enterprises”-Argentina, 
October 2007, IMF. 
[21] KANBUR, R. and KEEN, M. (2014), “Thresholds, informality and partitions of 
compliance”, International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, Vol. 21 (4), 536-559. 
[22] KEEN, M. (2007), “VAT, tariffs and withholding: border taxes and informality in 
developing countries”, IMF Working Paper, WP/07/174. 
[23]   (2012), “Taxation and Development-Again”, IMF Working Paper, WP/12/220. 
[24] KLEVEN, H. (2016), “Bunching”, Annual Review of Economics, 8. 
[25] KLEVEN, H. and WASEEM, M. (2013), “Using notches to uncover optimization 
frictions and structural elasticities: theory and evidence from Pakistan”, The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 128 (2). 
Essays on Behavioral Responses to Taxation 
149 
 
[26] KLEVEN, H., KHAN, A. and KAUL, U. (2016), “Taxing to develop: When ‘third-
best’ is best”, International Growth Centre (IGC), April 2016. 
[27] KLEVEN, H., KNUDSEN, M., THUSTRUP, C., PEDERSEN, S. and SAEZ, E. 
(2011), “Unwilling or unable to cheat? Evidence from a tax audit experiment in 
Denmark”, Econometrica, Vol.79, Nº3, pp.651-692. 
[28] KOPZUK, W. and SLEMROD, J. (2006), “Putting firms into Optimal Tax Theory”, 
American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, 96 (2), 130-134. 
[29] Laws No. 24977, 25865, 26565 and 649/97. Boletín Oficial de la República 
Argentina, June 1998, Dec. 2003 and Nov. 2009. 
[30] LEDIGA, C., RIEDEL, N. and STROHMAIER, K. (2016), “Corporate Taxes and 
Firm Behavior-Evidence from South Africa”, Working Paper. 
[31] MOSBERGER, P. (2016), “Essays on responses to taxation”, Working Paper. 
[32] SAEZ, E. (1999), “Do Taxpayers Bunch at Kink Points?”, National Bureau of 
Economic Research, Working Paper 7366. 
[33]   (2010), “Do Taxpayers Bunch at Kink Points?”, American Economic Journal, 
180-212. 
[34] SCHNEIDER, F., BUEHN, A. and MONTENEGRO, C. (2010), “Shadow 
Economies All over the World: New Estimates for 162 Countries from 1999 to 
2007”, Policy Research Working Paper 5356, World Bank. 
[35] VAN ELK, K. and KOLK, J. (2014), “Enterprise formalization: fact or fiction (A 
quest for case studies), ILO, GIZ and BMZ. 
[36] WASEEM, M. (2013), “Taxes, Informality and Income Shifting: Evidence from a 
Recent Pakistani Tax Reform”, Working Paper. 
Chapter 4: Evasion vs. Real production Responses to Taxation among Firms 
150 
 
Supplemental material Chapter 4 
 
4.A Descriptive statistics 
 
Table A.1: Summary statistics 
  1997 1998 1999 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Panel A: Tax Variables                             
Profit Tax Rate 0.33 0.33 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 
Turnover Tax Rate (Min.) - 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 
CIT Revenue (%GDP) 2.85 3.18 3.26 3.67 2.85 3.92 4.98 5.27 5.14 5.28 5.17 4.85 5.31 5.9 
Total Tax revenue (%GDP) 13.37 13.72 14.10 13.38 11.49 13.65 16.08 16.29 16.22 16.88 16.67 16.47 17.51 18.27 
SR Revenue (%GDP) - - 0.14 0.12 0.07 0.08 0.11 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.16 
SR Revenue (%TotGovRev) - - 0.81 0.72 0.44 0.39 0.51 0.63 0.58 0.53 0.50 0.51 0.51 0.55 
Panel B: Firm Characteristics (Mean) 
Taxable Income (thousands, pesos) 262 269 232 274 1 382 513 432 487 541 696 842 852 1 032 1 271 
Profits (thousands, pesos) 769 890 735 803 1 408 1 316 1 322 1 553 1 737 2 204 2 502 2 638 3 266 4 148 
Turnover (thousands, pesos) 2 632 2 968 2 413 2 554 4 210 4 370 4 271 5 010 5 637 7 334 8 550 8 604 10 589 13 716 
Total number of firms  105 721 102 617 104 193 103 706 93 661 92 699 132 032 133 639 152 429 140 135 159 995 172 385 176 387 182 577 
Firms reporting gains 59 791 58 220 56 097 54 139 43 437 49 797 71 380 78 551 94 244 93 735 109 498 115 477 123 878 133 746 
Firms reporting losses 1 704 1 881 2 257 2 334 36 242 27 458 34 297 30 591 32 203 26 132 29 640 36 471 30 829 28 297 
Observations 61 495 60 101 58 354 56 473 93 661 92 699 132 032 133 639 152 429 140 135 159 995 172 385 176 387 182 577 
 
Notes: Table A.1 presents descriptive statistics, focusing on tax variables (panel A) and firm characteristics (panel B) from the GR. Sources: Argentinean Laws No. 24977, 25865, 26565, Federal 
Administration of Public Revenue, Dataset (AFIP) and ILO (2014, p.42). 
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Table A.2: Classification of firms in the general regime 
 
Threshold Reported turnover (annual, pesos) Size Eligibility 
1º 1 100 000 
Small firms Eligible firms 
2º 100 001 200 000 
3º 200 001 300 000 
Medium firms 
Non eligible firms 
4º 300 001 500 000 
5º 500 001 1 000 000 
6º 1 000 001 2 000 000 
7º 2 000 001 3 000 000 
8º 3 000 001 5 000 000 
9º 5 000 001 10 000 000 
10º 10 000 001 20 000 000 
11º 20 000 001 30 000 000 
12º 30 000 001 50 000 000 
13º 50 000 001 100 000 000 
14º 100 000 001 200 000 000 
15º 200 000 001 300 000 000 
16º 300 000 001 500 000 000 
Large firms 
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Table A.3: Growth rates  
 
Firm's size Tax thresholds 1997/1998 1998/1999 2004/2005 2009/2010 2010/2011 
Panel A: Number of firms  
Small 1 to 2 -8% 7% -8% -8% -12% 
Medium 3 to 15 0% -7% 7% 6% 8% 
Large 16 to 17 18% -6% 15% 27% 34% 
Total 1 to 17 -2% -3% 1% 2% 4% 
Panel B: Amount of reported turnover 
Small 1 to 2 -14% 18% -14% -14% -21% 
Medium 3 to 15 6% -15% 25% 25% 39% 
Large 16 to 17 24% -38% 48% 73% 93% 
Total 1 to 17 4% -13% 23% 26% 42% 
Panel C: Amount of reported taxable income 
Small 1 to 2 -6% 13% -15% -17% -12% 
Medium 3 to 15 2% -22% 26% 25% 47% 
Large 16 to 17 9% -20% 38% 69% 73% 
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4.B Identification checks 
 
Figure B.1: Identification check, calculated profit 
 
Notes: Fig. B.1 shows the empirical Kernel density distribution of the profit rate (calculated profit as a fraction of turnover) for all firms 
and different time periods. The calculated profit is the reported turnover minus the reported costs. The zero profit rate is marked by a 
dotted red line. The green solid line shows the kink points calculated using 𝜏𝑦(min) and 𝜏𝜋: 1998(0.1), 1999/2003(0.09), 
2004/2009(0.09) and 2010/2011(0.05). The blue solid line shows the kink points calculated using 𝑡𝑦(𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙,min) and 𝜏𝜋: 1998(0.2), 
1999/2003(0.18), 2004/2009(0.25) and 2010/2011(0.31). 
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Figure B.2: Identification check, reported profit 
 
 
Notes: Fig. B.2 shows the empirical Kernel density distribution of the profit rate (reported profit as a fraction of turnover). The zero 
profit rate is marked by a dotted red line. The green solid line shows the kink points calculated using 𝜏𝑦(min) and 𝜏𝜋: 1998(0.1), 
1999/2003(0.09), 2004/2009(0.09) and 2010/2011(0.05). The blue solid line shows the kink points calculated using 𝑡𝑦(𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙,min) and 
𝜏𝜋: 1998(0.2), 1999/2003(0.18), 2004/2009(0.25) and 2010/2011(0.31).  
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4.C Additional evidence: Bunching by size and eligibility  
 
Figure C.1: Bunching evidence, small or eligible firms 
 
 
Notes: Figure C.1 shows the empirical Kernel density distribution of the profit rate (reported taxable income as a fraction of turnover) 
for small firms. The green solid line shows the kink points calculated using 𝜏𝑦(min) and 𝜏𝜋: 1998(0.1), 1999/2003(0.09), 
2004/2009(0.09) and 2010/2011(0.05). The zero profit rate is marked by a dotted red line. 
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Figure C.2: Bunching evidence, large firms 
 
Notes: Figure C.2 shows the empirical Kernel density distribution of the profit rate (reported taxable income as a fraction of turnover) 
for large firms. The green solid line shows the kink points calculated using 𝜏𝑦(min) and 𝜏𝜋: 1998(0.1), 1999/2003(0.09), 
2004/2009(0.09) and 2010/2011(0.05). The zero profit rate is marked by a dotted red line. 
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4.D Additional evidence: Dynamics of bunching  
 
 Figure D.1: Dynamics of bunching, small firms 
 
Notes: Figure D.1 shows the empirical Kernel density distribution of the profit rate (reported taxable income as a fraction of turnover) 
for small firms in 1997, 1998, 1999/2003, 2004/2009 and 2010/2011. The green solid line shows the profit rates calculated using 
𝜏𝑦(min) and 𝜏𝜋: 1998(0.1), 1999/2003(0.09), 2004/2009(0.09) and 2010/2011(0.05), and the zero profit rate is marked by a dotted line. 
 
 
Chapter 4: Evasion vs. Real production Responses to Taxation among Firms 
158 
 
Figure D.2: Dynamics of bunching, large firms 
 
 
Notes: Figure D.1 shows the empirical Kernel density distribution of the profit rate (reported taxable income as a fraction of turnover) 
for large firms in 1997, 1998, 1999/2003, 2004/2009 and 2010/2011. The green solid line shows the profit rates calculated using 
𝜏𝑦(min) and 𝜏𝜋: 1998(0.1), 1999/2003(0.09), 2004/2009(0.09) and 2010/2011(0.05), and the zero profit rate is marked by a dotted line. 
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4.E Additional evidence: Robustness checks 
 
Figure E.1: Robustness checks, small firms 
 
 
Notes: Figure E.1 shows the empirical Kernel density distribution of the profit rate (reported taxable income as a fraction of turnover) 
for small firms in each time period. The kinks are at a profit rate: 0.1 (in 1998), 0.09 (in 1999/2003), 0.09 (in 2004/2009) and 0,05 (in 
2010/2011). 
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Figure E.2: Robustness checks, large firms 
 
 
Notes: Figure E.2 shows the empirical Kernel density distribution of the profit rate (reported taxable income as a fraction of turnover) 
for large firms in each time period. The kinks are at a profit rate: 0.1 (in 1998), 0.09 (in 1999/2003), 0.09 (in 2004/2009) and 0,05 (in 
2010/2011). 













Governments increase tax revenue to finance public goods and to redistribute income. In 
developing countries, this requirement is indispensable for development and poverty reduction. 
However, tax policies have important effects on distribution and efficiency. Taxes alter households’ 
and firms’ economic decisions, which result in a less efficient allocation of resources (Dahlby 2008). 
Therefore, a central concern facing any government is how to increase public spending through 
taxation without generating substantial social costs (Feldstein 1996). To address this, public finance 
economists have focused their attention on studying the behavior of economic agents with respect to 
taxes. After all, the design of more efficient tax systems requires to know: (i) Do economic agents 
respond to taxation? (ii) Who are the most responsive? (iii) How do they respond, through which 
channels (i.e. the anatomy of the responses)? (iv) When do they respond most, at the short-, medium-
, or long-run (i.e. the timing of the responses)? The present thesis has been entirely devoted to 
answering to these questions. 
 
Chapter 2 estimates the ETI with respect to the net-of-tax rate in Spain, by using tax return 
microdata from 2010-2014 and the bunching approach. It shows that Spanish taxpayers are sensitive 
to taxes and to tax modifications. As a matter of fact, the speed of reaction raises the possibility of 
compliance responses being more important than real supply responses. In addition, this chapter 
identifies and classifies for the first time five different forms of bunching: bunching-holes, holes, 
agglomerations, interior bunching and asymmetric bunching. This indicates that individuals’ 
decisions may be influenced by optimization frictions, psychological components and adjustment 
costs. Furthermore, the identification of bunchers suggests that married couples, taxpayers filing 
separately and wage earners are the most responsive groups in the Spanish population. Surprisingly, 
I find that having a child make women less sensitive to taxation. Further exploration of the anatomy 
of responses reveal that bunching is caused by itemized deductions. In particular, for married couples, 
for men and for wage earners the contribution to pension schemes seems to be the main channel 
through which taxable income is adjusted. Overall, the empirical results show that Spanish taxpayers 
respond to taxation and adjust their taxable income through itemized deductions.  
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Chapter 3 assesses the impact of the 2011 PIT reform on tax revenue, welfare and efficiency. 
Using the Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) method and a panel of tax returns from 2009 to 2014, 
this chapter rises four main results. First, the elasticity estimates suggest that women are more 
sensitive to marginal tax rate changes than men. Second, the welfare cost of raising an extra euro of 
tax revenue is found to be well in excess of a euro, especially in the year immediate to the tax reform. 
Third, results reveal important differences on efficiency costs depending on individuals’ socio-
economic characteristics. In particular, it is more expensive to rise an additional euro of tax revenue 
in Catalonia than in Madrid and among self-employed individuals than among wage earners. Fourth, 
findings show that tax revenue losses get smaller when income shifting possibilities are introduced 
into the analysis. This empirical application makes evident the crucial role played by the ETI and 
income shifting responses in the evaluation of tax reforms. Accordingly, from an applied point of 
view, these results are extremely useful as they shed lights on the design of tax policies and tax 
revenue forecasting. 
 
Chapter 4 analyzes empirically the trade-off between revenue and production efficiency in the 
choice of tax instruments in a developing country. This study exploits the introduction of a Simplified 
Tax Regime in Argentina based on the bunching approach and on administrative tax data for the 
period 1997-2011. Results reveal that firms respond to the taxation component of the policy. In 
particular, this chapter shows that the policy provides small and medium firms with an additional 
incentive to reduce their turnover (“legally” or “illegally”) and to move towards the Simplified Tax 
Regime. The contributions of this study to the literature are threefold. First, it provides direct 
empirical evidence on firms’ margin responses to a widespread and questionable policy in Latin 
America with scarce quantitative evidence. Second, it contributes to the nascent literature that uses 
the bunching approach to estimate firm responses to tax changes. Third, it contributes to the analysis 
of the relation between informal firms, evasion and taxation in developing countries.  
 
On the whole, this thesis answers to the aforementioned requirements needed for the design of 
more efficient tax systems. (i) Do economic agents respond to taxation? For two different 
environments, Chapters 2 and 4 confirm that Spanish individuals and Argentinean firms respond to 
tax modifications. (ii) Who are the most responsive? For the Spanish population, Chapter 2 identifies 
that the most sensitive groups are married couples, taxpayers filing separately, wage earners, and 
men and women depending on the type of household. For the Argentinean context, Chapter 4 
identifies medium firms as the most responsive group. (iii) How do they respond, through which 
channels (i.e. the anatomy of the responses)? Chapter 2 raises the possibility of itemized deductions; 
in particular, the deductions to pension plan contributions, as a channel used by men, married couples 
and wage earners to respond to tax changes. Chapter 3 adds income shifting between tax bases as a 
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potential channel used by personal income taxpayers. With regard to firms, Chapter 4 brings up 
turnover evasion as a possible channel used by small and medium enterprises in Argentina to respond 
to tax modifications. Still, further analysis is required on this matter. (iv) When do they respond most, 
at the short-, medium-, or long-run (i.e. the timing of the responses)? It is unclear when the responses 
are more predominant. At first sight, Chapters 3 and 4 suggest that short-run responses may be 
important, but it depends on the specific context under study. Finally, the underlying motivation of 
these questions is to confirm whether behavioral responses have an effect on tax revenue, efficiency 
and welfare. On this matter, Chapter 3 uses the Spanish PIT to show that a substantial fraction of tax 
revenue is lost through behavioral responses. However, as has been demonstrated throughout this 
thesis, the magnitude of the behavioral response and therefore of the efficiency costs strongly depend 
on taxpayers’ socio-economic characteristics and on the length of the time-window over which the 
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